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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays in the area of Labor Economics.
The ﬁrst essay uses 500,000 bankruptcy ﬁlings matched to administrative tax records to es-
timate the impact of Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection on subsequent earnings and mortality.
Exploiting the random assignment of bankruptcy ﬁlings to judges, we ﬁnd that Chapter 13 pro-
tection increases annual earnings by $5,012, increases employment by 3.5 percentage points, and
decreases ﬁve-year mortality by 1.9 percentage points. We conclude by using our reduced form
estimates to calibrate a general equilibrium model of the credit market, ﬁnding that the beneﬁts of
consumer bankruptcy are an order of magnitude larger than previously estimated.
The second essay attempts to better understand why market failures may exist in subprime
credit markets. In this essay, my coauthors and I exploit sharp discontinuities in loan eligibility
to test for moral hazard and adverse selection in the payday loan market. Both regression dis-
continuity and regression kink approaches suggest that payday borrowers are less likely to default
when offered a larger loan. Conversely, there is economically and statistically signiﬁcant adverse
selection into larger payday loans when loan eligibility is held constant. Our results are therefore
consistent with the view that adverse selection alone can lead to credit constraints in equilibrium,
and that future policy should focus on resolving these types of selection problems in order to in-
crease credit supply among the poor.
The third essay asks whether high quality schools are enough to signiﬁcantly reduce social
disparities using survey data from the Promise Academy charter school. Six years after the random
admissions lottery, youth offered admission to the Promise Academy middle school score 0.283
standard deviations higher on a nationally-normed math achievement test and are 14.1 percentage
iiipoints more likely to enroll in college. Admitted females are 12.1 percentage points less likely to
be pregnant in their teens, and males are 4.3 percentage points less likely to be incarcerated. We
ﬁnd little impact of the Promise Academy on self-reported health. We conclude with speculative
evidence that high-performing schools may be sufﬁcient to signiﬁcantly improve human capital
and reduce risky behaviors among the poor.
ivTABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract........................................................................................................................................ iii
Acknowledgements....................................................................................................................... vii
1. Introduction............................................................................................................................ 1
2. Debt Relief and Debtor Outcomes: Measuring the Effects of Consumer Bankruptcy Pro-
tection..................................................................................................................................... 4
2.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Consumer Bankruptcy in the U.S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.2. Potential Beneﬁts of Bankruptcy Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3. Model and Research Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4. Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Protection and Labor Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.5.1. Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.5.2. Potential Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.6. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Protection and Mortality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.6.1. Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.6.2. Potential Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.7. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.8. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3. Information Asymmetries in Consumer Credit Markets: Evidence from Payday Lending.... 42
3.1. Data and Institutional Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2. Conceptual Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3. Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4. Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4.1. The Impact of Loan Eligibility on Loan Amount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4.2. Moral Hazard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.4.3. Adverse Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.4.4. Speciﬁcation Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.5. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4. Are High Quality Schools Enough to Reduce Social Disparities? Evidence from the
Harlem Children’s Zone......................................................................................................... 80
4.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.2. Harlem Children’s Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.3. Data and Research Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.3.1. Data and Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.3.2. Research Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.4. Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.4.1. Main Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
v4.4.2. Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.5. Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.5.1. Neighborhoods vs. Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.5.2. Test Scores and Later-Life Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.5.3. Other Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................124
viACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am deeply grateful for the exceptional guidance provided by my thesis committee: Roland Fryer,
Lawrence Katz, Ed Glaeser, and Raj Chetty. Each has provided examples of integrity, curiosity,
and dedication that I will cherish for the rest of my career. I hope this and future work is worthy of
their inspiration.
I would also like to thank my co-authors of the chapters in this dissertation, Roland Fryer,
Paige Marta Skiba, and Jae Song, for their endless patience and assistance. I am also indebted
to many others who have provided helpful feedback on parts of this thesis, including Joseph Al-
tonji, Sam Asher, Adrien Auclert, David Deming, Joseph Doyle, John Friedman, Peter Ganong,
Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham, Joshua Goodman, Adam Guren, David Laibson, Robert Lawless, Adam
Levitin, Brigitte Madrian, Neale Mahoney, Sendhil Mullainathan, Steven Shavell, Jörg Spenkuch,
Jeremy Tobacman, Danny Yagan, and Crystal Yang. I also thank Tal Gross, Matthew Notowidigdo,
and Jialan Wang for providing the bankruptcy data used in the ﬁrst essay of my thesis.
I also thank Harvard EdLabs, the Harvard Kennedy School, the Taubman Center for State
and Local Government, the National Bureau of Economic Research, the Olin Center for Law
and Economics, and the Harvard University Program in Inequality and Social Policy for ﬁnancial
support. Financial support from the Broad Foundation and the Ford Foundation is acknowledged
for the third essay.
Finally, to my parents and Crystal: thank you.
vii1. INTRODUCTION
This dissertation consists of three papers relating to the ﬁeld of Labor Economics. The ﬁrst two pa-
pers examine the subprime credit market, ﬁrst through an examination of the consumer bankruptcy
system, and second through the measurement of information asymmetries in payday lending. The
third paper estimates the impact of a high-quality charter school on non-test score outcomes such
as teen pregnancy, teen incarceration, and college enrollment. The common thread throughout this
work is a focus on the causes and consequences of poverty in America using the classic tools of the
Labor Economics literature. My work is also characterized by the use of new datasets compiled
speciﬁcally for the question at hand, and an emphasis on policy relevant questions.
The ﬁrst paper, coauthored with Jae Song at the Social Security Administration, uses 500,000
bankruptcy ﬁlings matched to administrative tax records to estimate the impact of Chapter 13
bankruptcy protection on subsequent earnings and mortality. Consumer bankruptcy is one the
largest social insurance programs in the United States, but little is known about its impact on
debtors. In this paper, we exploit the fact that most U.S. bankruptcy courts use a blind rotation sys-
tem to assign cases to judges, effectively randomizing ﬁlers to judges within each court. Moreover,
while there are uniform criteria by which a judge may dismiss a bankruptcy ﬁling, there is signif-
icant variation in the interpretation of these criteria across judges. As a result, otherwise identical
ﬁlers are assigned to judges with substantially different rates of granting bankruptcy protection.
Exploiting this random assignment of bankruptcy ﬁlings to judges, we ﬁnd that Chapter 13 pro-
tection increases annual earnings by $5,012, increases employment by 3.5 percentage points, and
decreases ﬁve-year mortality by 1.9 percentage points. We conclude by using our reduced form
estimates to calibrate a general equilibrium model of the credit market, ﬁnding that the beneﬁts of
bankruptcy are nearly 20 times larger than previously estimated. The results from this paper pro-
vide new evidence that bankruptcy is likely to beneﬁt disadvantaged households, and that recent
attempts to restrict bankruptcy ﬁling may have important adverse consequences.
The second paper, coauthored with Paige Marta Skiba at Vanderbilt University, explores the
1empirical relevance of information asymmetries in a subprime consumer lending market. Theory
has long emphasized the importance of private information in explaining credit-market failures,
yet there is little evidence of which asymmetries are most important. In this paper, we exploit
discontinuities in loan eligibility to test for moral hazard and adverse selection in the payday-loan
market. Regression-discontinuity and regression-kink approaches suggest that payday borrowers
are less likely to default on larger loans. A $50 larger payday loan leads to a 17 to 33 percent drop
in the probability of default. Conversely, there is economically and statistically signiﬁcant adverse
selection into larger payday loans when loan eligibility is held constant. Payday borrowers who
choose a $50 larger loan are 16 to 47 percent more likely to default. Given the emphasis placed
on moral hazard by policymakers and within the theoretical literature, the results of this paper are
somewhat surprising. These results also suggest that more emphasis should be placed on screen-
ing strategies or information sharing in the effort to expand credit access among disadvantaged
households.
The third paper, coauthored with Roland Fryer at Harvard University, estimates the effects of a
high-performing charter school on human capital, risky behaviors, and health outcomes using sur-
vey data from the Promise Academy in the Harlem Children’s Zone. We ﬁnd that, six years after
the random admissions lottery, youth offered admission to the Promise Academy middle school
score 0.283 standard deviations higher on a nationally-normed math achievement test and are 14.1
percentage points more likely to enroll in college. Admitted females are 12.1 percentage points
less likely to be pregnant in their teens, and males are 4.3 percentage points less likely to be incar-
cerated. We ﬁnd little impact of the Promise Academy on self-reported health. We also ﬁnd that the
cross-sectional correlation between test scores and adult outcomes may understate the true impact
of a high quality school, suggesting that high quality schools change more than cognitive ability,
and that the return on investment for high-performing charter schools could be much larger than
that implied by the short-run test score increases. Taken as a whole, our results are consistent with
those that argue that high-performing charter schools are effective at implementing educational
“best-practices” – frequent teacher feedback, data-driven instruction, an extended school day and
2year, and a relentless focus on achievement – which develop basic skills that lead to both gains on
short-run state test scores and longer-term non-tested measures.
32. DEBT RELIEF AND DEBTOR OUTCOMES: MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PROTECTION
With Jae Song, Social Security Administration
“The Bankruptcy Act is...of public as well as private interest, in that it gives to the
honest but unfortunate debtor...a new opportunity in life and a clear ﬁeld for future
effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt.”
- U.S. Supreme Court, Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934)
2.1. Introduction
In 2010, 1.5 million Americans ﬁled for over $450 billion in debt relief through the bankruptcy
system.1 American households now receive more resources through bankruptcy than from Tempo-
rary Assistance for Needy Families and state unemployment insurance programs combined (Lef-
gren, McIntyre, and Miller 2010), with nearly one in ten American households having ﬁled for
bankruptcy as of the late 1990s (Stavins 2000). The U.S. bankruptcy system is also considered
more ﬂexible than is typical, allowing debtors to choose between Chapter 7, which provides debt
relief and garnishment protection in exchange for a debtor’s non-exempt assets, and Chapter 13,
which adds asset protection in exchange for the partial repayment of debt.
Despite providing billions in debt relief each year, it is not clear how bankruptcy protection
impactsdebtors. Intheory, bankruptcyprotectionincreasesadebtor’sincentivetoworkandinsures
against any sharp drops in consumption that may have important long-term consequences, such
as becoming sick through lack of medical care or losing a home through foreclosure. Yet, in
practice, households work about the same number of hours (Han and Li 2007), accumulate less
wealth (Han and Li 2011), and have worse credit (Cohen-Cole, Duygan-Bump and Montoriol-
Garriga 2009) after receiving bankruptcy protection, leading some to conclude that the beneﬁts
1Non-business Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 ﬁling statistics are available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BAPCPA/2010/Table1A.pdf
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BAPCPA/2010/Table1D.pdf
4of debt relief have been overstated (Porter and Thorne 2006). The lack of demonstrable beneﬁts,
combined with a rapid increase in the number of ﬁlings, led Congress to pass the 2005 Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, making it more difﬁcult and expensive to ﬁle for
bankruptcy.
Empirically estimating the impact of bankruptcy protection on debtors has been complicated
by two important issues. First, there is little information on the long-term outcomes of most
bankruptcy ﬁlers. Bankruptcy ﬁlers are not tracked in a systematic way after ﬁling, and datasets
such as the PSID and NLSY only include a few hundred bankrupt households. Second, selection
and endogeneity problems bias most comparisons. Bankruptcy ﬁlers are likely to have had worse
outcomes even before ﬁling, biasing cross-sectional estimates, and the most proximate causes of
bankruptcy also impact later outcomes, biasing within-individual comparisons.
In this paper, we use a new dataset linking 500,000 bankruptcy ﬁlings with administrative tax
records from the Social Security Administration (SSA) to estimate the causal effect of Chapter
13 bankruptcy protection on subsequent earnings and mortality. Our empirical strategy exploits
the fact that most U.S. bankruptcy courts use a blind rotation system to assign cases to judges,
effectively randomizing ﬁlers to judges within each court. Moreover, while there are uniform
criteria by which a judge may dismiss a bankruptcy ﬁling, there is signiﬁcant variation in the
interpretation of these criteria across judges (Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook 1994, Norberg and
Compo 2007, Chang and Schoar 2008). As a result, otherwise identical ﬁlers are assigned to judges
with substantially different rates of granting bankruptcy protection.2
Using these differences in judge discharge rates as an instrumental variable for bankruptcy
protection, we are able to identify the ex-post impact of Chapter 13 on the marginal recipient –
ﬁlers whose bankruptcy decision is altered by the assigned judge due to disagreement on whether
or not they should receive debt relief. The identiﬁed parameter holds ﬁxed any ex-ante impacts of
2We are unable to estimate the impact of Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection using judge assignment, as there is
relatively little variation in the treatment of Chapter 7 cases. In Appendix B, we use an event study design to show
that ﬁlers granted protection under Chapter 7 earn $1,048 more each year, are 6.3 percentage points more likely to
be employed, and are 1.45 percentage points less likely to be deceased after ﬁve years, compared to ﬁlers dismissed
under Chapter 7.
5bankruptcy, such as over-borrowing, moral hazard in the workplace (White 2011), entrepreneurial
risk-taking (Fan and White 2003, Armour and Cummings 2008), or the crowding out of formal
insurance (Mahoney 2010). Our empirical strategy is therefore similar to Kling (2006), who uses
the random assignment of criminal cases to judges to estimate the ex-post impact of sentence
length on earnings, and subsequent research estimating the ex-post effects of foster care (Doyle
2007, 2008), corporate bankruptcy (Chang and Schoar 2008), temporary-help employment (Autor
and Houseman 2010), and Disability Insurance (French and Song 2011, Maestas, Mullen, and
Strand forthcoming).
In our empirical analysis, we ﬁnd compelling evidence that Chapter 13 bankruptcy beneﬁts
debtors. Over the ﬁrst ﬁve post-ﬁling years, Chapter 13 protection increases the marginal recip-
ient’s annual earnings by $5,012, a 21.7 percent increase from the pre-ﬁling mean. Employment
increases by 3.5 percentage points, a 4.2 percent increase from the pre-ﬁling mean. Chapter 13 pro-
tection also decreases ﬁve-year mortality by 1.9 percentage points, a 47.5 percent decrease from
the dismissed ﬁler mean. The effects on mortality are larger for older ﬁlers, with an estimated
impact on ﬁve-year mortality of 17.6 percentage points for ﬁlers 60 and older, compared to 2.8
percentage points for ﬁlers between 40 and 60 and 0.4 percentage points for ﬁlers between 25 and
40. All of the reported results are robust to a wide variety of speciﬁcations, and remain large and
precisely estimated up to ten years after ﬁling.
Next, we explore two possible mechanisms through which bankruptcy protection may impact
debtors. First, we exploit within- and across-state variation in wage garnishment to assess the im-
portance of the Chapter 13 provision protecting wages from garnishment. We ﬁnd that the impact
of Chapter 13 is sharply increasing in the marginal garnishment rate, with an implied earnings
elasticity with respect to garnishment of 2.756. This is consistent with the idea that bankruptcy
protection increases the incentive to work by lowering the effective marginal tax rate. Second, we
use information from ﬁrm EINs to estimate the impact of Chapter 13 on mobility. We ﬁnd that
marginal recipient of Chapter 13 is 19.6 percentage points more likely to work in his or her pre-
ﬁling job, 20.0 percentage points more likely to work in the same industry, and 16.7 percentage
6points more likely to work in the same state. The impacts on stability and mortality are both larger
in states with fewer restrictions on home foreclosure, suggesting that the home saving provisions
of the bankruptcy code are particularly important in explaining our results. These results are con-
sistent with Chapter 13 signiﬁcantly reducing the likelihood of economic instability, such as that
caused by moving to avoid creditors or after a home foreclosure.
We conclude by using our reduced form estimates to calibrate a general equilibrium model
of the credit market. The evaluation of consumer bankruptcy laws has typically involved an as-
sessment of two second-order effects. Speciﬁcally, these models assume that bankruptcy provides
partial insurance against uncertainty, but at the cost of higher borrowing costs that makes life-cycle
smoothing more difﬁcult (e.g. Athreya 2002, Li and Sarte 2006, Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt
2007, Chatterjee and Gordon forthcoming). However, the existing literature has largely ignored
the ﬁrst-order effect of bankruptcy protection on earnings that we estimate in this paper. Using our
reduced form estimates to calibrate a stylized extension of a standard model of the credit market,
we ﬁnd that the beneﬁts of bankruptcy are nearly 20 times larger than previously estimated.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of
consumer bankruptcy law in the United States. Section 3 presents a stylized model to formalize
our research design. Section 4 describes our data and provides summary statistics. Section 5
presents our earnings and employment results. Section 6 presents our mortality results. Section
7 discusses our results in light of a stylized general equilibrium model, and Section 8 concludes.
There are three Web Appendices. Web Appendix A provides additional results. Web Appendix B
presents event study estimates of the impact of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13. Web Appendix C details
the quantitative model.
2.2. Consumer Bankruptcy in the U.S.
2.2.1. Overview
Bankruptcy is the legal process to resolve unpaid debts. In the United States, individual debtors
are allowed to choose between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection.
7Under Chapter 7, debtors forfeit all non-exempt assets in exchange for a discharge of all el-
igible debts and protection from wage garnishment. Nearly all unsecured debts are eligible for
discharge under Chapter 7, including credit card debt, installment loans, medical debt, unpaid rent
and utility bills, tort judgments, and business debt. Student loans, child support obligations, and
debts incurred by fraud cannot be discharged under Chapter 7, and secured debts such as mort-
gages, home equity loans, and automobile loans can only be discharged if debtors give up the
collateral.
Under Chapter 13, ﬁlers propose a three- to ﬁve-year plan to repay part of their unsecured debt
in exchange for a discharge of any remaining eligible debts, wage garnishment protection, and
the retention of any non-exempt assets included in the repayment plan. Chapter 13 also allows
debtors to retain any assets pledged as collateral if the collateral amount is repaid in the plan.
In practice, Chapter 13 is most often used as a home saving procedure, with 71 percent of ﬁlers
including mortgage arrears in their repayment plans (White and Zhu 2010), and approximately the
same number reporting that avoiding foreclosure is their most important goal in bankruptcy (Porter
2011). In comparison, 41 percent of Chapter 13 ﬁlers include car loans in their repayment plans,
38 percent include priority debt, and 0.5 percent include student loans (White and Zhu 2010).3
Under either Chapter, a randomly assigned bankruptcy judge decides any and all matters con-
nected to a case, including whether or not to dismiss a ﬁling.4 The most common reason a ﬁling is
dismissed is that it constitutes a “substantial abuse” of the bankruptcy process, which is typically
interpreted as meaning that a debtor is able to repay his or her debts without bankruptcy protec-
tion. Other commonly cited reasons for dismissal include a repayment plan being infeasible given
a debtor’s income constraints, a repayment plan paying too little to creditors, or a ﬁling missing
3One additional difference between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 is that dismissed Chapter 7 ﬁlers are not allowed to
reﬁle under any Chapter for at least six years, while dismissed Chapter 13 ﬁlers are allowed to reﬁle for bankruptcy
after only 180 days. While almost no dismissed Chapter 13 ﬁlers reﬁle under Chapter 13, approximately 20 percent
reﬁle under Chapter 7. Dismissed Chapter 13 ﬁlers who reﬁle under Chapter 7 tend to be those with fewer assets and
higher debts.
4Procedurally, U.S. bankruptcy courts typically use a random number generator or blind rotation system to assign
ﬁlings within a court. For example, Rule 1073-1 of the bankruptcy code of the Minnesota Assignment of Cases states
“[e]ach case shall be assigned to a judge by random allocation as determined by order of the judges. Unless otherwise
ordered, the judge assigned to the case shall thereafter hear all matters and preside at all times in the case. All adversary
proceedings arising in or related to the case shall be assigned to the same judge.”
8important information (Hynes 2004).
Creditors have a number of options to collect unpaid debts after a ﬁling is dismissed, such as
sending letters or making telephone calls, visiting the debtor at home or work, or seizing assets
through the courts (Dawsey, Hynes, and Ausubel 2009). Creditors may also collect unpaid debts
by garnishing a portion of the debtor’s wages. Federal law typically restricts the weekly total of
most garnishments to be disposable earnings minus 30 times the federal minimum wage, with a
cap at 25 percent of disposable earnings.5 Debtors can make these collection efforts more difﬁcult
by ignoring collection letters and telephone calls, changing their telephone number, or moving
without leaving a forwarding address. Debtors can also leave the formal banking system to hide
their assets from seizure, or change jobs to force creditors to reinstate a garnishment order.
2.2.2. Potential Beneﬁts of Bankruptcy Protection
There are at least two theories for why debtors might beneﬁt from bankruptcy protection. First,
bankruptcy protection increases the incentive to work by protecting future wages from garnishment
that can total 25 percent of a debtor’s disposable earnings, and up to 100 percent of a debtor’s
marginal earnings. Indeed, in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt (1934), the Supreme Court argued that
increasing the incentive to work is “[o]ne of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act,” as
“[f]rom the viewpoint of the wage earner, there is little difference between not earning at all and
earning wholly for a creditor.”
The second reason debtors may beneﬁt from bankruptcy protection is a reduction in economic
instability. Bankruptcy protection discharges most debts, allows debtors to repay mortgage arrears,
and puts a hold on almost all debt collection efforts. As a result, debtors are less likely to be forced
outoftheirhome, eitherthroughforeclosureoreviction, andwillhavelessincentivetostrategically
move across state lines or change jobs to avoid creditors. Bankruptcy protection may also reduce
instability by helping debtors to avoid any sharp drops in consumption that have important long-
5Federal law allows garnishments of up to 50 percent of a debtor’s disposable earnings for payment related to
child support or alimony if the worker is supporting another spouse or child, and up to 60 percent if the worker is not.
An additional ﬁve percent may be garnished for court order payments more than 12 weeks in arrears.
9term consequences, such as becoming sick through lack of medical care or losing one’s car through
repossession. Finally, bankruptcy protection may reduce the psychic and time costs associated with
excessive debt, both of which may impact a debtor’s health or ability to stay employed.
There are also many reasons to believe that bankruptcy protection will have little impact on
debtors. It is plausible that labor supply is highly inelastic for poor households, or that debt relief
will reduce the incentive to work through the increase in income. It is also possible that debtors are
able to avoid most debt collection efforts at a relatively low cost, or that creditors do not garnish
a signiﬁcant enough fraction of the marginal recipient’s wages to impact employment decisions.
Bankruptcy ﬁlers may also be in distress due to important underlying issues, such as low human
capital or poor health, that the bankruptcy system is unable to remedy.
2.3. Model and Research Design
In this section, we develop a stylized bankruptcy and labor supply model to formalize our esti-
mation strategy and identiﬁcation assumptions. We simplify the model by assuming a single debt
relief program and predetermined debt. Our model is therefore unable to shed light on any ex-ante
impacts of bankruptcy or the interplay between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13.
Setup. Individuals are endowed with identical debts D, and an idiosyncratic disutility of work
✓ that captures differences in ability across individuals. We assume that ✓ ⇠ [0, ¯ ✓], and that ✓ is
known by the individual but only partially observable to the bankruptcy court.
In the ﬁrst period of the model, individuals choose whether or not to ﬁle for bankruptcy pro-
tection at cost F that captures any psychic or monetary costs of ﬁling. Individuals pay F whether
bankruptcy protection is granted or not, and whether they choose to work or not. Individuals re-
ceive a full discharge of debt if bankruptcy protection is granted, but must repay their debts if it is
not. Conditional on ﬁling, the probability of receiving bankruptcy protection is equal to p(✓).W e
assume that p(✓) is increasing in ✓ to capture the idea that bankruptcy judges dismiss ﬁlings from
individuals who are able to repay their debts outside the bankruptcy system (e.g. ﬁlings that are a
“substantial abuse” due to the ﬁler’s high ability).
10In the second period, individuals receive or do not receive bankruptcy protection. Individuals
then choose whether to work at wage W, or to not work and receive C in social welfare. If
individuals leave the labor market, they cannot be made to repay their debts. Dropping out of the
labor market is therefore a different type of debt relief. We also assume that wage earnings pay a
lump sum tax ⌧ that ﬁnances both debt relief and social welfare payments.
An individual’s utility is equal to earnings from social welfare C or wages W minus disutility
of work ✓, debt D, ﬁling costs F, and a lump sum tax ⌧. We assume that W   ¯ ✓   ⌧   F   C
so that all individuals prefer to work if they are given debt relief. There are therefore three utility
levels to consider: UW(✓)=W   ✓   D   ⌧ for workers not receiving bankruptcy protection,
UWB(✓)=W  ✓ ⌧ for workers receiving bankruptcy protection, and UN(✓)=C for individuals
who are not working and not receiving bankruptcy protection.
Given the utility functions of workers and non-workers, we can analyze which individuals pre-
fer working to not working if they do not receive bankruptcy protection, and, taking this decision
as given, which individuals prefer ﬁling for bankruptcy to not ﬁling.
Proposition 1: There exists a cutoff ✓W that equates the utility of working without debt relief with
the utility of not working:
UW(✓W)=UN
which implies ✓W = C  W +⌧  D. Thus, individuals with ✓  C  W +⌧  D will work even
if their bankruptcy ﬁling is dismissed, while individuals with ✓>C  W + ⌧   D will not work
if they do not receive debt relief. This result is the well-known debt overhang problem, where debt
distorts the ex-post decision of whether to exert costly effort or not (e.g. Krugman 1988).
Proposition 2: There exists a cutoff ✓F that equates the expected utility of ﬁling for bankruptcy
protection with not ﬁling:
p(✓F)UWB(✓F)   (1   p(✓F))UW(✓F)   F = UW(✓F)
11Since the utility of working with no debt is strictly greater than the utility of working with debt,
the threshold for ﬁling for bankruptcy protection is lower than the threshold for work.6 Thus
we have ✓F <✓ W, and all individuals on the margin of ﬁling will work even if their ﬁling is
dismissed. These individuals compare the expected beneﬁts of ﬁling p(✓)D with the ﬁxed ﬁling
costs F, holding ﬁxed the work decision. Individuals will therefore ﬁle if p(✓)D   F, and not ﬁle
if p(✓)D<F.
Figure 1 illustrates individuals’ labor supply and ﬁling choices, with P(✓) deﬁned as the frac-
tion of the population with disutility of labor ✓ who would be granted bankruptcy protection had
they ﬁled. Very productive individuals (✓<✓ F) work and never ﬁle for bankruptcy protection,
as the expected beneﬁt is too low to justify the ﬁxed ﬁling costs (p(✓)D<F ). Individuals who
are slightly less productive ﬁle for debt relief, but will work regardless of the ﬁling outcome as
UW  F   UN  F. In contrast, individuals with ✓>✓ W will work only if they receive debt relief.
We now turn to the bankruptcy judge and the optimal allocation of debt relief. We assume that
each bankruptcy judge j observes a noisy but unbiased signal of the disutility of labor ˆ ✓
j
i = ✓i+⌘ij,
where ⌘ij is assumed to be i.i.d. within and across judges. The problem for the judge is to choose
an allocation of debt relief that maximizes the sum of all individual utilities, subject to an economy
wide resource constraint equating government revenues and expenditures. Given the above setup,
this is equivalent to choosing a cutoff value of observed ability ˆ ✓B, such that all ﬁlers with ˆ ✓   ˆ ✓B
receive bankruptcy protection and all ﬁlers with ˆ ✓<ˆ ✓B do not.
Proposition 3: There exists a cutoff ˆ ✓B that maximizes the sum of all individual utilities:
Z ✓F(ˆ ✓B)
0
UW dF(✓)+
Z ✓W
✓F(ˆ ✓B)
[p(✓(ˆ ✓B))(UWB  F)+( 1  p(✓(ˆ ✓B)))(UW   F)]dF(✓)
+
Z ¯ ✓
✓W
[p(✓(ˆ ✓B))(UWB  F)+( 1  p(✓(ˆ ✓B)))(UN   F)]dF(✓)
6To simplify the model, we assume that all individuals with ✓>✓ F ﬁle for bankruptcy protection. This condition
holds if p(✓) is concave and p(¯ ✓)(W   C   ¯ ✓   tau)   F. These conditions ensure that p(¯ ✓) is sufﬁciently high and
that the disutility of work ¯ ✓ is sufﬁciently low that no one prefers to drop out of the labor force immediately over ﬁling
for debt relief.
12subject to a budget constraint that equates tax revenue from ⌧ with expenditures on debt relief D
and welfare payments C:
Z ✓F(ˆ ✓B)
0
⌧d F(✓)+
Z ¯ ✓
✓F(ˆ ✓B)
(1   p(✓(ˆ ✓B)))⌧d F(✓)=
Z ¯ ✓
✓F(ˆ ✓B)
p(✓(ˆ ✓B))DdF(✓)+
Z ¯ ✓
✓W
(1   p(✓(ˆ ✓B)))Cd F(✓)
Intuitively, the choice of cutoff ˆ ✓B equates two opposing forces. On one hand, a more lenient
cutoff reduces social welfare payments and increases tax revenues by inducing individuals with
✓>✓ W to work. On the other hand, a more lenient decision rule increases debt relief payments to
individuals with ✓  ✓W who would have worked without debt relief.
This tradeoff is particularly clear when the bankruptcy judge observes true ability ✓. When
✓ is fully observable, the sum of individual utilities is maximized by only providing debt relief
to individuals who would otherwise drop out of the labor market and default on their repayment
obligations. That is, by setting ✓B = ✓W so that p(✓)=0when ✓<✓ W, and p(✓)=1when
✓   ✓W. Thus the judge provides debt relief to incentivize individuals with a high disutility
of work to stay in the labor market and contribute to the tax base, without giving debt relief to
individuals who would have worked anyway.
Estimation. Our objective is to estimate the causal impact of Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection
on ﬁler outcomes Y :
  = E[Y |B =1 ]  E[Y |B =0 ]
where   is the causal effect of interest conditional on ﬁling, and B is an indicator for having
received bankruptcy protection. In the context of our model, this treatment effect is equal to the
structural parameter:
  =   ·
R ¯ ✓
✓W dF(✓)
R ¯ ✓
✓F dF(✓)
where   is the change in labor market outcomes for individuals whose labor supply decisions are
affected by bankruptcy protection (e.g. those with ✓>✓ W),
R ¯ ✓
✓WdF(✓) is the proportion of affected
ﬁlers, and
R ¯ ✓
✓FdF(✓) is the proportion of both affected and unaffected ﬁlers. The effect of
13Figure 2.1
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Notes: This ﬁgure summarizes the theoretical model.
14bankruptcy protection is therefore increasing in the impact on responders, and the fraction of re-
sponders in the ﬁling population.
The problem for inference is that OLS estimates of   may be biased if bankruptcy protec-
tion is correlated with the unobservable determinants of later outcomes: E[✓i|Bankruptcyi] 6=0 .
It is plausible, for example, that bankruptcy ﬁlers had worse outcomes even before ﬁling, bias-
ing cross-sectional estimates with non-ﬁlers. Cross-sectonal estimates using dismissed ﬁlers as a
control group are also likely to be biased, as the bankruptcy judge may be more likely to grant
bankruptcy protection to those who are unable to repay their debts outside of bankruptcy protec-
tion, while within individual comparisons may be biased by the fact that the most proximate causes
of bankruptcy, such as job loss or unexpected medical emergencies, also impact later outcomes.
The key insight of our approach is that this bias can be overcome if the distribution of unob-
servable characteristics is the same among ﬁlers assigned to more and less lenient judges. To see
this, recall that judges grant bankruptcy protection to ﬁlers who cannot repay their debts outside of
bankruptcy, that is, those ﬁlers whose disutility of work is above ✓B:
ˆ ✓ij > ˆ ✓B
where ˆ ✓ij is composed of an observable component Xi and a partially unobservable component
 i that is estimated by the bankruptcy judge as ˆ  ij. To illustrate how variation in judge leniency
can identify equation (2.3.), we relax the assumption that ˆ  ij is unbiased, and allow each judge’s
estimate of unobservable ability to be a function of individual i’s true ability to repay, and charac-
teristics of the judge assigned to the case, such as previous experience or personal biases:
ˆ  ij =  i +  j + ⌘ij
where  j is the systematic component of judge j’s decision-making that leads her to consistently
over- or under-estimate a ﬁler’s disutility of labor, and ⌘ij is noise in the decision-making process
15that is i.i.d. within and across judges.7 This implies that bankruptcy protection is granted if:
Xi +  i +  j + ⌘ij > ˆ ✓B (1)
which implies that judge j’s probability of granting bankruptcy conditional on ﬁler i’s observable
characteristics Xi is:
Pj(Xi)=1  F +⌘(ˆ ✓B   Xi    j)
where F +⌘ is the cumulative distribution of unobservable ability to repay   plus the idiosyn-
cratic noise ⌘. Thus, judge leniency  j is correlated with the probability of receiving bankruptcy
protection, but uncorrelated with unobservable ﬁler characteristics such as  i due to the random
assignment of ﬁlings to judges. This setup implies that any relationship between future outcomes
and judge assignment is due to the causal impact of bankruptcy protection.
Formally, we estimate the causal impact of receiving bankruptcy protection through a two-
stage least squares regression of equation (2.3.) with judge leniency as an instrumental variable for
bankruptcy protection. The second stage equation is:
yit = ↵ + ↵ct +  Xi +  Bankruptcyi + "it
where i denotes individuals, t is the year of observation,   is the causal impact of bankruptcy
protection deﬁned above, ↵ct are ofﬁce by month-of-ﬁling ﬁxed effects, Xi includes race, gender,
a quadratic in age, baseline employment, and baseline earnings, and "it is noise. The ﬁrst stage
equation associated with equation (2.3.) is:
Bankruptcyi = ↵ + ↵ct +  Xi + ⇡ j + "i (2)
where ⇡ represents the impact of judge leniency on the probability of receiving bankruptcy protec-
7The decision problem can also be expressed as one in which estimates of ✓ are unbiased, but judges use different
cutoff values ˆ ✓
j
B due to pro-creditor or pro-debtor preferences. In this scenario, judge j grants a ﬁling if Xi +ˆ  i >
ˆ ✓B +  j, where  j represents judge speciﬁc differences in the optimal cutoff.
16tion.
Estimating the ﬁrst stage regression from equation (2) utilizing an exhaustive set of judge
ﬁxed effects as instruments yields a consistent two-stage least squares estimate of   as the number
of ﬁlers i !1 , but is potentially biased in ﬁnite samples because each ﬁler’s observation is
included in the estimation of his own judge’s effect on bankruptcy protection and future outcomes.
There are several potential solutions to this own-observation issue. Jackknife IV, for example,
eliminates the bias by omitting a ﬁler’s own observation when forming the instrument (Angrist,
Imbens, and Krueger 1999). Split-sample two-stage IV addresses the own-observation issue by
randomly splitting the sample into two groups, using judge tendencies in one part of the sample
as an instrument for bankruptcy protection in the other part of the sample (Angrist and Krueger
1995). Limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) eliminates the own-observation bias by
collapsing the parameter space and using maximum likelihood to obtain a consistent estimate of
the effect of bankruptcy protection.
We address the own-observation problem by omitting a ﬁler’s own observation when calculat-
ing each judge’s leniency relative to the court he serves in.8 Formally, we deﬁne judge leniency
Zicjt as the leave-one-out fraction of ﬁlings granted by judge j in year t, minus the leave-one-out
fraction granted in his court c in year t:
Zicjt =
1
ncjt   1
 ncjt X
k=1
(Bk)   Bi
!
 
1
nct   1
 
nct X
k=1
(Bk)   Bi
!
(3)
where i again denotes individuals, c denotes courts, j is the assigned judge, t is the year of ob-
servation, Bi is an indicator for receiving bankruptcy protection, ncjt is the number of cases seen
by a judge in year t, and nct is the number of cases seen by a court in year t. This leave-one-out
procedure, which is essentially a reduced-form version of the jackknife IV regression, purges the
mechanical correlation between a ﬁler’s own outcomes and our measure of judge leniency.
Consistent with past research (Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook 1994, Norberg and Compo
8Estimates using Jackknife IV and LIML are available Web Appendix Table 1. The results are nearly identical to
those using Zicjt as an instrument.
172007), we ﬁnd considerable variation in the treatment of Chapter 13 cases within a court. The
ﬁler level standard deviation of Zijct is 0.025 for Chapter 13 ﬁlers in our sample. In other words,
moving from the 5th percentile to the 95th percentile in the ﬁler level distribution of judge leniency
is associated with a 10.1 percentage point increase in the probability of receiving Chapter 13 pro-
tection, a 22 percent increase. There is also signiﬁcant persistence in judge behavior over time,
suggesting that this variation represents systematic differences in judge behavior. Web Appendix
Figure 1 plots judge discharge rate against the discharge rate in the previous year, with each point
representing a separate year by judge observation. Discharge rates are highly correlated across
time, with an OLS regression relating judge discharge rate to the discharge rate in the previous
year yielding a coefﬁcient of 0.821.
In contrast to Chapter 13, there is almost no variation in the treatment of Chapter 7 cases
across judges within an ofﬁce, likely because almost all Chapter 7 ﬁlings are granted in our sample
period. The standard deviation of Zijct for Chapter 7 ﬁlers is only 0.003 in our data, making it
difﬁcult to measure the impact of bankruptcy protection for these ﬁlers using our instrumental
variables strategy. In Web Appendix B, we use an event study design to estimate the impact of
Chapter 7, ﬁnding it has a modest positive impact on debtors.
Using our reduced form measure of judge leniency Zijct as an instrumental variable, the iden-
tiﬁed two-stage least squares parameter from equation (2.3.) measures the causal impact of Chap-
ter 13 protection for the marginal recipient. Our estimates therefore measure the local average
treatment effect for ﬁlers whose bankruptcy outcome is altered by judge assignment due to dis-
agreement on whether they should receive bankruptcy protection. In the context of our empirical
model,   is identiﬁed for ﬁlers whose estimated disutility of work ˆ ✓ is sufﬁciently close enough
to the cutoff of receiving bankruptcy protection ˆ ✓B that a high or low draw of  j will impact the
probability of receiving bankruptcy protection.
The conditions necessary to interpret our two-stage least squares estimates as local average
treatment effects are: (1) that judge assignment is associated with bankruptcy protection, (2) that
judge assignment only impacts debtor outcomes through the probability of receiving bankruptcy
18protection, and (3) that the impact of judge assignment is monotonic across ﬁlers.
The ﬁrst assumption is empirically testable. Web Appendix Table 2 presents ﬁrst stage results
of the impact of judge leniency on the probability of a ﬁler being granted Chapter 13 bankruptcy
protection. The sample includes ﬁrst time ﬁlers between 1992 and 2005 in the 33 courts that
randomly assign Chapter 13 ﬁlings to judges. The median court in our sample has two judges,
with the largest court having eight judges. All speciﬁcations control for ofﬁce by month-of-ﬁling
ﬁxed effects, with column 2 adding controls for gender, race, age, and average baseline earnings.
Standard errors are clustered at the court level.
Our results from Web Appendix Table 2 show that there is a large and precisely estimated re-
lationship between judge leniency and the probability of receiving bankruptcy protection. While
measurement error attenuates the coefﬁcient on Zijct away from one, our reduced form measure
of judge leniency is one of the strongest predictors of whether a ﬁler receives Chapter 13 protec-
tion. With no controls, a one percentage point increase in Zijct increases the probability that a
debtor receives bankruptcy protection by 0.700 percentage points. Controlling for gender, race,
age, and baseline earnings, a one percentage point increase in Zijct increases the probability that
a debtor receives bankruptcy protection by 0.676 percentage points. Thus, moving from the 5th
percentile to the 95th percentile in the ﬁler level distribution of judge leniency increases the like-
lihood of receiving Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection by to 6.83 to 7.07 percentage points. To put
these magnitudes in perspective, our results from Web Appendix Table 2 show that male ﬁlers are
1.6 percentage points less likely to receive bankruptcy protection, black ﬁlers are 10.0 percent-
age points less likely to receive bankruptcy protection, and ﬁlers with baseline earnings that are
$10,000 lower are about 0.03 percentage points less likely to receive bankruptcy protection.
Our second identifying assumption is that judge assignment only impacts debtor outcomes
through the probability of receiving bankruptcy protection. This assumption would be violated
if judge leniency is correlated with unobservable determinants of future outcomes: E[ j i] 6=0 .
Table 1 presents a series of randomization checks to partially assess the validity of this exclusion
restriction. Column 2 reports results from an OLS regression of judge leniency on a ﬁler’s age,
19Table 2.1
Test of Randomization
Control F-test
Mean Judge Leniency p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 36.682 0.000009⇤ 0.000009 [0.166]
(16.663) (0.000005) (0.000015)
Male 0.570 0.000142  0.000279 [0.781]
(0.494) (0.000093) (0.000510)
White 0.462 0.000325⇤  0.000075 [0.304]
(0.498) (0.000150) (0.000427)
Earnings 20.019  0.000002  0.000003 [0.232]
(18.503) (0.000027) (0.000031)
Employment 0.791 0.000655 0.009107 [0.315]
(0.352) (0.000399) (0.008243)
Self Earnings 0.649 0.000011 0.000010 [0.389]
(3.188) (0.000015) (0.000015)
401k 0.247 0.000020 0.000024 [0.674]
(0.746) (0.000071) (0.000067)
Self Emp. 0.065  0.000141  0.000112 [0.120]
(0.187) (0.000280) (0.000272)
Disability Ins. 0.042 0.000342 0.000294 [0.263]
(0.194) (0.000259) (0.000254)
Job Tenure 2.822 0.000034⇤ 0.000034⇤ [0.062]
(3.034) (0.000020) (0.000020)
Firm Wage 18.896  0.000011 0.000011 [0.532]
(19.932) (0.000016) (0.000013)
Pred. Earnings 20.230 0.000375 [0.189]
(13.542) (0.000413)
Pred. Emp. 0.444  0.038486 [0.131]
(0.147) (0.037885)
Pred. Mortality 0.031  0.013043 [0.214]
(0.055) (0.012249)
Joint F-Test [0.549] [0.504]
Observations 496880 496880 496880
Notes: This table reports reduced form results testing the random assignment of ﬁlings to judges. The sample consists
ofallﬁrsttimeChapter13ﬁlersbetween1992and2005inthe33courtsthatrandomlyassignﬁlingstojudges. Column
1 reports the control mean and standard deviation for each variable. Columns 2 - 3 each report estimates from an OLS
regression of judge leniency on the variables listed in the row and ofﬁce by month-of-ﬁling ﬁxed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the court level. Judge leniency is the leave-one-out mean rate of granting bankruptcy protection
for the assigned judge minus the leave-one-out mean rate of granting bankruptcy protection for the court in the same
ﬁling year. The p-value reported at bottom of columns 2 - 3 is for a F-test of the joint signiﬁcance of the variables listed
in the rows. Each row of column 4 reports a p-value from a separate OLS regression of the pre-determined variable
listed in the corresponding row on judge and ofﬁce by month-of-ﬁling ﬁxed effects. The p-value is for a F-test of the
joint signiﬁcance of the judge ﬁxed effects. Predicted earnings, employment, and mortality are formed using the other
variables listed in the rows. All monetary values are expressed in real 2000 dollars divided by 1,000. *** = signiﬁcant
at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
20gender, race, baseline earnings, baseline self-employment earnings, baseline employment, baseline
self-employment, baseline401kcontributions, baselineDIreceipt, baselinejobtenure, andaverage
wages at the baseline employer. We control for ofﬁce by month-of-ﬁling ﬁxed effects, and cluster
standard errors at the court level. Age, race, and job tenure are related to judge leniency at the ten
percent level, though the magnitudes are not economically signiﬁcant. None of our other baseline
variables appear systematically related to judge leniency, and a joint F-test of the hypothesis that
all differences in background characteristics and baseline measures in column 1 are zero has a
p-value of 0.549.
Columns 3 adds controls for predicted earnings, employment, and mortality. We predict each
outcome over the ﬁrst ﬁve post-ﬁling years using gender, race, a quartic in age, baseline employ-
ment, and baseline earnings. There are no signiﬁcant relationships in this pooled speciﬁcation,
and a joint F-test of the hypothesis that all differences in background characteristics and baseline
measures in column 6 are zero has a p-value of 0.504.
Column 4 presents results from our ﬁnal test of random assignment. We regress each de-
mographic characteristic and baseline measure on an exhaustive set of judge ﬁxed effects. Each
regression controls for ofﬁce by month-of-ﬁling ﬁxed effects, and clusters standard errors at the
ofﬁce by month-of-ﬁling level. We report the p-value from a joint F-test of signiﬁcance on the
judge effects, which provides an omnibus test for the null hypothesis that ﬁler covariates do not
differ signiﬁcantly among ﬁlers assigned to different judges within a ofﬁce by month combination.
None of the joint F-tests in column 4 suggest that there is systematic non-random assignment of
ﬁlings to judges.
Our second identifying assumption would also be violated if judge assignment impacts future
outcomes through channels other than bankruptcy protection, and these channels were correlated
with judge leniency: E[ j( i  ¯  )] 6=0 . If judge assignment does impact future outcomes through
other channels, our measure of judge leniency would be correlated with the error term of our two-
stage least squares model and the resulting local average treatment effect would incorporate any
additional impacts associated with judge assignment. This restriction that judges only systemat-
21ically affect debtor outcomes through bankruptcy is fundamentally untestable, and our estimates
should be interpreted with this potential caveat in mind. With that said, we view this assumption
as reasonable in our setting, as bankruptcy judges typically interact with debtors only at the conﬁr-
mation hearing, with little communication before or after the hearing. Thus, it seems unlikely that
judges would confer signiﬁcant beneﬁts to debtors other than through their bankruptcy ruling.
Our third identifying assumption is that judge assignment has a monotonic impact on ﬁlers.
The monotonicity assumption implies that being assigned to a more (less) lenient judge does not
result in an decrease (increase) in the likelihood of receiving bankruptcy protection. This mono-
tonicity assumption would be invalid if judges treat some ﬁlings in a more lenient manner and
others in a more strict manner. If the monotonicity assumption is violated, our estimates from
equation (2.3.) are still a weighted average of marginal treatment effects, but the weights would
be outside the unit interval (Angrist, Imbens, and Ruben 1996, Heckman and Vytacil 2005). To
partially test the monotonicity assumption, Web Appendix Figure 2 plots judge leniency measures
that are calculated separately for each judge by gender, race, baseline income, and age. We also
report the coefﬁcient and standard error from an OLS regression relating the separately calculated
judge measures. Consistent with our monotonicity assumption, judges exhibit remarkably similar
tendencies across observably different ﬁlers. Regressing the judge leniency for male ﬁlers on those
for female ﬁlers yields a point estimate of 0.822. For white and non-white ﬁlers, the point estimate
is 0.885, for high and low baseline earnings 0.998, and for ﬁlers older and younger than 40, the
coefﬁcient is 1.038. None of the results suggest that the monotonicity assumption is invalid in our
setting.
2.4. Data
To estimate the impact of bankruptcy protection on debtors, we merge information from individual
bankruptcy ﬁlings and administrative tax records from the Social Security Administration (SSA).
Bankruptcy records are available from 1992 to 2009 for the 72 federal bankruptcy courts that
allow full electronic access to their dockets. These data represent approximately three quarters of
22all bankruptcy ﬁlings during this period.9 Each record in our bankruptcy data contains information
on the Chapter ﬁled, ﬁling date, court, ofﬁce, outcome, and the judge and trustee the ﬁling was
assigned to. The data also contain information on each debtors’ name, address, and social security
number, whether the ﬁling includes any assets, and whether the ﬁling fee was paid immediately or
in installments.
Our empirical strategy requires that a court randomly assign ﬁlings to judges within an ofﬁce.
This appears reasonable in our setting, as U.S. bankruptcy courts typically use a random assign-
ment or blind rotation system to assign ﬁlings. There are two typical reasons that ﬁlings are not
randomly assigned in our data. First, some ofﬁces assign every case from a county to a single
judge. Second, cases that are still on a retiring judge’s docket are reassigned on the day of retire-
ment. This is problematic both because these cases will not be included in the estimated effect of
the retiring judge, and because these cases are far more likely to be successful, as only cases where
the repayment plan is in progress remain on a judge’s docket.
To ensure the random assignment of ﬁlings to judges in our sample, we drop ﬁlings originating
from counties that send all ﬁlings to a single judge, and drop ofﬁce by year bins where a retiring
judge’s cases were reassigned and there is no documentation as to the original judge. We also
drop courts that assign all Chapter 13 ﬁlings to a single judge, as there is no variation in judge
behavior for us to exploit. Finally, we restrict the data to ﬁrst time ﬁlers between 1992 and 2005 to
ensure that we have ﬁve or more years of post-ﬁling outcomes for all debtors, and that all ﬁlings
occurred before the 2005 Bankruptcy Reform Act came into effect. These restrictions leave us
with 506,420 Chapter 13 ﬁlings in 33 bankruptcy courts. This data represents just over 30 percent
of the available Chapter 13 ﬁlings. Web Appendix Table 3 provides additional details on the courts
and years in our sample.
Toexploretheimpactofbankruptcyprotectiononsubsequentoutcomes, wematchthebankruptcy
records to administrative tax records from the SSA using last name and the last four digits of the
9OurbankruptcydataaredrawnfromPublicAccesstoCourtElectronicRecords(PACER)recordsprovidedbyTal
Gross, Matthew Notowidigdo, and Jialan Wang. Additional details on the PACER data and its coverage are available
in Gross, Notowidigdo, and Wang (2012).
23debtor’s social security number. We were able to successfully match 97.4 percent of the bankruptcy
data, with almost all of the unmatched records being the result of an individual sharing a name and
last four digits of the social security number with another individual in the SSA data. The SSA data
are remarkably complete and include nearly every individual in the United States. Information on
earnings and employment comes from annual W-2s. Individuals with no W-2 in any particular year
are assumed to have had no earnings in that year. We measure non-earnings outcomes using data
from three sources. Information on annual 401k contributions, job location, and ﬁrm character-
istics also comes from annual W-2s. Information on Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) receipt comes from the Master Beneﬁciary Record. Information on mor-
tality comes from the Death Master File that is compiled by the SSA and covers deaths occurring
anywhere in the United States. All dollar amounts are in terms of year 2000 dollars.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for a ﬁve percent random draw of all ﬁrst time ﬁlers be-
tween 1992 and 2005. Consistent with previous research on bankruptcy ﬁlers, 98.3 percent of
Chapter 7 ﬁlers in sample are granted bankruptcy protection, compared to 47.9 percent of Chapter
13 ﬁlers. Fifty-nine percent of Chapter 7 ﬁlers are male, 74.2 percent are white, and 13.3 percent
are black. For Chapter 13, 61.3 percent of ﬁlers are male, 55.3 percent are white, and 34.1 percent
are black.
The typical bankruptcy ﬁler earns far less than the average American worker. In the ﬁve years
before ﬁling, 80.6 percent of Chapter 7 ﬁlers are employed on average, with average annual earn-
ings of just $21,064. Eighty percent of Chapter 13 ﬁlers are employed, earning $22,460 annually
in the ﬁve years before ﬁling. Over the same ﬁve year time period, 4.8 percent of Chapter 7 ﬁlers
receive DI, and 9.7 percent receive SSI. Just over four percent of Chapter 13 ﬁlers receive DI, and
7.9 percent receive SSI. Consistent with the low individual earnings we observe, average wages at
a typical ﬁler’s employer are just over $20,000 for both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 ﬁlers.
Table 2 also presents summary statistics for ﬁlers in the 33 courts that randomly assign ﬁlings
to judges. This analysis sample is very similar to the full sample of ﬁlers. Forty-ﬁve percent of
Chapter 13 ﬁlers in our sample are granted bankruptcy protection, 2.9 percent less than the full
24Table 2.2
Summary Statistics
Full Sample Analysis Sample
Chapter 7 Chapter 13 Chapter 13
Characteristics (1) (2) (3)
Bankruptcy 0.983 0.479 0.455
Age 40.399 40.892 38.112
Male 0.588 0.613 0.591
White 0.742 0.553 0.522
Black 0.133 0.341 0.366
Outcomes 5 years before ﬁling
Earnings 21.064 22.460 23.005
Employment 0.806 0.802 0.815
Self Emp. 0.060 0.062 0.060
Wages 20.559 21.856 22.433
Self Earnings 0.505 0.604 0.572
401k 0.262 0.293 0.319
Disability Insurance 0.048 0.043 0.041
Sup. Security Income 0.097 0.079 0.088
Job Tenure 3.425 3.746 3.660
Firm Wages 22.413 23.006 23.055
Observations 367103 83552 496880
Notes: This table reports summary statistics. The full sample consists of a 5% random draw from ﬁrst time ﬁlers
between 1992 and 2005 in 72 bankruptcy courts. The analysis sample consists of all ﬁrst time ﬁlers between 1992 and
2005 in the 33 courts that randomly assign ﬁlings to judges. Bankruptcy is an indicator for being granted bankruptcy
protection and receiving a discharge of debt. Earnings and employment outcomes come from 1978 - 2010 W-2s, DI
and SSI receipt from the Master Beneﬁciary File, and mortality from the Death Master File. We restrict non-mortality
outcomes to be for individuals who are alive. SSI outcomes are restricted to individuals older than 65 years old. All
monetary values are expressed in real 2000 dollars divided by 1,000. Employed is an indicator for non-zero wage
earnings. Self employment is an indicator for non-zero self employment earnings, including negative earnings. Firm
wages are averaged over all employees listing the same EIN in the same calendar year.
25sample. Fifty-ninepercentofﬁlersinoursamplearemale, 2.3percentlessthanthefullsample, and
52.2 percent are white compared, 3.1 percent less. In the ﬁve years before ﬁling, average annual
earnings were $23,005 for ﬁlers in our analysis sample, slightly more than in the full sample.10
2.5. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Protection and Labor Supply
2.5.1. Results
As a benchmark for evaluating the causal effects described below, we begin with a descriptive
analysis of granted and dismissed ﬁlers. Web Appendix Figure 3 plots pre- and post-ﬁling earnings
for a ﬁve-percent random sample of ﬁrst time Chapter 13 ﬁlers between 1992 and 2005 in our full
sample of bankruptcy courts. We also calculate expected earnings using a ﬁler’s gender, race, a
quadratic in age, a quadratic in tenure, industry ﬁxed effects, and earnings in the previous ﬁve
years.
Filers granted Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection earn $1,500 to $2,000 more than dismissed
ﬁlers even before ﬁling. Earnings for both groups fall two to three years before ﬁling, with a
larger dip for dismissed ﬁlers.11 The post-ﬁling earnings of dismissed ﬁlers dip further, falling
more than $4,000 below the expected trajectory ﬁve years after ﬁling. In contrast to the large
and permanent decline in earnings experienced by dismissed ﬁlers, individuals granted bankruptcy
protectionappeartohavenolong-term earningslosses. Takentogether, ourdescriptiveresultsfrom
Web Appendix Figure 3 suggest that many Chapter 13 ﬁlers experience an adverse earnings shock
before ﬁling, but that bankruptcy protection may help to mitigate the long-term consequences of
10Web Appendix Table 4 presents summary statistics separately by census region. Filers in the south are less likely
to be white and more likely to be black compared to ﬁlers in the east and midwest. Filers in the west are less likely
to be white or black, likely because there are more Hispanic ﬁlers. Filers in the west are also the least likely to be
granted either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection, and have relatively higher earnings than ﬁlers in other
regions. There is also signiﬁcant variation in Chapter 13 discharge rate within regions. The Birmingham ofﬁce, for
example, discharges only 31.0 percent of Chapter 13 ﬁlings, while the Columbia ofﬁce in the District of South Carolina
discharges 74.9 percent of Chapter 13 ﬁlings. See Web Appendix Table 3 for additional details.
11The fall in pre-ﬁling earnings is likely related to the “Ashenfelter dip” - the fact that individuals with negative
earnings shocks are more likely to enroll in job training programs - discussed by Ashenfelter (1978), Ashenfelter and
Card (1985), and Heckman and Hotz (1989), among many others. In our context, the selection of individuals with
negative earnings shocks into bankruptcy ﬁling will lead OLS estimates with a non-ﬁling control group to overstate
the true gains of bankruptcy if there is mean reversion in earnings, and to understate the impact of bankruptcy if shocks
have consequences that increase over time. We return to this point when discussing the Chapter 7 estimates.
26those earnings shocks.
Figures2Aand2Bpresenttwo-stageleastsquaresresultsmeasuringthecausalimpactofChap-
ter 13 bankruptcy protection on earnings and employment using judge leniency as an instrumental
variable for bankruptcy protection. The sample consists of ﬁrst time ﬁlers between 1992 and 2005
in the 33 courts that randomly assign ﬁlings to judges. We use our reduced form measure of judge
leniency Zijct as an instrumental variable for bankruptcy protection, and control for gender, race, a
quartic in age, baseline employment, baseline earnings, and ofﬁce by month-of-ﬁling ﬁxed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the court level. Table 3 presents results pooling outcomes across
the ﬁrst ﬁve post-ﬁling years, and Web Appendix Table 1 presents results using Jackknife IV and
LIML.
Figure 2A shows that Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection has a large and precisely estimated
impact on earnings. In the year of ﬁling, debtors granted Chapter 13 protection due to a more
lenientjudgeearn$3,375morethandismissedﬁlers. Intheﬁrstfullyearafterﬁling, thesemarginal
recipients of Chapter 13 earn $5,528 more than dismissed ﬁlers. Pooling outcomes across the
ﬁrst ﬁve full post-ﬁling years, the longest period available for all ﬁlers, Chapter 13 protection
increases the marginal recipient’s annual earnings by $5,012, a 21.7 percent increase from baseline
earnings. In a sample of individuals ﬁling between 1992 and 2000, Chapter 13 protection increases
the marginal recipient’s annual earnings by $5,089 in the sixth through tenth post-ﬁling years,
suggesting that the impact of bankruptcy protection is persistent even after the end of the Chapter
13 repayment plan (see Web Appendix Table 5). The estimated effects are nearly identical using
judgeﬁxedeffectsasaninstrumentforbankruptcyprotection, orwhenusingJackknifeIVorLIML
instead of two-stage least squares.12
12One additional concern is that individuals will be more likely to work in the informal labor market after being
dismissed from the bankruptcy system. To partially test this hypothesis, we estimate the impact of Chapter 13 sepa-
rately by baseline industry. We hypothesize that it is easier on the margin to increase informal earnings in industries
such as construction and agriculture as compared to retail trade or health care. In results available upon request, we
ﬁnd no systematic differences in the impact of Chapter 13 across industries that may be more or less likely to use
informal workers, though we cannot rule out modest differences.
27Figure 2.2
Chapter 13 Bankruptcy and Labor Supply and Mortality
Figure 2.2A: Earnings Figure 2.2B: Employment
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Figure 2.2C: Mortality
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Notes: Theseﬁguresplottwo-stageleastsquaresresultsoftheimpactofChapter13bankruptcyprotectiononearnings,
employment, and cumulative mortality. The sample includes all ﬁrst time ﬁlings between 1992 and 2005 in courts that
randomly assign cases to judges. We instrument for bankruptcy protection using judge leniency and control for gender,
race, a quartic in age, baseline employment, baseline earnings, and ofﬁce by month-of-ﬁling ﬁxed effects. The dashed
lines are 95 percent conﬁdence intervals from standard errors clustered at the court level. Year 0 indicates the year a
debtor ﬁles for bankruptcy protection. Earnings are winsorized at the top and bottom one percent. Employment is an
indicator for non-zero wage earnings on the W-2. All monetary values are expressed in real 2000 dollars. Mortality is
an indicator for being deceased in the indicated year using information from the Death Master File.
28Table 2.3
Chapter 13 Bankruptcy and Labor Supply and Mortality
CM 2SLS Results
Panel A: Labor Supply (1) (2) (3)
Earnings 17.362 6.943⇤⇤⇤ 5.012⇤⇤⇤
(1.6381) (1.635) (1.339)
Employment 0.432 0.063⇤⇤⇤ 0.035⇤⇤⇤
(0.218) (0.017) (0.013)
Panel B: Mortality
5-year Mortality 0.040  0.024⇤⇤⇤  0.019⇤⇤
(0.197) (0.009) (0.009)
Controls – No Yes
Observations 226080 496880 496880
Notes: This table reports two-stage least squares results of the impact of Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection on earnings
and employment averaged over the ﬁrst ﬁve post-ﬁling years. The sample consists of all ﬁrst time ﬁlers between
1992 and 2005 in the 33 courts that randomly assign ﬁlings to judges. Column 1 reports the mean and standard
deviation for dismissed ﬁlers. Columns 2 - 3 instrument for bankruptcy protection using the reduced form measure of
judge leniency described in the text. All speciﬁcations control for ofﬁce by month-of-ﬁling ﬁxed effects, and cluster
standard errors at the court level. Column 3 also includes controls for gender, race, age, and the ﬁve year average of
baseline employment and baseline earnings. All monetary values are expressed in real 2000 dollars divided by 1,000.
Earnings information comes from the W-2. Employed is an indicator for non-zero wage earnings on the W-2. Self
employment is an indicator for non-zero self employment earnings on the W-2. *** = signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, **
= signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
29As an additional check of our identiﬁcation strategy, Figure 2A also plots estimates for ﬁve pre-
ﬁling years. Consistent with our identifying assumptions discussed above, there is no systematic
relationship between bankruptcy protection and earnings in the pre-ﬁling years, with the estimated
coefﬁcients small and not statistically different from zero.
Figure2BshowsthatthereisalsoalargeandpreciselyestimatedeffectofChapter13bankruptcy
protection on employment. While there is little relationship between bankruptcy protection and
employment in the pre-ﬁling period, average employment is 3.5 percentage points higher in the
post-ﬁling period for debtors with bankruptcy protection, a 4.2 percent increase from mean em-
ployment in the baseline period. The probability of being employed is also higher in the sixth
through tenth post-ﬁling years, but the point estimates are very imprecisely estimated.
Web Appendix Table 6 presents results for a number of other outcomes available in our SSA
data. Bankruptcy protection increases self-employment by 2.9 percentage points, but does not have
an economically or statistically signiﬁcant impact on self-employment earnings. Among eligible
ﬁlers, bankruptcy protection decreases the receipt of SSI by 12.2 percentage points, an 89 percent
decrease. Bankruptcy protection is also associated with a decrease in the receipt of DI and an
increase in 401k contributions, though neither point estimate is statistically signiﬁcant.
Web Appendix Table 7 presents two-stage least squares results interacted with ﬁler gender,
race, age, and baseline earnings for outcomes over the ﬁrst ﬁve post-ﬁling years. Chapter 13 in-
creases annual earnings by $6,968 for ﬁlers with above median incomes, compared to only $2,968
for ﬁlers with below median earnings. The impact of Chapter 13 protection on employment is also
3.2 percentage points higher for ﬁlers with above median baseline earnings. Chapter 13 increases
the earnings of ﬁlers older than 60 by only a statistically insigniﬁcant $2,580, likely because these
ﬁlers have already left the labor market. In contrast, Chapter 13 increases the annual earnings of
ﬁlers who are between 25 to 40 years old by $5,759, and the annual earnings of ﬁlers who are be-
tween 40 and 60 years old by $6,507. Bankruptcy protection also increases annual earnings more
for ﬁlers who are female and non-white, but the differences are not statistically signiﬁcant.
To investigate heterogeneous treatment effects across unobservable debtor characteristics, we
30also estimate marginal treatment effects (MTE) (Heckman and Vytlacil 2005). In our setting,
the MTE estimates describe how the outcomes for debtors on the margin of bankruptcy protection
change as we move from more strict to more lenient judges, essentially a Wald estimator for a small
change in the probability of receiving bankruptcy protection. MTE estimates therefore shed light
on the types of ﬁlers who beneﬁt most from bankruptcy protection, which may be important for
policy. To calculate the MTE function, we predict the probability of bankruptcy protection using
a quadratic in our reduced form measure of judge leniency Zijct. We then regress each outcome
on a quadratic in the predicted probability of receiving bankruptcy protection. Finally, we evaluate
the estimate of the ﬁrst derivative of this relationship between each post-ﬁling outcome and the
quadratic in predicted probability at each percentile of predicted probability.
Web Appendix Figure 4 reports the MTE estimates for earnings and employment over the ﬁrst
ﬁve post-ﬁling years. The MTE function for earnings is increasing in the predicted probability of
bankruptcy protection. The upward slope in the earnings MTE suggests that ﬁlers on the margin of
bankruptcy who are assigned to the most lenient judges experience the largest increases in earnings
when granted bankruptcy protection. These are likely ﬁlers with unobservable characteristics that
make them the least likely to be granted bankruptcy in the ﬁrst place, since the margin for rela-
tively lenient judges should entail relatively less deserving ﬁlers compared to judges who dismiss
most ﬁlings. This implies that the impact of bankruptcy on earnings is somewhat higher for less
deserving debtors. On the other hand, the MTE function for employment outcomes is essentially
ﬂat in judge leniency, suggesting that the employment effects do not differ systematically across
unobservable characteristics.
2.5.2. Potential Channels
Why are there such large beneﬁts of receiving bankruptcy protection? In this section, we explore
two potentially relevant explanations: (1) protection from wage garnishment, and (2) protection
against episodes of economic instability.
One explanation for our results is that Chapter 13 increases the incentive to work by protecting
31futurewagesfromgarnishmentthat cantotal25percentofadebtor’s disposable earnings, andupto
100 percent of a debtor’s marginal earnings. Table 4 partially tests this hypothesis by estimating the
impact of Chapter 13 separately by predicted garnishment before ﬁling. Columns 1 and 2 of Table
4 present results for ﬁlers in the four states that prohibit wage garnishment - Florida, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, and Texas - and ﬁlers in states that allow at least some wage garnishment. The
impact of Chapter 13 on annual earnings over the ﬁrst ﬁve post-ﬁling years is $5,112 in states that
allow garnishment, compared to $2,533 in the four states that prohibit garnishment. The pattern
of results is reverse for employment, however, with larger impacts in the four states that prohibit
garnishment, though the difference is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Columns 3 through 5 present results for ﬁlers who are likely to be subject to different marginal
garnishment rates. Within each state, potential garnishment is a non-linear function of earnings.
In states that follow the Federal guidelines, for example, creditors are allowed to garnish each
additional dollar of disposable earnings between 30 and 40 times the minimum wage, and 25 cents
of every additional dollar after that point. There is also across state variation in garnishment from
the twelve states that have higher exemptions on garnishment, the ten states that have lower caps
on the total garnishment amount, and the four states that prohibit garnishment altogether. For
each ﬁler, we estimate disposable earnings using pre-tax earnings in the ﬁve most recent pre-ﬁling
years and the NBER TAXSIM Federal and state income tax calculator. We then apply the binding
Federal or state garnishment law to calculate the marginal rate of garnishment a ﬁler would face in
the pre-ﬁling period.
The effect of Chapter 13 protection is small and imprecisely estimated for ﬁlers unlikely to face
wage garnishment. The impact on annual earnings is $1,611, while the impact on employment is
0.5percentagepoints. Neitherestimateisstatisticallysigniﬁcantatconventionallevels. Incontrast,
there is a large and precisely estimated impact of Chapter 13 on ﬁlers subject to either 25 or 100
percent marginal garnishment rates. The impact on annual earnings is $7,522 for ﬁlers subject to
marginal garnishment of 25 percent, and $3,415 for those subject to 100 percent. The impact on
employment is 5.2 and 5.0 percentage points, respectively, for ﬁlers subject to a marginal
32Table 2.4
Results by Wage Garnishment Regulations
Garnishment in State? Marginal Garnishment Rate
No Yes 0% 25% 100%
Panel A: Labor Supply (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Earnings 2.533⇤ 5.112⇤⇤⇤ 1.611 7.522⇤⇤⇤ 3.415⇤
(1.477) (1.362) (1.211) (1.711) (1.936)
Employment 0.066 0.034⇤⇤⇤ 0.005 0.052⇤⇤⇤ 0.050⇤⇤
(0.053) (0.013) (0.022) (0.017) (0.025)
Log Earnings 0.593 0.463⇤⇤⇤  0.186 0.793⇤⇤⇤ 0.996⇤⇤⇤
(0.431) (0.145) (0.347) (0.172) (0.291)
Panel B: Mortality
5-year Mortality  0.033  0.019⇤  0.005  0.025⇤⇤  0.040⇤⇤
(0.058) (0.010) (0.027) (0.012) (0.018)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 64743 432137 234925 218080 43875
Notes: This table reports two-stage least squares results of the impact of Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection interacted
with binding garnishment regulations. The sample consists of all ﬁrst time ﬁlers between 1992 and 2005 in the 33
courts that randomly assign ﬁlings to judges. Columns 1 - 2 interact Chapter 13 with indicators for living in a state that
does not allow any wage garnishment and living in a state that does allow wage garnishment. Columns 3 - 5 interact
Chapter 13 with indicators for garnishment bracket implied by the ﬁler’s state of residence and baseline income. All
speciﬁcations control for gender, race, age, and the ﬁve year average of baseline employment baseline earnings, and
ofﬁce by month-of-ﬁling ﬁxed effects, and cluster standard errors at the court level. All monetary values are expressed
in real 2000 dollars divided by 1,000. Observations refer to the number of bankruptcy ﬁlers in the indicated group. The
number of observations in each regression is the sum of both groups. See text for additional details. *** = signiﬁcant
at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
33garnishment rate of 25 and 100 percent. The ﬁnal row of Table 4 presents results for log earnings,
showing that Chapter 13 increases annual log earnings by 0.793 for ﬁlers subject to a garnishment
rate of 25 percent, and 0.996 for ﬁlers subject to a garnishment rate of 100 percent. The difference
in the earnings and log earnings result is driven by differences in mean earnings between the two
groups. The 25 percent rate applies to individuals who earn above a certain threshold, typically 40
times the minimum wage each week. In contrast, the 100 percent rate applies only to individuals
earning less than that threshold.
Taking the estimates from Table 4 at face value, we can calculate the implied earnings elasticity
with respect to garnishment for the 25 percent bracket. The earnings elasticity with respect to
garnishment is equal to the log change in taxable earnings divided by the log change in the net tax
rate. The log change in taxable earnings comes directly from Table 4. We assume that the state
and Federal earnings tax rate is 20 percent, implying that the net tax and garnishment rate is 40
percent. This implies an elasticity of 2.756 for the 25 percent bracket. Note that we are unable to
calculate the elasticity for the 100 percent bracket, as log(0) is undeﬁned. If we assume that the
marginal garnishment rate is 99 percent, the implied elasticity is 0.227 for the 100 percent bracket.
A second explanation for the estimated effects is that bankruptcy protection reduces both the
likelihoodandconsequencesofeconomicinstability. Bankruptcyprotectiondischargesmostdebts,
allows debtors to repay mortgage arrears, and puts a hold on almost all debt collection efforts.
These features of Chapter 13 increase economic stability by allowing debtors to avoid eviction or
home foreclosure, reducing the incentive to strategically move across state lines or change jobs
to avoid creditors, and preventing sharp drops in consumption that may have important long-term
consequences, such as becoming sick through lack of medical care. We partially test the empirical
relevance of this channel by examining the impact of Chapter 13 on employment and geographic
mobility, and by exploiting variation in state foreclosure laws.
Table 5 presents estimates of the impact of Chapter 13 protection on the probability of working
in the same baseline job, industry, county, and state. We also present results for job tenure and
average ﬁrm wages. The sample is restricted to ﬁlers with at least one year of employment in both
34Table 2.5
Chapter 13 Bankruptcy and Mobility
CM 2SLS Results
(1) (2) (3)
Same Job 0.241 0.219⇤⇤⇤ 0.196⇤⇤⇤
(0.364) (0.035) (0.037)
Same Industry 0.328 0.221⇤⇤⇤ 0.200⇤⇤⇤
(0.386) (0.036) (0.034)
Same County 0.351 0.211⇤⇤⇤ 0.194⇤⇤⇤
(0.391) (0.036) (0.035)
Same State 0.444 0.182⇤⇤⇤ 0.167⇤⇤⇤
(0.401) (0.036) (0.035)
Controls – No Yes
Observations 195367 426567 426567
Notes: This table reports two-stage least squares results of the impact of Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection on mobility
averaged over the ﬁrst ﬁve post-ﬁling years. The sample consists of all ﬁrst time ﬁlers between 1992 and 2005 in the
33 courts that randomly assign ﬁlings to judges who are employed for at least one post-ﬁling year. Column 1 reports
the mean and standard deviation for dismissed ﬁlers. Columns 2 - 3 instrument for bankruptcy protection using the
reduced form measure of judge leniency described in the text. All speciﬁcations control for ofﬁce by month-of-ﬁling
ﬁxed effects, and cluster standard errors at the court level. Columns 3 and 5 also include controls for gender, race,
age, and the ﬁve year average of baseline employment and baseline earnings. All monetary values are expressed in
real 2000 dollars divided by 1,000. Mobility and ﬁrm information comes from the ﬁrm EIN from annual W-2s. Each
dependent variable is equal to one if the individual is in the same job, industry, county, or state as in the pre-ﬁling
period. See text for additional details. *** = signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * =
signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
35the pre- and post-ﬁling period. Consistent with the economic instability hypothesis, bankruptcy
protection increases the probability of working in the same (2-digit NAICS) industry by 20.0 per-
centage points, with the mean of 32.8 percent among dismissed ﬁlers. Bankruptcy also increases
the probability that a ﬁler stays at his or her baseline job by 19.6 percentage points, nearly double
the dismissed ﬁler mean of 24.1 percent. There is also a large impact of bankruptcy protection
on geographic mobility, with bankruptcy protection increasing the probability of working in his
or her baseline county by 19.4 percentage points, and his or her baseline state by 16.7 percentage
points. Job tenure and average ﬁrm wages are also higher, suggesting that this increase in economic
stability is beneﬁcial.13,14
2.6. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Protection and Mortality
2.6.1. Results
Figure 2C presents two-stage least squares results measuring the impact of Chapter 13 bankruptcy
protection on mortality. Following our labor supply results from Figures 2A and 2B, the sample
includes ﬁrst time ﬁlers between 1992 and 2005 in the 33 courts that randomly assign ﬁlings to
judges. We use our reduced form measure of judge leniency Zijct as an instrumental variable
for bankruptcy protection, and control for gender, race, a quartic in age, baseline employment,
baseline earnings, and ofﬁce by month-of-ﬁling ﬁxed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
court level. The dependent variable for each regression is an indicator for being deceased in or
13Web Appendix Table 9 presents mobility results interacted with garnishment regulations. The impact of Chapter
13 protection on working in the same industry, county, and state are larger in states that allow garnishment, though
the differences are not statistically signiﬁcant. The estimated impacts on working in the same job, same industry, and
same county are also increasing in the marginal garnishment bracket, though working in the same state is not. The
estimated effects also remain large and precisely estimated for ﬁlers in the no garnishment bracket. Taken together, we
interpret the results from Web Appendix Table 9 as suggesting that garnishment protections can only partially explain
the impact of bankruptcy protection on economic stability.
14Web Appendix Tables 10 and 11 report results of the impact of Chapter 13 protection interacted with whether or
not a state requires judicial approval during the foreclosure process. In states without a judicial requirement, lenders
have the right to sell the house after providing a notice of sale to the borrower, resulting in signiﬁcantly higher rates
of foreclosure (Mian, Suﬁ, Trebbi 2011). We ﬁnd that the impact of Chapter 13 on job stability is modestly larger in
states that do not require a judicial foreclosure process, with mixed results on labor supply. We interpret these results
as suggesting that protection from home foreclosures is of only modest importance in explaining our estimated effects
on economic instability. On the other hand, it is possible that judicial foreclosure laws only impact the likelihood of
ﬁling for Chapter 13, not the impact of Chapter 13 once the foreclosure process is approved.
36before the speciﬁed year. Thus, our estimates represent the impact of Chapter 13 protection on
cumulative mortality.
Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection signiﬁcantly lowers mortality in the ﬁrst ﬁve years after
ﬁling. Chapter 13 protection decreases one-year mortality for the marginal recipient by statistically
insigniﬁcant 0.6 percentage points, and two-year mortality by 1.6 percentage points. Five-year
mortality, the longest time period available for our entire sample, is 1.9 percentage points lower, a
47.5 percent decrease from the control mean of 4.0 percentage points. In a sample of individuals
ﬁling between 1992 and 2000, Chapter 13 protection decreases ten-year mortality by a statistically
insigniﬁcant 5.5 percentage points.
Panel B of Web Appendix Table 7 reports results separately by gender, race, age, and baseline
earnings. The effect of Chapter 13 protection on mortality is larger for ﬁlers who are female, white,
and who have above median baseline earnings. The most striking difference is by age, however.
Chapter 13 protection decreases ﬁve-year mortality by 17.6 percentage points for ﬁlers 60 and
older at the time of ﬁling, despite little to no impact on earnings for these ﬁlers. In comparison,
Chapter 13 decreases ﬁve-year mortality by a statistically insigniﬁcant 0.4 percentage points for
ﬁlers between 25 and 40, and a marginally signiﬁcant 2.8 percentage points for ﬁlers between 40
and 60. This pattern of results is consistent with a change in earnings playing little to no role in
explaining the mortality results.
Web Appendix Figure 4C reports the MTE estimates for ﬁve-year mortality. The MTE function
for earnings is essentially ﬂat in the predicted probability of bankruptcy protection. This implies
that the mortality effects do not differ systematically across unobservable characteristics.
To put the magnitude of these estimates in context, it is helpful to consider the effects of job
loss, which is the most commonly cited reason for needing bankruptcy protection, on mortality.
In a sample of Pennsylvania workers, Sullivan and von Wachter (2009) ﬁnd that job displacement
increases short-run mortality by 50 to 100 percent, and long-run mortality by 10 to 15 percent. In
the speciﬁcation closest to ours, they ﬁnd that job displacement increases ﬁve-year mortality by 1.2
percentage points, albeit for a population with lower underlying mortality risk. One interpretation
37of our estimates is therefore that bankruptcy protection can, at least in part, offset the increased
mortality risk from ﬁnancial distress caused by events such as job loss.
2.6.2. Potential Channels
Bankruptcy protection may impact mortality through the change in earnings, or through any num-
ber of non-earnings channels, such as a reduction in stress or increased access to health care.
Toestimatetheextenttowhichthelaborsupplyimpactsestimatedabovecanexplaintheimpact
of bankruptcy protection on mortality, we follow Sullivan and von Wachter (2009) and compare
our two-stage least squares results to the effect implied by the cross-sectional correlation between
mortality and both earnings and employment. Our two-stage least squares results suggest that
bankruptcy protection increases annual earnings by $5,012, and employment by 3.5 percentage
points. The estimated correlation between ﬁve-year mortality and $1,000 in average annual earn-
ings is -0.00019, and the correlation with average employment is -0.00996. Thus, the change in
labor supply can explain (0.035⇤0.00996+5.102⇤0.00019)⇤100 = 0.13 percentage point decrease
in ﬁve-year mortality, or about 6.8 percent of the reduced form effect of 1.9 percentage points. This
suggests that about 93 percent of the estimated effect of Chapter 13 on ﬁve-year mortality is driven
by non-earnings channels. This result is also consistent with our subsample results, which suggest
that the mortality estimates are driven by ﬁlers over 60 who are likely to have exited the labor
market, and hence whose earnings are relatively unaffected by bankruptcy protection.15,16
There are several potentially relevant channels not related to earnings that we cannot examine
with our current data. For example, bankruptcy protection may decrease an individual’s stress
15Panel B of Table 4 reports results of the impact of Chapter 13 protection on ﬁve-year mortality interacted with
garnishment regulations. Chapter 13 protection only decreases mortality by a statistically signiﬁcant 0.5 percentage
points for ﬁlers not subject to wage garnishment, compared to 2.5 and 4.0 percentage points, respectively, for ﬁlers
subject to 25 percent and 100 percent marginal garnishment rates. Given the weak relationship between earnings and
mortality in our sample, the relationship between garnishment and the impact on mortality is likely to be driven by the
increased stress associated with debt collection, rather than the garnishment itself.
16Panel B of Web Appendix Table 10 reports results of the impact of Chapter 13 protection on ﬁve-year mortality
interacted with whether or not a state requires a judicial foreclosure process. The impact of Chapter 13 on mortality
is 1.8 percentage points higher in states that do not require a judicial foreclosure process compared to states that do.
Taken together with the garnishment results, we interpret these as being consistent with the idea that the mortality
decrease is driven by a reduction in economic instability and disruption.
38by reducing contact with creditors and allowing greater control over his or her ﬁnancial future.
Consistent with this theory, 84 percent of debtors report being under extreme stress before ﬁling
for bankruptcy, compared to only 35 percent after ﬁling (Porter 2011). Dismissed ﬁlers may also
lose their health insurance or have changed family environments that could impact health. Unfor-
tunately, it is not possible to link information on morbidity, health insurance, or family status to
our data. The precise mechanisms for our estimated mortality effect therefore remain unclear, and
likely include a combination of these factors.
2.7. Discussion
The results we have presented have potentially important implications for the modeling of the con-
sumer bankruptcy system. The evaluation of consumer bankruptcy laws has typically involved
an assessment of two second-order effects, as bankruptcy provides partial insurance against un-
certainty, but at the cost of higher borrowing costs that makes life-cycle smoothing more difﬁcult
(e.g. Athreya 2002, Li and Sarte 2006, Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt 2007, Chatterjee and Gordon
forthcoming). The typical bankruptcy model does not account for the ﬁrst-order importance of
the relationship between bankruptcy and earnings estimated in this paper, however. As a result,
previous research is likely to have dramatically understated the potential beneﬁts of debt relief.
To see this, it is helpful to consider our earnings result in light of a stylized extension of the
heterogeneous agent life cycle model of Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007). In the model, house-
holds borrow from a perfectly competitive ﬁnancial market to smooth consumption from expected
and unexpected changes in earnings and expenses. Bankruptcy allows households to avoid very
low consumption after a particularly severe shock, but increases borrowing costs in all periods due
to a higher risk of default. When the model is calibrated to match the credit market, the model
suggests that the beneﬁts from this increased smoothing across states through bankruptcy just out-
weigh the distortion of the credit market. Bankruptcy leads to tighter borrowing constraints early
in the life-cycle, reducing a household’s ability to smooth expected changes in earnings. On the
other hand, bankruptcy helps households smooth income when hit by a particularly bad shock,
39reducing consumption variance later in life. Additional details on the setup and calibration of the
baseline scenario are available in Web Appendix C.
We extend the Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007) model by assuming that default outside
of the bankruptcy system lowers household productivity. This assumption is meant to capture in
a transparent way the earnings loss observed among dismissed ﬁlers in our data. Holding ﬁxed
the other parameters, bankruptcy is over ten times more beneﬁcial if default is assumed to lower
household productivity by 10 percent, and nearly 20 times more beneﬁcial when default is assumed
to lower household productivity by 25 percent. To put these magnitudes in perspective, bankruptcy
is estimated to be six times more beneﬁcial when the frequency of expense shocks is doubled, and
nearly 40 times more beneﬁcial when the size of expense shocks is doubled (Livshits, MacGee,
and Tertilt 2007).
The results of this stylized exercise suggest that individual debt relief is much more likely
to be welfare-improving than previously realized. This conclusion differs substantially from a
number of prominent models, such as Athreya (2002) and Chatterjee and Gordon (forthcoming),
that abstract away from the effects of bankruptcy on earnings. Even models that suggest debt relief
is welfare-improving, such as Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007), likely understate the beneﬁts
of the consumer bankruptcy system.
2.8. Conclusion
This paper presents evidence that Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection has a signiﬁcant long-term
impactondebtors. Overtheﬁrstﬁve post-ﬁling years, Chapter13protectionincreasesthemarginal
recipient’s annual earnings by $5,012, a 21.7 percent increase, and employment by 3.5 percentage
points, a 4.2 percent increase. Chapter 13 protection also decreases ﬁve-year mortality by 1.9
percentage points, a 47.5 percent decrease. The effects are increasing in the amount that creditors
can garnish outside of the bankruptcy system, suggesting that garnishment protections can explain
at least some of the estimated effects. There is also evidence that bankruptcy protection reduces
the likelihood of economic instability, increasing the probability that a ﬁler stays in the same job
40and geographic area.
Our estimates provide new evidence on the ex-post beneﬁts of debt relief. These results are par-
ticularly important in light of the on-going debate surrounding the use of debt relief and mortgage
modiﬁcation to stimulate the economy. Work by Mulligan (2008), Hall (2011), and Eggertsson
and Krugman (forthcoming) suggests that household borrowing constraints can help explain the
severity of the recession, while Mian and Suﬁ (2012) show that differences in the incidence of debt
overhang can help explain regional differences in unemployment. Our work also suggests that re-
strictions on bankruptcy ﬁling, such as those introduced by the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act, may have important adverse consequences for the economy.
The main limitation of our analysis is that we are not able to estimate the impact of bankruptcy
laws on either borrowing costs or pre-ﬁling behavior. There may also be important impacts of
bankruptcy protection on outcomes such as home ownership or credit access that we are unable to
measure with our data. Finally, our analysis has focused on Chapter 13 bankruptcy, which makes
up about 30 percent of all bankruptcy ﬁlings. This paper should therefore be viewed as a ﬁrst step
towards characterizing the impact of consumer bankruptcy protection on debtors.
413. INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES IN CONSUMER CREDIT MARKETS: EVIDENCE
FROM PAYDAY LENDING
With Paige Marta Skiba, Vanderbilt Law School
Theory has long emphasized the importance of private information in explaining credit-market
failures. Information asymmetries and the resulting credit constraints have been used to explain
anomalous behavior in consumption, borrowing, and labor supply. Motivated in part by this re-
search, policymakers and lenders have experimented with various interventions to circumvent such
problems. Yet, the success of these strategies depends on which information asymmetries are em-
pirically relevant. Credit scoring and information coordination can help mitigate selection prob-
lems, while incentive problems are better addressed by improved collection or repayment schemes.
This paper provides new evidence on the empirical relevance of asymmetric information using
administrative data from the payday-lending market. Payday loans are short-term loans of $100
to $500. Loan fees average $15 to $20 per $100 of principal, implying an annual percentage rate
(APR) of over 400 percent. Despite these high interest rates, payday lenders have more storefronts
in the United States than McDonald’s and Starbucks combined, with nearly 19 million households
receiving a payday loan in 2010 (Skiba and Tobacman 2011). The payday-loan market is also
extremely high risk, with more than 19 percent of initial loans in our sample ending in default.
Payday borrowers are particularly vulnerable to market failures due to their low incomes and
poor credit histories. Two-thirds of payday borrowers report not having applied for credit at least
once in the past ﬁve years due to the anticipation of rejection, and nearly three-quarters report
having been turned down by a lender or not given as much credit as applied for in the last ﬁve
years (Elliehausen and Lawrence 2001, IoData 2002). Payday loans also have the unique feature
that delinquencies are not reported to traditional credit-rating agencies, and default comes with
few penalties outside of calls from debt collection agencies. Theory suggests that asymmetric-
information problems are exacerbated by precisely these kinds of commitment problems (Athreya,
Tam and Young 2009, Chatterjee et al. 2007, Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt 2010, White 2007,
42White 2009).
We identify the impact of moral hazard in the payday-loan market using two separate empir-
ical models. The ﬁrst exploits discontinuities in the relationship between borrower pay and loan
eligibility to estimate a regression-discontinuity design. Many payday lenders offer loans in $50
increments up to but not exceeding half of an individual’s biweekly pay. As a result, there are
loan-eligibility cutoffs around which very similar borrowers are offered different size loans. These
institutional features allow us to attribute any discontinuous relationship between loan outcomes
and pay at the loan-eligibility cutoffs to the causal impact of loan size. Our second empirical
model uses a discontinuous change in slope relating borrower pay to loan eligibility to estimate
a regression-kink design. In this separate sample of states, payday lenders offer loans in contin-
uous increments that are no larger than half of a borrower’s biweekly pay, capping loans for all
borrowers at a state-mandated limit of either $300 or $500. The fact that loan amounts are offered
in continuous increments up to these caps implies that there is a discontinuous change in the slope
relating loan eligibility and biweekly pay at each loan cap. We use this discontinuous change in
the slope to provide a second set of moral-hazard estimates. As the correlation between default
and loan size combines the selection and incentive effects of loan size, we can, under reasonable
assumptions, obtain an estimate of adverse selection by subtracting our moral-hazard estimates
from the cross-sectional coefﬁcient relating loan size and borrower default.
We begin our empirical analysis by documenting credit constraints among payday borrowers.
Using our regression-discontinuity strategy, we ﬁnd that a $50 increase in payday credit leads to
a $19.73 to $22.02 increase in average loan size. Thus, payday borrowers borrow 39 to 44 cents
per additional dollar of credit. These estimates are larger than previous ﬁndings using data from
different types of debtors, likely reﬂecting the fact that payday borrowers are particularly credit
constrained. For example, the typical credit-card holder consumes 10 to 14 cents out of every
additional dollar of credit (Gross and Souleles 2002), while the typical ﬁnancially constrained
household consumes 20 to 40 cents out of every additional dollar in tax-rebate amount (Johnson,
Parker, and Souleles 2006).
43Surprisingly, bothourregression-discontinuityandregression-kinkempiricalstrategiessuggest
that relaxing these credit constraints lowers the probability that a payday borrower defaults. A $50
increase in payday-loan size leads to a 4.4 to 6.4 percentage point decrease in the probability of
default in our regression-discontinuity strategy sample, a 22 to 33 percent decrease. Using our
regression-kink design, we ﬁnd that a $50 increase in payday-loan size lowers the probability of
default by 1.6 to 4.6 percentage points, a 17 to 23 percent decrease. The ﬁnding that larger loans
lower the rate of default is surprising given the prominence of moral hazard in the theoretical
literature and the empirical relevance of moral hazard in other consumer-lending markets (Adams,
Einav, and Levin 2009).
Conversely, we ﬁnd economically and statistically signiﬁcant adverse selection into larger pay-
day loans. In our OLS results, which combine both adverse selection and moral hazard, a $50
increase in loan size is associated with a 1.0 to 2.3 percentage point increase in the probability of
default in our regression-discontinuity sample. Taken together with our estimates of moral hazard,
this suggests that borrowers who choose a loan that is $50 larger are 5.4 to 8.7 percentage points
more likely to default, a 28 to 44 percent increase. In our regression-kink sample, the OLS results
suggest that borrowers who choose a $50 larger loan are 16 to 47 percent more likely to default.
Our results are therefore consistent with the view that adverse selection alone can lead to credit
constraints in equilibrium.
We conclude our analysis by examining two key threats to our interpretation of the regression-
discontinuity and regression-kink estimates. The ﬁrst threat is that individuals may opt out of
borrowing if they are not eligible for a sufﬁciently large loan. Such selective borrowing could
invalidate our regression-discontinuity design by creating discontinuous differences in borrower
characteristics around the eligibility cutoffs. We evaluate this possibility by testing whether the
density of borrowers is a continuous function of the loan-eligibility cutoffs and by examining the
continuity of observable borrower characteristics at the cutoffs. The second threat to our identiﬁ-
cation strategy is that our empirical design is misspeciﬁed. To ensure that our estimates identify
discontinuities that exist solely due to institutional factors, we replicate our empirical results in a
44set of states where loan size is not a discontinuous function of income.
Our work ﬁts into an important empirical literature estimating moral hazard and adverse se-
lection in credit markets in the United States (Ausubel 1991, Edelberg 2003, Edelberg 2004) and
abroad (Klonner and Rai 2006, Karlan and Zinman 2009). Ausubel (1999), for example, uses ran-
domized credit-card offers to show that a 1 percent increase in introductory interest rate increases
the probability of delinquency by 1.2 percentage points and the probability of bankruptcy by 0.4
percentage points. Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009) exploit exogenous variation in price and mini-
mum down payments to identify moral hazard and adverse selection in an automobile-loan market.
Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009) estimate that for a given auto-loan borrower, a $1,000 increase
in loan size increases the probability of default by 16 percent. Individuals who borrow an extra
$1,000 for unobservable reasons have an 18 percent higher rate of default than those who do not.
Also related is Melzer and Morgan (2010), who ﬁnd adverse selection into bank overdraft services
when payday lending is available.
This paper complements this literature in three ways. First, the characteristics of the borrowers
make this a particularly important population for which to study credit dynamics. As previously
discussed, payday borrowers are particularly vulnerable to market failures given their low incomes
and poor credit histories. Payday borrowers apply for payday loans precisely when they have
exhausted traditional credit options. In fact, 80 percent of payday-loan applicants have no available
credit on credit cards when they apply for a payday loan (Bhutta, Skiba, and Tobacman 2012).
Second, the institutional features of the payday-loan market allow for a particularly sharp research
design. Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009), whose work is most closely related to ours, use price and
down-payment variation across time, credit categories, and regions to identify the impact of moral
hazard. Their empirical design therefore relies on having controlled for all sources of endogenous
variation. In contrast, we focus on two transparent and well-identiﬁed sources of variation in
payday-loan size to identify moral hazard. Third, we are the ﬁrst to explore the role of information
frictions in the payday-loan market, one of the largest and fastest growing sources of subprime
credit in the United States. Since the emergence of payday lending in the mid-1990s, annual loan
45volume has grown from approximately $8 billion in 2000 to $44 billion in 2008. In comparison,
the subprime automobile-loan market totaled approximately $50 billion in 2006 (J.D. Power and
Associates 2007).
Our paper also adds to a large literature documenting consumer-credit constraints. The major-
ity of this literature has inferred credit constraints from the excess sensitivity of consumption to
expected changes in labor income (e.g., Hall and Mishkin 1982, Altonji and Siow 1987, Zeldes
1989, Runkle 1991, Stephens 2003, Stephens 2006, Stephens 2008) or tax rebates (e.g., Parker
1999, Souleles 1999, Johnson, Parker, and Souleles 2006). Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007) and
Chetty (2008) also ﬁnd excess sensitivity of job-search behavior to available liquidity, which they
interpret as evidence of liquidity constraints.
Finally, our paper is related to a rapidly expanding literature examining the impact of payday
credit. There is evidence that loan access may help borrowers smooth negative shocks (Morse
2011) and avoid ﬁnancial distress (Morgan, Strain, and Seblani 2012). On the other hand, there
is also evidence that loan access may erode job performance (Carrell and Zinman 2008), increase
bankruptcy (Skiba and Tobacman 2011) and lead to increased difﬁculty paying mortgage, rent, and
utility bills (Melzer 2011).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.1. provides background on
our institutional setting and describes our data. Section 3.2. reviews the theoretical framework
that motivates our empirical analysis. Section 3.3. describes our empirical strategy. Section 3.4.
presents our results. Section 3.5. discusses potential mechanisms through which larger payday
loanslowertheprobabilityofdefault. Section3.6.concludes. WebAppendixAprovidesadditional
results.
3.1. Data and Institutional Setting
Payday loans are small, short-term loans collateralized with a personal check. In a typical payday-
loan transaction, individuals ﬁll out loan applications and present their most recent pay stubs,
checking-account statements, utility or phone bills, and a government-issued photo ID. Lenders
46use applicants’ pay stubs to infer their next payday and designate that day as the loan’s due date.
The customer writes a check for the amount of the loan plus a ﬁnance charge that is typically $15 to
$18 per $100 borrowed.17 The lender agrees to hold the check until the next payday, typically for
about two weeks, at which time the customer redeems the check with cash or the lender deposits
the check. A loan is in default if the check does not clear.
Payday-loan eligibility is typically a discontinuous function of net pay, with the precise eli-
gibility rules varying across ﬁrms and states. In our data, loan-eligibility rules take two forms.
In the ﬁrst form, loans are offered in $50 increments that are no larger than half of a borrower’s
biweekly pay. Thus, loan eligibility increases discontinuously by $50 at each $100 pay interval.
Stores using this rule form our regression-discontinuity sample. A second set of stores offer loans
in continuous increments that are no larger than half of a borrower’s biweekly pay, capping loans
for all borrowers at a state-mandated limit of either $300 or $500. The fact that loan amounts are
offered in continuous increments implies that there are no discontinuous jumps in loan eligibility.
Instead, there is a discontinuous change in the slope relating loan eligibility and biweekly pay at
the loan-limit amount. Stores using this eligibility rule form our regression-kink sample.
Our speciﬁc data come from three large payday lenders. Lending information is available from
January 2000 through July 2004 in 15 states for the ﬁrst ﬁrm in our data (hereafter Firm A), from
January 2008 through April 2010 in two states for the second ﬁrm in our data (hereafter Firm B),
and from January 2008 through June 2011 in two states for the third ﬁrm in our data (hereafter
Firm C).18 We combine these data with records of repayment and default from each ﬁrm. This
gives us information on borrower characteristics, loan terms, and the subsequent loan outcomes.
Our data from Firm A include information on each borrower’s income, home address, gender, race,
age, checking-account balance, and subprime credit score. Our data from Firms B and C are more
sparse, only including information on each borrower’s income, home address, and age.
17While some lenders use credit scores to screen applicants, none of the ﬁrms in our sample use risk-based pricing
and all borrowers pay the same ﬁnance charge. See Agarwal, Skiba, and Tobacman (2009) for more information on
the subprime credit-scoring process.
18Our data spans periods both before and after the Great Recession. Our regression-discontinuity sample is too
small to provide estimates by period. Our regression-kink estimates are nearly identical for both Firm A and Firm C,
whose data span both time periods.
47Our regression-discontinuity sample consists of all initial loans made in four states that offer
loans in $50 increments. This sample includes Firm A stores in Ohio and Tennessee and Firm B
storesinKansasandMissouri. Werestrictouranalysistoborrowerspaidbiweeklyorsemimonthly,
whomakeupnearly70percentofallborrowers, toallowamorestraightforwardpresentationofthe
regression-discontinuity results. Results are nearly identical including all borrowers. Finally, we
restrict our regression-discontinuity analysis to borrowers earning within $100 of a loan-eligibility
cutoff, or borrowers who make between $100 and $500 in Tennessee, which limits loans at $200,
and between $100 and $1,100 in the other three states in our sample. These restrictions leave us
with 2,350 observations from Firm A and 7,123 observations from Firm B.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 present summary statistics for the two ﬁrms in our regression-
discontinuity sample. Weighting the mean from each ﬁrm by the number of borrowers, the typical
borrower borrows $226.71 (including fees) in his ﬁrst transaction and earns $682.39 every two
weeks. Nineteen and a half percent of borrowers default on their ﬁrst loan, with the rate being
more than ten percentage points higher for borrowers at Firm B. The higher rate of default may be
due, at least in part, to these loans being made during the Great Recession. The more detailed data
from Firm A show that 28.3 percent of borrowers are male and 77.8 percent are black, although
these numbers vary widely across store locations. Just under 27 percent of payday borrowers in
our regression-discontinuity sample own a home, 25.3 percent use direct deposit, and 2.4 percent
have their wages garnished by a creditor.
Our regression-kink sample consists of all initial loans made in four states that offer loans
in $1 or $10 increments. This sample includes Firm A stores in Alabama, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Texas. The sample for
Firm C includes stores in California and Oklahoma. Stores in California limit loans at $300, while
all other states limit loans at $500. Following our regression-discontinuity sample, we restrict
our regression-kink analysis to borrowers paid biweekly or semimonthly. We also drop borrowers
making less than $100 each biweekly pay period and those making more than $1,000 than the
amount necessary to qualify for the largest available payday loan.
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49Thus, weincludeborrowersmakingbetween$100and$1,600inCaliforniaand$100and$2,000in
all other states in our regression-kink sample. These restrictions leave us with 91,806 observations
from Firm A and 38,311 observations from Firm C.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 present summary statistics for our regression-kink sample. Weight-
ing the mean from each ﬁrm by the number of borrowers, the typical borrower in our regression-
kinksampleborrows$267.64inhisﬁrsttransaction, $40.93morethaninourregression-discontinuity
sample, and earns $840.92 every two weeks, $158.53 more. Borrowers in our regression-kink
sample also default at a rate of 12.3 percent, more than seven percentage points less than the
regression-discontinuity sample. Borrowers in the regression-kink sample are also less likely to
be black, have lower credit scores, and are more likely to own a home than borrowers in the
regression-discontinuity sample. The positive selection into our regression-kink sample is due
to the sample including borrowers earning between $100 and either $1,600 or $2,000 every two
weeks, as opposed to our regression-discontinuity sample that only includes borrowers earning
between $100 and $1,100. Moreover, our regression-kink sample includes more borrowers from
Firm A, whose data is drawn from before the Great Recession when default rates were lower for
all payday-lending ﬁrms.
3.2. Conceptual Framework
Models of asymmetric information predict that information frictions will produce a positive cor-
relation between loan default and the size or price of that loan.19 In the moral-hazard version
of the model, individual borrowers are more likely to default on larger or more expensive loans.
The underlying behavioral mechanisms consistent with these moral-hazard models span situations
whereby individuals have a great deal of control over their default decisions (e.g. strategic default)
to situations where individuals have relatively little control and default is due largely to unexpected
shocks. For instance, payday borrowers may have less incentive to repay a larger loan even when
19Modelsofasymmetricinformationtypicallyassumelimitedcommitmentbyborrowers, ortheideathatborrowers
always have the option of personal bankruptcy. An emerging literature suggests that asymmetric-information issues
are no longer relevant when limited commitment can be fully resolved (Athreya, Tam, and Young 2009, Chatterjee et
al. 2007, Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt 2010, White 2007, White 2009).
50they have the ability to do so. This can happen if the penalties of default increase less quickly
than the beneﬁts of default. Borrowers will therefore be more likely to voluntarily default as the
loan amount increases. This can lead to credit constraints in the payday-loan market because bor-
rowers will not internalize the full increase in default costs that come with larger loan sizes, with
lenders needing to cap loan sizes to prevent overborrowing. In this scenario, improved collection
or repayment schemes can help relax credit constraints for all payday borrowers.
In models of adverse selection, borrowers at a high risk of default choose larger loans. Adverse
selectionmayresultfromforward-lookingborrowersanticipatingthehighlikelihoodofdefaultand
therefore choosing larger and more valuable loans. Conversely, payday borrowers that are more
illiquid today and more in need of a larger loan may also be more likely to be illiquid later and
have trouble with repayment. Adverse selection of either kind will lead to credit constraints in the
payday-loan market whenever lenders cannot observe a borrower’s risk type, as lenders will need
to deny credit to both high- and low-risk types. In this scenario, credit scoring and information
coordination can help mitigate selection problems and increase the supply of credit to low-risk
borrowers.
It is impossible to identify the separate impact of each of these channels with our available
data. Instead, the goal of our paper is to document the presence of liquidity constraints in payday
lending and to assess the consequences of moral hazard and adverse selection in our setting. Our
estimates will likely reﬂect a number of the mechanisms discussed above. In Section 3.5., we will
explore which of these mechanisms is most plausible given the pattern of results.
3.3. Empirical Strategy
We estimate two empirical models to identify the impact of moral hazard in the payday-loan mar-
ket. The ﬁrst empirical model exploits discontinuities in the relationship between net pay and loan
eligibility to estimate a regression-discontinuity design. The second empirical model uses loan
limits to estimate a regression-kink design.20
20A third empirical strategy to estimate the impact of moral hazard exploits the fact that payday loans in Tennessee
are capped at $200. As a result, there is a trend break in the relationship between net pay and maximum loan size in
51Consider the following model of the causal relationship between default (Di) and loan size
(Li):
Di = ↵ +  Li + "i (4)
The parameter of interest is  , which measures the causal effect of loan size on default (e.g., moral
hazard). The problem for inference is that if individuals select a loan size because of important
unobserved determinants of later outcomes, such estimates may be biased. In particular, it is
plausible that people who select larger loans have a different probability of default even if loan
size was held constant: E["i|Li] 6=0 . Since Li may be a function of default risk, this can lead to a
bias in the direct estimation of   using OLS.
Thekeyintuitionofourﬁrststrategyisthatthisbiascanbeovercomeiftheconditionaldistribu-
tion of unobserved determinants of default E["i|payi] trends smoothly through the loan-eligibility
cutoffs used by payday lenders. In this scenario, the distribution of unobserved characteristics of
individuals who just barely qualiﬁed for a larger loan is the same as the distribution among those
who just barely did not qualify:
E["i|payi = cl +  ]  !0+ = E["i|payi = cl    ] !0+ (5)
where payi is an individual’s net pay and cl is the eligibility cutoff for loan size l. Equation (5)
therefore implies that the distribution of individuals to either side of the cutoff is as good as random
with respect to unobserved determinants of default, "i. Since loan size is a discontinuous function
of pay, whereas the distribution of unobservable determinants of default, "i, is by assumption
continuous at the cutoffs, the coefﬁcient   is identiﬁed. Intuitively, any discontinuous relation
between default and net pay at the cutoffs can be attributed to the causal impact of loan size under
the identiﬁcation assumption in Equation (5).
Tennessee. Speciﬁcally, we can use the interaction of an indicator variable for a borrower residing in Tennessee and
being eligible for a $200 loan with net pay as an instrumental variable. The differences in state trends in loan amounts
and default after the $200 cutoff identiﬁes the impact of moral hazard. Web Appendix Table 1 reports these difference-
in-difference results. The results are qualitatively similar to our preferred regression-discontinuity and regression-kink
estimates.
52Formally, let loan size Li be a smooth function of an individual’s pay with a discontinuous
jump at each of nine loan-eligibility cutoffs cl:
Li = f(payi)+
500 X
l=100
 l {payi   cl} + ⌘i (6)
where  l measures the effect of loan eligibility on loan size at each of the nine cutoffs.  l can be
interpreted as the marginal propensity to borrow estimated by Gross and Souleles (2002) and others
at each eligibility cutoff. We can use Equation (6) as the ﬁrst stage to estimate the average causal
effect for individuals induced into a larger loan by earning an amount just above a cutoff. The two-
stage least squares regression controls for the underlying relationship between pay and both default
and loan size using f(payi), and instruments for loan size using loan eligibility {payi   cl} at
each cutoff l.
In practice, the functional form of f(payi) is unknown. In our empirical analysis, we experi-
ment with several functional forms to control for borrower pay, including a seventh-order polyno-
mial, a linear spline, and a local linear regression. To address potential concerns about discreteness
in pay, we cluster our standard errors by pay (Lee and Card 2008). We also control for month-,
year-, and state-of-loan effects in all speciﬁcations. Adding controls for age, gender, race, baseline
credit score, and baseline checking-account balance leaves the results essentially unchanged.
As with any regression-discontinuity approach, one threat to a causal interpretation of our esti-
mates is that individuals may opt out of borrowing if they are not eligible for a large enough loan.
Such selective borrowing could invalidate our empirical design by creating discontinuous differ-
ences in borrower characteristics around the eligibility cutoffs. In Section 5.4 we evaluate this
possibility in two ways: (1) by testing whether the density of borrowers is a continuous function
of loan-eligibility cutoffs, and (2) by examining the continuity of observable borrower character-
istics around the cutoffs. Neither test points to the kind of selective borrowing that invalidates our
empirical design.
A more general threat is the possibility that our regression-discontinuity design is misspeciﬁed.
53To ensure that our estimates identify actual discontinuities in loan size and default that exist due
to institutional factors, we replicate our empirical speciﬁcations in a set of states where loan size
is not a discontinuous function of income. Consistent with our empirical design, we do not ﬁnd a
relationship between loan size and income or default and income around the loan-eligibility cutoffs
in these states.
Finally, our regression-discontinuity approach assumes that loan eligibility impacts default
only through loan size. This assumes, for example, that individuals do not strategically repay
lenders who offer higher credit lines in order to protect future access to credit. If this assump-
tion is violated, our reduced-form estimates represent the net impact of increasing an individual’s
credit limit more generally. Note that Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009) use the same assumption to
identify the impact of moral hazard in the subprime auto-loan market.
To complement our regression-discontinuity strategy, our second statistical approach exploits
loan limits in states that offer payday loans in relatively continuous amounts. In these states,
payday lenders offer loans in continuous increments that are no larger than half of a borrower’s
biweekly pay up to a state-mandated limit of either $300 or $500. The fact that loan amounts are
offered in continuous increments up to these caps implies that there is a discontinuous change in
the slope relating loan eligibility and biweekly pay at each loan cap. We use this discontinuous
change in the slope to provide a second set of moral-hazard estimates.
Formally, let loan size Li be a smooth function of an individual’s pay with a discontinuous
change in the slope after the largest available loan in a state cmax:
Li = payi + ⇡ {payi   cmax}·payi + ⌘i (7)
where ⇡ measures the effect of the loan limit on the relationship between earnings and loan size.
Under a number of assumptions, including a monotonicity condition analogous to the standard
instrumental-variables framework (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996), we can use Equation (7)
as the ﬁrst stage to provide a second set of moral-hazard estimates. The two-stage least squares
54regressioncontrolsfortheunderlyingrelationshipbetweenpayandbothdefaultandloansizeusing
payi, and instruments for loan size using the change in slope at the loan cap {payi   cmax}. The
identiﬁed two-stage least squares parameter is a weighted average of marginal effects, where the
weights are proportional to the magnitude of the individual-speciﬁc kinks (see Card . (2012) for
additional details).
There are two important assumptions necessary to interpret our regression-kink estimates as
causal. Following our regression-discontinuity design, the conditional distribution of unobserved
determinants of default E["i|payi] must trend smoothly through the loan caps used by payday
lenders. In addition, the conditional distribution of unobserved determinants E["i|payi] must be
continuously differentiable in pay. In practice, these assumptions imply that borrowers cannot
precisely change their income, while allowing for other less extreme forms of endogeneity such as
borrowers having imperfect control over their preborrowing earnings.
Similar to our regression-discontinuity approach, the identifying assumptions required by the
regression-kink design generate strong predictions for the distribution of predetermined covariates
around the loan caps. Following our robustness checks for our regression-discontinuity design, we
test our regression-kink design in two ways: (1) by testing whether the density of borrowers is
a continuous function of kink point, and (2) by examining the continuity of observable borrower
characteristics at the kink point. There is no evidence that the number of borrowers changes at the
kinkpoint, withtheresultsfromSection5.4rulingoutevenmodestselectioninoroutofthesample
around the kink point. However, there are some small changes in the observable characteristics of
borrowers around the kink points. Thus, our regression-kink estimates should be interpreted with
these changes in mind.
A simple extension of our regression-discontinuity and regression-kink approach, ﬁrst pio-
neered by Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009), allows us to estimate the magnitude of selection in our
sample. Recall that a cross-sectional regression of default on loan size combines both selection
and incentive effects. By subtracting our estimate of moral hazard from the cross-sectional coef-
ﬁcient on loan size, we obtain an estimate of selection. It is important to note that this approach
55assumes that our estimate of moral hazard is the relevant estimate for the full population. There are
nine cutoffs in our sample and this assumption would be violated if borrowers right around these
eligibility cutoffs have a different marginal return to credit than other borrowers.
3.4. Results
3.4.1. The Impact of Loan Eligibility on Loan Amount
Figures 1A - 1C present regression-discontinuity estimates of the impact of loan eligibility on loan
amount. Each ﬁgure plots average loan amounts in $25 income bins for the ﬁrst loans of borrowers
with biweekly take-home pay between $100 and $1,100. Figure 1A plots ﬁtted values from a
regression of loan size on a seventh-order polynomial in net pay. That is, the ﬁtted values for
Figure 1A come from the following speciﬁcation:
Li = ↵0 +
500 X
l=100
↵1l {payi   cl} +
7 X
p=1
 1ppay
p
i + "i (8)
where ↵1l is the effect of having a biweekly income above the cutoff for each loan size l.
Figure 1B plots ﬁtted values from a linear spline speciﬁcation:
Li = ↵0 +
500 X
l=100
 
↵1l {payi   cl} +  1l {payi   cl}·(payi   cl)
 
+ "i (9)
Figure 1C stacks data from each cutoff and controls for pay with a linear trend interacted with
the loan-eligibility cutoff:
b Li = ↵0 + ↵1 {payi   c} +  1(payi   c)+ 2
 
{payi   c}·(payi   c)
 
+ "i (10)
where ↵1 is the impact of having an income above the loan-eligibility cutoff. To normalize the loan
amounts across the nine cutoffs, Figure 1C plots residualized loan amounts b Li from a regression of
raw loan size on cutoff ﬁxed effects. All three ﬁgures exclude borrowers from Tennessee earning
more than $500.
56Figure 3.1
Loan Eligibility and Loan Amount in the RD Sample
A. Polynomial B. Linear Spline
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58Loan eligibility is highly predictive of average loan size across all three speciﬁcations. While
average loan amount is approximately constant between each two consecutive cutoffs, the typical
loan increases approximately $25 at each $50 eligibility cutoff. It is also interesting to note that
at lower cutoffs, borrowers take out loans that are near the maximum allowed level. The average
loan size for borrowers earning just above the $100 cutoff is at or just above $100. In contrast, the
typical debtor around higher cutoffs takes out loans that are signiﬁcantly less than the maximum
loan amount. The average loan size at the $500 cutoff, for example, is just over $300.
Table 2 presents formal estimates for the ﬁgures just described. The sample consists of ﬁrst
loans for borrowers with biweekly take-home pay between $100 and $1,100. Analogous to Figure
1A, columns 1 and 2 control for income using a seventh-order polynomial in net pay. Columns
3 and 4, corresponding to Figure 1B, control for income using a linear spline. Columns 5 and 6
present results that are analogous to Figure 1C, where we stack data from each cutoff and control
for income using a linear trend and a linear trend interacted with earning above the loan-eligibility
cutoff. Thedependentvariableisrawloanamount. Allspeciﬁcationscontrolformonth-, year-, and
state-of-loan effects, with columns 5 and 6 adding controls for cutoff ﬁxed effects. Columns 2, 4,
and 6 also control for age, race, gender, credit score, checking-account balance, home ownership,
direct-deposit status, and garnishment status. Observations from Firm B only control for age, the
only demographic characteristic available. All speciﬁcations restrict the effect of each loan cutoff
to have the same impact on loan size, and cluster standard errors at the pay level.
Consistent with the graphical evidence, loan eligibility is highly predictive of loan amount.
Controlling for income using a seventh-order polynomial, borrowers with earnings just above a
loan cutoff borrow $22.02 more than borrowers with earnings just below a cutoff. Adding con-
trols for age, race, gender, marital status, credit score, and checking-account balance leaves the
results essentially unchanged. Controlling for income with a linear spline speciﬁcation, the effect
is $21.91. Stacking data from each cutoff the effect is $19.63.
Our regression-discontinuity estimates therefore imply that individuals in the payday market
borrow 39 to 44 cents out of every additional dollar of available credit. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
59this suggests that payday borrowers are much more liquidity constrained than other individuals in
the United States. For instance, Gross and Souleles (2002) ﬁnd that a $1 increase in a credit-card
holder’s limit raises card spending by 10 to 14 cents, and Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006)
ﬁnd that households immediately consumed 20 to 40 cents for every $1 increase in their 2001 tax
rebate.
Figure 2 plots average loan size and biweekly pay for ﬁrst-time payday borrowers in our
regression-kink sample. The sample consists of borrowers living in states offering payday loans in
$1 or $10 increments who are paid biweekly or semimonthly. We restrict the sample to borrowers
earning more than $100, and less than the kink point plus $1000. The smoothed line controls for
pay interacted with being eligible for the maximum loan size in a state cmax. That is, the ﬁtted
values for Figure 2 come from the following local linear speciﬁcation:
Li = ↵0 + ↵1(payi   cmax)+ 1 {payi   cmax}·(payi   cmax)+"i (11)
estimated separately for borrowers in states with a $300 and $500 maximum loan size.
As expected given the loan-eligibility formula, Figure 2 shows very clear kinks in the empirical
relationship between average loan size and biweekly earnings, with a sharp decrease in slope as
earnings pass the loan-limit threshold. However, the relationship between loan amount and earn-
ings before the kink is less than the 0.5 predicted by the loan-eligibility formula, again suggesting
that not all borrowers take out the maximum loan available. Loan size is also increasing in earnings
after the kink point, suggesting that there is a slight positive relationship between underlying loan
demand and earnings.21
21Web Appendix Table 2 presents results estimating the association between borrower characteristics and loan
choice in our regression-discontinuity and regression-kink samples. The dependent variable for each regression is an
indicator for choosing the largest available loan. Thirty-three percent of borrowers in our regression-discontinuity
sample choose the largest available loan, as do 28 percent of borrowers in the regression-kink sample. Web Appendix
Table 2 shows that an additional hundred dollars of biweekly pay is associated with a 7.4 to 7.6 percentage point
decrease in the probability of choosing the largest loan in the regression-discontinuity sample, and a 0.6 percentage
point decrease in the regression-kink sample. In both samples, borrowers who are older, white, and male are more
likely to choose a larger loan. Borrowers with higher credit scores and lower checking-account balances are also
somewhat more likely to choose larger loans, though not all point estimates are statistically signiﬁcant.
60Figure 3.2
Loan Eligibility and Loan Amount in the RK Sample
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Notes: These ﬁgures plots average loan size and biweekly pay for ﬁrst-time payday borrowers in
our regression-kink sample. The sample consists of borrowers living in states offering payday loans
in $1 or $10 increments who are paid biweekly or semimonthly and paid more than $100 and within
$1000 of a kink point. The smoothed line controls for pay interacted with being eligible for the
maximum loan size in a state. See text for additional details.
61Table 3.3
Regression-Kink Estimates of the
Effect of Loan Eligibility on Loan Amount
$300 Cutoff $500 Cutoff
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pay x Loan Cap  0.257⇤⇤⇤  0.256⇤⇤⇤  0.251⇤⇤⇤  0.249⇤⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Pay 0.294⇤⇤⇤ 0.291⇤⇤⇤ 0.286⇤⇤⇤ 0.283⇤⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Age 0.423⇤⇤⇤ 0.013
(0.030) (0.037)
Black – 0.483
(1.185)
Male –  4.810⇤⇤⇤
(1.261)
Credit Score –  0.006⇤
(0.003)
Checkings – 0.004⇤⇤⇤
(0.001)
Home Owner – 11.669⇤⇤⇤
(1.416)
Direct Deposit – 0.424
(0.972)
Garnishment –  1.154
(4.045)
Observations 33,259 33,259 96,766 96,766
Notes: This table reports regression-kink estimates of the impact of loan eligibility interacted with
payonloanamount. Thesampleconsistsofﬁrst-timepayday-loanborrowerslivinginstatesoffering
payday loans in $1 or $10 increments who are paid biweekly or semimonthly earning more than
$100 and within $1000 of a kink point. Loan amount is limited to half of net pay up to the loan
limit. Columns 1-2 include states with a $300 loan limit. Columns 3-4 include states with a $500
loan limit. The dependent variable is the dollar amount of the borrower’s ﬁrst loan. Loan cap is an
indicator for eligibility for the largest loan available in a state. All regressions control for month-,
year-, and state-of-loan effects. Standard errors are clustered by pay. *** = signiﬁcant at 1 percent
level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
62Table 3 presents formal regression-kink estimates controlling for month-, year-, and state-of-
loan effects. For borrowers in states capping loans at $300, loan amount increases by 29.4 cents
for each additional dollar of earnings before the kink point, compared to only 3.7 cents after the
kink point. In $500 cap states, loan amount increases by 28.6 cents for each additional dollar of
earnings before the kink point, compared to only 3.5 cents after the kink point.
3.4.2. Moral Hazard
Figures 3A - C plot default and biweekly pay for payday borrowers in our regression-discontinuity
sample. These ﬁgures represent the reduced-form impact of loan eligibility on default. Following
the ﬁrst-stage regression-discontinuity results, each ﬁgure plots average loan amounts in $25 in-
come bins for the ﬁrst loans of borrowers with biweekly take-home pay between $100 and $1,100.
Figure 3A plots ﬁtted values controlling for income using a seventh-order polynomial. Figure 3B
plots ﬁtted values using a linear spline. Figure 3C plots residualized default rates after stacking
data from each cutoff and controlling for income using a linear trend interacted with earning above
the loan-eligibility cutoff. In sharp contrast to previous research, there is no evidence of moral
hazard in our setting. In fact, default appears to be somewhat lower for borrowers with earnings
just above loan cutoffs.
Table 4 presents formal two-stage least squares estimates of the causal impact of an additional
dollar in loan amount on default. These two-stage least squares estimates pool information across
all loan-eligibility cutoffs and are therefore more precise than the reduced-form results presented
in Figure 3. All speciﬁcations instrument for loan amount using the maximum eligible loan, and
controlformonth-, year-, andstate-of-loaneffects. Columns5and6controlforcutoffﬁxedeffects,
with columns 2, 4, and 6 controlling for age, race, gender, credit score, checking-account balance,
home ownership, direct-deposit status, and garnishment status. Observations from Firm B control
for age, the only available demographic characteristic. All speciﬁcations restrict the effect of each
loan cutoff to have the same impact on loan size and cluster standard errors at the pay level.
63Figure 3.3
Loan Eligibility and Default in the RD Sample
A. Polynomial B. Linear Spline
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Notes: These ﬁgures plot average default and biweekly pay for ﬁrst-time payday borrowers in our
regression-discontinuity sample. The sample consists of borrowers living in states offering payday
loans in $50 increments who are paid biweekly or semimonthly between $100 and $1100. The
smoothed line in Figure A controls for a seventh-order polynomial in net pay. Figure B controls
for a linear spline in net pay. Figure C stacks data from each cutoff and controls for net pay using
a linear regression and a linear regression interacted with the loan cutoff. See text for additional
details.
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65The dependent variable in each speciﬁcation is an indicator variable equal to one if the debtor
defaults on their payday loan. We multiply all estimates by 100 so that each coefﬁcient can be
interpreted as the percentage change in the probability of default.
Our regression-discontinuity results from Table 4 suggest that a larger loan decreases the prob-
ability that a payday borrower defaults on his ﬁrst loan. Controlling for income using a seventh-
order polynomial, a $1 larger loan is associated with a 0.127 percentage point decrease in default.
This implies that a $50 larger loan (e.g. the typical increase in loan eligibility) is associated with
a 6.35 percentage point decrease in default, a 32 percent decrease from the mean default rate of
19.47 percent. Controlling for income with a linear spline speciﬁcation, a $50 larger loan lowers
default by 6.05 percentage points, a 31 percent decrease. Stacking data from each cutoff, the effect
of a $50 larger loan is 4.35 percentage points, a 22 percent drop in the probability of default in our
regression-discontinuity sample.
Figure 4 plots default and biweekly pay for payday borrowers in our regression-kink sample.
Following the ﬁrst-stage results, there is a clear kink in the empirical relationship between default
and biweekly earnings, with a sharp decrease in slope as earnings pass the loan-limit threshold.
This pattern is consistent with larger loans decreasing the probability of default.
Table 5 presents formal two-stage least squares estimates of the causal impact of an additional
dollar in loan amount on default using our regression-kink design. We instrument for loan amount
using the interaction between pay and the kink point, and use a local linear control speciﬁcation
to control for pay. We also control for month-, year-, and state-of-loan effects, and multiply all
estimates by 100. In our regression-kink speciﬁcation, a $1 larger loan is associated with a 0.09
percentage point decrease in the probability of default at the $300 cutoff and a 0.3 percentage
point decrease in the probability of default at the $500 cutoff. This implies that a $50 larger loan
is associated with a 4.55 percentage point decrease in the probability of default at the $300 cutoff,
a 21.9 percent drop, and a 1.60 percentage point decrease in the probability of default at the $500
cutoff, a 17.2 percent drop. It is worth noting the closeness of our regression-discontinuity and
regression-kink estimates given the very different samples and identiﬁcation strategies.
66Figure 3.4
Loan Eligibility and Default in the RK Sample
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Notes: These ﬁgures plots default and biweekly pay for ﬁrst-time payday borrowers in our
regression-kink sample. The sample consists of borrowers living in states offering payday loans
in $1 or $10 increments who are paid biweekly or semimonthly and paid more than $100 and within
$1000 of a kink point. The smoothed line controls for pay interacted with being eligible for the
maximum loan size in a state. See text for additional details.
67Table 3.5
Regression-Kink Estimates of the
Effect of Loan Amount on Default
$300 Cutoff $500 Cutoff
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Loan Amount  0.091⇤⇤⇤  0.088⇤⇤⇤  0.032⇤⇤⇤  0.028⇤⇤⇤
(0.017) (0.017) (0.004) (0.004)
Pay  0.009⇤⇤⇤  0.007⇤⇤⇤ 0.001 0.003⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age  0.381⇤⇤⇤  0.238⇤⇤⇤
(0.023) (0.009)
Black – 3.111⇤⇤⇤
(0.276)
Male – 1.789⇤⇤⇤
(0.294)
Credit Score –  0.019⇤⇤⇤
(0.001)
Checkings –  0.001⇤⇤⇤
(0.000)
Home Owner –  0.956⇤⇤⇤
(0.355)
Direct Deposit –  2.733⇤⇤⇤
(0.273)
Garnishment – 0.302
(1.125)
Observations 33,259 33,259 96,766 96,766
Notes: This table reports regression-kink estimates of loan amount on default. The sample consists
of ﬁrst-time payday-loan borrowers living in states offering payday loans in $1 or $10 increments
who are paid biweekly or semimonthly earning more than $100 and within $1000 of a kink point.
Columns 1-2 include states with a $300 loan limit. Columns 3-4 include states with a $500 loan
limit. The dependent variable is an indicator for default on the ﬁrst loan. All regressions instrument
for loan amount using an indicator for eligibility for the largest loan available in a state and control
for month-, year-, and state-of-loan effects. Coefﬁcients and robust standard errors are multiplied
by 100. *** = signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10
percent level.
68Table 6 and Table 7 report regression-discontinuity and regression-kink estimates interacted
with borrower age, gender, race, baseline home ownership, baseline credit score, and baseline
checking-account balance. We focus on our regression-kink results, where the larger sample size
allows for increased precision. We follow our earlier speciﬁcations by controlling for a local linear
trend in pay and month-, year-, and state-of-loan effects. We instrument for loan size using the
triple interaction of pay with the loan kink point and the relevant borrower characteristic. We
dichotomize all borrower characteristics by splitting the sample at the median. Finally, we restrict
our attention to the $500 kink point, as we do not have information on borrower characteristics for
borrowers in the $300 kink point states.
The effect of loan size on default is larger for borrowers who are younger and who are male.
A $50 increase in loan size decreases the probability that a borrower under 40 defaults by 2.2
percentage points, compared to only 0.6 percentage points for borrowers over 40. A $50 increase in
loan size also decreases the probability that a male borrower under 40 defaults by 1.65 percentage
points, compared to only 0.05 percentage points for female borrowers. However, both younger
borrowers and male borrowers are more likely to default in general, implying that the relative
effect of loan size on default is comparable between the different groups.
More striking is the lack of difference between borrowers with high and low baseline credit
scores and high and low baseline checking-account balances. In both cases, the interaction term is
economically small and not statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that the impact of loan size on
repayment behavior is similar across high- and low-risk individuals. This pattern of results is also
consistent with the regression-kink estimates from Table 5 showing similar impacts at the $300
and $500 kink points, despite large differences in the type of borrowers on those margins.
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713.4.3. Adverse Selection
Table 8 presents OLS estimates relating default to loan size. Recall that these cross-sectional
estimates combine the causal impact of loan size with the selection of borrowers into different
size loans. Under our identifying assumptions discussed in Section 4, the magnitude of adverse
selection is the coefﬁcient from our OLS regressions minus the impact of moral hazard implied by
Tables 4 and 5.
Following our earlier results, the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if a
loan ends in default. All speciﬁcations control for month-, year-, and state-of-loan effects. We
report robust standard errors in parentheses and multiply all coefﬁcients and standard errors by
100. Columns 1 and 5 present our baseline results using data from both ﬁrms in our sample and no
controls other than month-, year-, and state-of-loan ﬁxed effects. Columns 2 and 6 add controls for
net pay, columns 3 and 7 add controls for age, race gender, marriage, credit score, and checking-
account balance, and columns 4 and 8 add controls for the maximum loan a borrower is eligible
for. Observations from Firms B and C only control for age and the maximum loan available, as
other demographic controls are not available.
Consistent with the view that information frictions lead to credit constraints in equilibrium,
thereisapositiveassociationbetweenloansizeandtheprobabilityofdefault. Scalingtheestimates
to be equivalent to our two-stage least squares results, a $50 increase in loan size is associated with
a 1.0 percentage point increase in the probability of default in our regression-discontinuity sample,
and a 0.4 percentage point increase in the probability of default in our regression-kink sample.
Controlling only for biweekly pay, a $50 increase in loan size is associated with a 2.3 percentage
point increase in the probability of default in our regression-discontinuity sample, and a 1.3 per-
centage point increase in our regression-kink sample. Controlling for borrower characteristics and
loan eligibility yields similar results to those that control for pay only.
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73Taken together with our moral-hazard estimates discussed above, our results from Table 8 im-
ply that borrowers who select a $50 larger loan are 5.4 to 8.65 percentage points more likely to
default on their ﬁrst payday loan in our regression-discontinuity sample, and 2.00 to 5.85 percent-
age points more likely to default in our regression-kink sample. These represent a 28 to 44 percent
increase in the probability of default in our discontinuity sample, and a 16 to 47 percent increase in
our regression-kink sample. The precision of both our two-stage least squares and OLS estimates
result in our adverse-selection estimates also being highly statistically signiﬁcant, with p-values of
less than 0.001 across all speciﬁcations.
3.4.4. Speciﬁcation Checks
This section presents results from a series of speciﬁcation checks for our regression-discontinuity
and regression-kink estimates. First, we test the assumption that individuals do not selectively
borrow based on loan eligibility. Second, we replicate our results in states without the discontinuity
as a more general falsiﬁcation test.
Our ﬁrst set of speciﬁcation checks examines the assumption that individuals eligible for larger
loans are not more or less likely to borrow. Such selective borrowing could invalidate our empiri-
cal design by creating discontinuous differences in borrower characteristics around the eligibility
cutoffs. Although the continuity assumption cannot be fully tested, its validity can be evaluated by
testing whether the observable characteristics of borrowers trend smoothly through the cutoffs and
by testing the density of borrowers around the cutoffs.
Web Appendix Figure 1A plots observable borrower characteristics and biweekly pay for bor-
rowers in our regression-discontinuity sample. Following our earlier results, we also plot predicted
lines controlling for a seventh-order polynomial in pay, a linear spline in pay, and a local linear
line stacking data from each eligibility cutoff. There is little evidence of the type of systematic
selection that would bias our results. Borrower characteristics appear to trend smoothly through
each cutoff.
Web Appendix Table 3 presents formal results testing whether observable baseline characteris-
74tics trend smoothly through the loan-eligibility cutoffs. We regress each baseline characteristic on
the maximum loan for which a borrower is eligible, controlling for income and month-, year-, and
state-of-loan effects. Consistent with the results from Web Appendix Figure 1A, none of the point
estimates are statistically signiﬁcant in any of the three speciﬁcations we consider.
Web Appendix Figure 1B plots the number of borrowers and biweekly pay for our regression-
discontinuity sample. The bottom row of Web Appendix Table 3 presents formal estimates testing
whether the number of borrowers trends smoothly through the loan-eligibility cutoffs. Speciﬁcally,
we regress the number of borrowers in each $10 bin on a seventh-order polynomial in pay, a linear
spline in pay, and local linear in pay stacking data from each cutoff. Consistent with our identifying
assumptions, none of these speciﬁcations suggest that the number of borrowers changes with loan
eligibility. Results are identical across a range of speciﬁcations and choice of binwidth.
WebAppendixFigure2AandWebAppendixTable4presentresultstestingwhetherobservable
characteristics trend smoothly in our regression-kink sample. Following our earlier results, we
also plot predicted lines controlling for pay interacted with the kink point. The results from Web
Appendix Figure 2A suggest that the fraction of borrowers who are black trends down after the
kink point. There are also changes in direct deposit and garnishment. Conversely, gender, credit
score, checking-account balance, home ownership, and age all appear to trend smoothly through
the kink point. Formal estimates available in Web Appendix Table 4 further suggest we cannot
rule out economically small differences at the kink point for a number of characteristics. Thus, our
regression-kink estimates should be interpreted with this caveat in mind.
Web Appendix Figure 2B plots the number of borrowers and biweekly pay for our regression-
kinksample. Wealsoplotapredictedlinefromaseventh-orderpolynomialinteractedwiththekink
point, the polynomial order that has the lowest Akaike criterion. The bottom row of Web Appendix
Table 4 presents formal estimates from the same speciﬁcation. Following Card et al. (2012) we
report the coefﬁcient and standard error on the linear interaction term. There is no evidence that
the number of borrowers changes at the kink point, with the results from Web Appendix Table 4
ruling out even modest selection in or out of the sample around the kink point.
75We conclude this section by considering a more general falsiﬁcation test of our regression-
discontinuity design. To ensure that our estimates identify discontinuities in loan size and default
that exist due to institutional rules determining loan eligibility, we replicate our main results in
our regression-kink sample, where loan size is not a discontinuous function of income before the
kink point. As in the rest of our results, we restrict this falsiﬁcation sample to biweekly borrowers
with take-home pay between $100 and $1,100. These restrictions leave us with a large sample of
101,026 borrowers.
The ﬁrst-stage estimates from our falsiﬁcation test are presented in Web Appendix Figure 3
with corresponding regression results in Web Appendix Table 5. There is no evidence of an eco-
nomically or statistically signiﬁcant relationship between income and loan size in our falsiﬁcation
sample of states where loan size is not institutionally set to be a discontinuous function of pay.
Loan amount trends smoothly through each cutoff, with the ﬁrst-stage point estimates ranging
from 1.65 to 2.75, with none of the point estimates reaching statistical signiﬁcance.
Reduced-form estimates from our falsiﬁcation test are presented in Web Appendix Figure 4 and
Web Appendix Table 6. Again, there is no evidence of an economically or statistically signiﬁcant
relationship between pay and default in the falsiﬁcation sample. Default trends smoothly through
each cutoff, with none of the two-stage least squares estimates suggesting a statistically signiﬁcant
relationship between loan size and default.
3.5. Discussion
This paper has presented evidence that larger payday-loan amounts decrease the probability of
payday-loan default. This is a surprising result given the prominence of moral hazard in the the-
oretical literature and the empirical relevance of moral hazard in other consumer-lending markets
(e.g., Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009)). There are at least ﬁve potential reasons why moral hazard
is not empirically relevant in payday lending.
First, it is possible that borrowers repay larger loans to maintain a larger credit line in the future.
In this scenario, the marginal beneﬁt of a higher credit line tomorrow is larger than the marginal
76beneﬁt of defaulting on a larger loan today. This scenario also assumes that it is prohibitively costly
for borrowers to increase their credit line in other ways, such as increasing earnings to qualify for
a larger loan or petitioning the lender for an exemption. Payday ﬁrms in our sample report that
they offer these types of exemptions on second loans, suggesting that this mechanism is unlikely
to play an important role in explaining our results.
Second, borrowers may fear more aggressive collection efforts if they default on a larger loan.
If lenders are able to increase the cost of default sufﬁciently, the marginal cost of default may
increase faster with loan size than the marginal beneﬁt. Conversely, the payday ﬁrms in our sample
have no ofﬁcial policy of pursuing larger loans more aggressively, and there is no evidence that
payday lenders are more effective at collecting larger loans in our sample. However, we are unable
to rule out differences in borrower beliefs regarding collection efforts.
Third, larger loans may increase the ability of borrowers to repay in the future. For example,
if electricity or telephone service is shut off, the time and expense to restart service can exceed
the payday-loan fees. A larger payday loan may also allow an individual to ﬁx her car and stay
employed, or pay rent or her mortgage and avoid eviction or foreclosure. Consistent with this
mechanism, approximately one-half of payday borrowers report that they plan to use their loan
for bills, emergencies, transportation expenses, food or to repay another debt (Bertrand and Morse
2011). In a separate sample, approximately one-half of payday borrowers report that they plan to
use their loan to deal with an unexpected expense shock, while another ﬁfth report that they plan
to use their loan to deal with an unexpected income shock. Only one-third of payday borrowers
plan to use their loan for a discretionary expense (Elliehausen and Lawrence 2001).
Fourth, it is possible that individuals who do not qualify for a large enough loan substitute
toward even more costly forms of credit which makes it more difﬁcult to repay. Many sources of
short-term credit are more expensive than payday loans, including overdraft charges on a checking
account, returned check fees, credit-card late fees, and automobile-title loans. Consistent with this
explanation, Skiba and Tobacman (2011) ﬁnd that rejected payday-loan applicants are more likely
to take out a pawn loan. This is likely because 80 percent of payday applicants have precisely $0
77in available credit-card liquidity at the time of application, with 90 percent having less than $300
in liquidity when they apply (Bhutta, Skiba, and Tobacman 2012).
Finally, our results are consistent with a number of alternative models of decision-making.22
For instance, if borrowers suffer from limited attention, they may be more likely to repay larger
loans due to their increased salience. Forward-looking borrowers suffering from limited attention
problems may also be more likely to set reminders or seek commitment devices to repay larger
loans (O’Donoghue and Rabin 2001). It is also possible that payday borrowers discount smaller
dollar amounts more than larger amounts (e.g. the magnitude effect discussed by Loewenstein and
Prelec (1992)).
3.6. Conclusion
This paper exploits sharp discontinuities in loan eligibility to test for moral hazard and adverse
selection in the payday-loan market, one of the largest sources of subprime credit in the United
States. Both regression-discontinuity and regression-kink approaches suggest that payday-loan
borrowers are less likely to default when offered a larger loan. A $50 larger payday loan leads to a
17 to 33 percent drop in the probability of default on the ﬁrst loan. Conversely, we ﬁnd evidence
of economically and statistically signiﬁcant adverse selection into larger payday loans when loan
eligibility is held constant. Payday borrowers who choose a $50 larger loan are 16 to 44 percent
more likely to default on the ﬁrst loan.
Given the emphasis placed on moral hazard by policymakers and within the theoretical liter-
ature, our results are somewhat surprising. We hope that our ﬁndings spur new work estimating
the impact of moral hazard in other settings and continue to explore new identiﬁcation strategies
as we have done here. Our work also highlights the signiﬁcant adverse-selection problems facing
ﬁrms in the payday-loan market. Improved screening strategies or information sharing may play
an important role in alleviating these frictions.
With that said, the welfare effects of resolving information frictions in the payday-loan market
22Campbell et al. (2011) discuss behavioral anomalies in the payday-loan market. See DellaVigna (2009) and
Rabin (1998) for a broader discussion of potential deviations from the neoclassical model of decision-making.
78are still unknown, as we cannot say with certainty what is driving our effects. A better under-
standing of which model of decision-making best characterizes the behavior of credit constrained
borrowers would go a long way toward addressing this issue. We view the parsing out of these
various mechanisms, both theoretically and empirically, as an important area for future research.
794. ARE HIGH QUALITY SCHOOLS ENOUGH TO REDUCE SOCIAL DISPARITIES?
EVIDENCE FROM THE HARLEM CHILDREN’S ZONE
With Roland Fryer, Harvard University
4.1. Introduction
The typical charter school is no more effective at increasing test scores than the typical traditional
public school (Gleason et al. 2010). Yet, an emerging body of research using admissions lotteries
suggests that high-performing charter schools can signiﬁcantly increase the achievement of poor
urban students. Students attending an over-subscribed Boston-area charter school score approxi-
mately 0.4 standard deviations (hereafter  ) higher per year in math and 0.2  higher per year in
reading (Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011). Promise Academy students in the Harlem Children’s Zone
(HCZ) score 0.229  higher per year in math and 0.047  higher per year in reading (Dobbie and
Fryer 2011a). The Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP) schools – America’s largest network of
charter schools – and the SEED urban boarding school in Washington D.C. experience similar test
score gains (Angrist et al. 2010, Tuttle et al. 2010, Curto and Fryer forthcoming).
An important open question is whether these increases in student achievement translate into
comparable gains on medium-term outcomes such as high school graduation, college enrollment,
drug-use, teen pregnancy, or incarceration. Charter advocates argue that high-performing charter
schools are effective at implementing educational “best-practices” – frequent teacher feedback,
data-driven instruction, an extended school day and year, and a relentless focus on achievement
– which develop basic skills that lead to both gains on short-run state test scores and longer-term
non-tested measures (Carter 2000, Thernstrom and Thernstrom 2004, Whitman 2008).23 Con-
versely, critics argue that high-performing charter schools increase test scores through intense test
23There is also evidence that students assigned to high test score value-add teachers are more likely to attend
college, earn higher salaries as adults, and are less likely to become pregnant as teenagers (Chetty, Friedman, and
Rockoff 2011). Additionally, attending a high-quality public school can reduce crime and increase college enrollment
even when there is little impact on state test scores (Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt 2006, Deming 2011, Deming et al.
2011), perhaps due to the development of non-tested forms of intelligence or changes in social networks (Heckman
and Rubenstein 2001, Heckman et al. 2006, Segal 2008, Whitman 2008, Chetty et al. 2011).
80prep (Haladyna, Nolen, and Hass 1991, Haladyna 2006, Jacob 2005), a paternalistic environment
(Whitman 2008), strategic resource allocation (Jacob 2005), or blatant cheating (Jacob and Levitt
2003), without instilling long-term or general knowledge in their students.
In this paper, we use data from the Promise Academy in the HCZ to provide a “proof of
concept” that the best practices used by high-performing charter schools can impact medium-term
outcomes. Like many other high-performing charters, the Promise Academy largely adheres to
the ﬁve tenets of effective charter schools identiﬁed by Dobbie and Fryer (2011b). The school
has an extended school day and year, emphasizes the recruitment and retention of high-quality
teachers, uses extensive data-driven monitoring to track student progress and assign students to
small group-tutoring sessions based on these data, and makes a concerted effort to change the
culture of achievement (Dobbie and Fryer 2011b). Web Appendix Table 1 provides evidence that
suggests the Promise Academy charter school is emblematic of other successful charter schools,
but not an outlier.
Our identiﬁcation strategy exploits the fact that the Promise Academy is required to select
students by lottery when the number of applicants exceeds the number of available slots for ad-
mission. The treatment group is composed of youth who are lottery winners and the control group
consists of youth who are lottery losers. This empirical strategy allows us to provide a set of causal
estimates of the effects of the Promise Academy.
Outcomes for our analysis come from survey data collected from youth entered in the 2005
and 2006 Promise Academy sixth grade admissions lotteries. The survey included questions about
educational achievement and attainment, risky behaviors, and health outcomes. We also adminis-
tered the Woodcock-Johnson math and reading tests as an alternative measure of cognitive ability,
and included questions on a number of potential mechanisms such as non-cognitive skills, so-
cial networks, risk aversion, and discount rates. We surveyed 407 out of 570 lottery entrants, a
high response rate for survey studies on low-income urban youth (Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt 2006,
Kling, Liebman, and Katz 2007, Rodriguez-Planas 2012). We augment this survey data with ad-
ministrative data on high school course-taking from the New York City Department of Education
81(NYCDOE) and college enrollment data from the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC).
We ﬁnd that the Promise Academy increases a wide range of human capital measures. Six
years after the admissions lottery, lottery winners outscore lottery losers by 0.283  higher on the
no-stakes Woodcock-Johnson math exam, and by 0.119  on the Woodcock-Johnson reading exam.
On New York City’s high school Regents exams, designed to measure mastery in core subjects,
lottery winners pass approximately one additional exam, score 0.359  higher on exams taken by
the majority of the sample, and are more than twice as likely to take and pass more advanced
exams such as chemistry and geometry. Lottery winners are also 14.1 percentage points more
likely to enroll in college compared to lottery losers, and 21.3 percentage points more likely to
enroll in a four-year college, a 102 percent increase from the control mean. Lottery winners are
also 7.2 percentage points less likely to enroll in a two-year college, likely due to the fact that these
youth enroll in a four-year college instead. Combining our ﬁve primary human capital variables
into a single index measure, we ﬁnd that lottery winners increase their human capital by 0.277 
compared to lottery losers.
The Promise Academy’s effect on risky behaviors is mixed and we ﬁnd very little evidence
of impacts on self-reported health. Female lottery winners are 12.1 percentage points less likely
to report being pregnant during their teenage years, a 71 percent drop from the control mean
of 17 percent among lottery losers. Male lottery winners are 4.3 percentage points less likely
to be incarcerated, essentially a 100 percent drop. Students who win the lottery to attend the
Promise Academy report similar drug and alcohol use and criminal behavior as students who lose
the lottery. An index measure of risky behavior that combines all four variables is positive and
marginally signiﬁcant (p-value=0 .06). Finally, there is little impact of the Promise Academy on
asthma, obesity, or mental health, though lottery winners are more likely to report eating nutritious
foods.
We complement our main analysis with two robustness checks. First, we consider the extent
to which differential sample attrition threatens our estimates by calculating Lee (2009) bounds
and imputing outcomes for youth who did not respond to the survey. Lottery winners were 11.8
82percentage points more likely to respond to our survey. If lottery losers who did not respond
to the survey differ in some important way, this could invalidate our empirical design by creat-
ing unobserved differences between the treatment and control groups. Second, we account for
multiple-hypothesis testing by calculating p-values with an algorithm that accounts for the Fami-
lywise Error Rate (Westfall and Young 1993, Kling, Liebman and Katz 2007, Anderson 2008). The
most conservative bounding procedures reduce some individual effects to statistical insigniﬁcance,
but our main ﬁndings are not signiﬁcantly altered by these robustness checks.
We conclude with a more speculative discussion on the potential mechanisms driving our re-
sults. First, we investigate the empirical importance of the HCZ neighborhood programs and the
Promise Academy school policies by separately estimating the effects on youth who are more or
less likely to receive neighborhood beneﬁts based on their home address. Consistent with Dob-
bie and Fryer (2011a), we ﬁnd little evidence that the neighborhood programs drive our results.
Second, we consider the extent to which changes in test scores might explain the impact of the
Promise Academy on non-test score outcomes. Using the cross-sectional relationship between test
scores and non-test score outcomes reported by Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2011), we ﬁnd
that only a small portion of our estimated effects can be explained by the test score change. Third,
we estimate the impact of the Promise Academy on a number of other possible mechanisms. We
ﬁnd little impact on non-cognitive skills, social networks, or discount rates, though lottery winners
are more averse to risk than lottery losers.
Our analysis has three important caveats. First, we present evidence from only one New York
City charter school, which could differ from other high-performing schools in important ways
that limit our ability to generalize the results. As discussed earlier, the inputs and impacts of the
Promise Academy are similar to other high-performing charter schools, and turn-around efforts
that use the similar practices have yielded similar results on state test scores (Angrist et al. 2010,
Tuttle et al. 2010, Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011, Dobbie and Fryer 2011a, Fryer 2011b). We chose
to obtain a higher response rate on a detailed face-to-face survey with lottery entrants from one
school, as opposed to a lower rate with lottery entrants from multiple schools using online or other
83methods, in order to maximize the internal validity of our study. The cost of this face-to-face
approach – roughly $2,150 per student, or $895,000 for the entire sample – necessitated the focus
on a single school.24
Second, the survey respondents may not have truthfully answered our questions. In particular,
it is plausible that Promise Academy students were directly or indirectly pressured to overstate
the impact of the school. However, results using administrative outcomes are even larger than the
survey results, suggesting this issue does not signiﬁcantly impact our ﬁndings.
Third, our analysis is necessarily limited to various medium-term outcomes. Longer-term out-
comes, such as college graduation, earnings, and mortality, are not a part of our analysis due to the
age of the lottery entrants.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the
Harlem Children’s Zone. Section 3 describes the data collected for this paper and our lottery-based
research design. Section 4 estimates the impact of the Promise Academy on human capital, risky
behaviors, and health. Section 5 discusses potential mechanisms. Section 6 concludes. There are
ﬁve Web Appendices. Web Appendix A presents additional analyses to supplement the results in
the text. Web Appendix B is a data appendix that details our sample and variable construction.
Web Appendix C details the tracking and outreach efforts used to contact lottery entrants. Web
Appendix D includes the full survey instrument. Finally, Web Appendix E details the algorithm
used to calculate p-values corrected for multiple hypothesis-testing.
24Interviewing a random subsample of lottery entrants from multiple schools proved to be infeasible, as there
are not enough charter schools with a large enough alumni sample and binding admissions lotteries for a study with
multiple high-performing schools in a single city. The additional cost of interviewing subjects in multiple cities would
have forced a much smaller survey population.
84Table 4.1
Characteristics of Charter Schools
HCZ NYC
Promise Above All Middle
Academy Median Schools
Human Capital (1) (2) (3)
Teacher Formal Feedback 3.00 4.21 2.84
Teacher Informal Feedback 12.50 14.08 8.39
Total Teacher Hours 45.00 57.08 54.68
Max Teacher Pay 11.00 9.08 8.55
Data Driven Instruction
Number of Interim Assessments 9.00 3.90 2.83
Tracking Using Data 1.00 0.33 0.57
Parent Engagement
Academic Feedback 13.50 12.67 10.25
Behavior Feedback 54.00 26.25 21.36
Regular Feedback 54.00 13.90 8.15
Tutoring
High Quality Tutoring 0.00 0.17 0.07
Any Tutoring 1.00 0.83 0.79
Small Group Tutoring 0.00 0.20 0.18
Frequent Tutoring 1.00 0.60 0.45
Instructional Time
+25% Increase in Time 1.00 0.83 0.64
Instructional Hours 7.50 8.25 8.04
Instructional Days 210.00 193.50 188.64
Culture
High Expectations 0.00 0.83 0.50
School-wide Discipline 0.00 0.33 0.36
Traditional Inputs
Small Classes 0.00 0.40 0.64
High Expenditures 1.00 0.75 0.67
High Teachers with MA 1.00 0.40 0.64
Low Teachers without Certiﬁcation 0.00 0.20 0.45
Schools 1 5 13
Notes: This table reports results from a survey of 35 New York City charter schools administered by Dobbie and Fryer
(2011b). Column (1) reports the mean of each variable for the Promise Academy Middle School. Column (2) includes
all schools with entry in middle school grades (5th - 8th) whose average treatment effects on Math and ELA scores
are above the median in the sample. Column (3) includes all Middle Schools in the sample with a tested grade in
2010-2011. See Dobbie and Fryer (2011b) for variable deﬁnitions and codings.
854.2. Harlem Children’s Zone
The Harlem Children’s Zone consists of over 20 neighborhood and school programs meant to
address the myriad problems that children from low income families face – housing, schools,
crime, asthma, and so forth – through a “conveyor belt” of services from birth to college. The
approach is based on the assumption that one must improve both communities and schools to have
a long-term impact on disadvantaged youth. Starting with a 24-block area in central Harlem, the
Zone expanded to a 64-block area in 2004 and a 97-block area in 2007.
Neighborhood Programs
The HCZ neighborhood programs serve as broad investments in community development.
These programs include early childhood programs, K-12 tutoring, after-school programs, a col-
lege success ofﬁce, family programs, health programs, a foster-care prevention program, a tax
assistance program, and so on. Consistent with Wilson’s (1987) theory of non-linear neighbor-
hood effects and cycles of poverty, HCZ’s vision is to create a “tipping point” in the neighborhood
so that children are surrounded by an enriching environment of college-oriented peers and support-
ive adults. HCZ neighborhood programs are available to anyone living near HCZ and serve more
than 8,000 youth and 5,000 adults each year.
School Programs
The Promise Academy largely adheres to the ﬁve correlates of effective schools identiﬁed by
Dobbie and Fryer (2011b). The Promise Academy has an extended school day and year with
coordinated after-school tutoring and additional classes on Saturdays for children who need re-
mediation in mathematics and English Language Arts skills. Promise Academy middle schoolers
spent 1,785 hours in school during the 2010-11 school-year, 46.1 percent more time than the typ-
ical New York City public school student and 11.8 percent more than the typical student in a
high-performing New York City charter school (Dobbie and Fryer 2011b). The Promise Academy
also emphasizes the recruitment and retention of high-quality teachers and uses measures of test
score value-added to incentivize and evaluate current teachers. In the search for high-achieving
86teachers, the Promise Academy had high teacher turnover during the ﬁrst three years of operation,
with 48 percent of teachers not returning for the 2005-2006 school year, 32 percent leaving before
2006-2007, and 14 percent leaving before 2007-2008. The Promise Academy also uses extensive
data-driven monitoring to track student progress and differentiate instruction, with students who
have not met the required benchmarks receiving small-group tutoring. Like other “No Excuses”
charters, the Promise Academy also makes a concerted effort to change the culture of achievement,
stressing the importance of hard work in achieving success. It is assumed that every student will
enroll in college, with the goal of establishing college attendance as the default option.25
4.3. Data and Research Design
4.3.1. Data and Summary Statistics
We merge information from lottery ﬁles at the Harlem Children’s Zone, administrative records
on student demographics and outcomes from the New York City Department of Education (NY-
CDOE), information on college enrollment from the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC), and
survey data collected from Promise Academy lottery participants for the purposes of this study.
Survey Data
In order to investigate the impact of the Promise Academy on various medium-term outcomes,
we conducted in-person interviews with youth who entered the 2005 and 2006 sixth grade admis-
sions lotteries. Web Appendix B contains additional information on the coding of variables. Web
Appendix C describes our tracking and survey administration, and Web Appendix D contains the
full survey instrument and protocols used to administer the survey. This section summarizes the
most relevant information from our Web Appendices.
25There are at least two potentially important differences between the Promise Academy and the typical high-
performing New York charter school. First, the Promise Academy does not require parents or students to sign a
behavioral contract, resulting in students that are more similar to the surrounding neighborhood than other charter
schools. HCZ argues that only the most motivated and trusting parents are willing to sign even a non-binding contract.
Second, Promise Academy students are exposed to a wide range of wrap-around services that are not available at most
charter schools. The schools provide free medical and dental services, student incentives for achievement, nutritious
cafeteria meals, parental engagement and supports (e.g. bus fare, meals), and so on.
87Table 4.2
An Accounting of the Sample
Pooled 2005 Lottery 2006 Lottery
Winner Loser Winner Loser Winner Loser
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lottery Entrants 189 410 96 237 93 173
Matched To NYC Data 181 390 90 223 91 167
Match Rate 0.958 0.951 0.938 0.941 0.978 0.965
Survey Pool 189 381 96 222 93 159
Survey Respondents 150 257 76 145 74 112
Survey Response Rate 0.794 0.676 0.792 0.653 0.796 0.709
Notes: This table describes the match rate for Promise Academy lottery entrants to New York City administrative data
and response rates for the in-person survey. The ﬁrst row tabulates all students who entered the Promise Academy
Middle School lottery in the Spring of 2005 or 2006, excluding students who were automatically admitted due to
sibling preferences. The second row tabulates students whom we are able to match to New York City administrative
data using the matching algorithm described in the Web Appendix. The third row displays the percentage of students
who are successfully matched. Our survey pool includes all lottery entrants except for the group of randomly selected
lottery losers that were used to test and calibrate the survey instrument during the Fall of 2011, along with any records
that were discovered to be mistaken matches and/or duplicates during the survey process. The ﬁfth row tabulates all
students who completed our survey, and the sixth reports the percentage of the survey pool who responded.
88From January 2012 through July 2012, we attempted to contact 570 Promise Academy lottery
entrants using letters, phone calls, and home visits.26 Using information from NYCDOE adminis-
trative data, internet searches of current addresses, and publicly available address records, we were
able to successfully contact 501 of these lottery entrants. Contacted youth were offered a ﬁnancial
incentive between $40 and $200 to participate in the study, with the amount increasing as the sur-
vey period progressed. Parents were also offered an additional cash incentive to review the consent
form. Of the 501 lottery entrants we contacted, 407 agreed to participate in the study, 61 refused
to participate in the study, and 33 were unable to participate due to distance, language barriers,
health, incarceration, or another obstacle. We obtained a ﬁnal response rate of 79.4 percent for
lottery winners and 67.6 percent for lottery losers. Section 3.2 examines the differences between
lottery winners and lottery losers who respond to our survey, ﬁnding no evidence of differential
selection into our sample along observable characteristics or administrative outcomes.
The questionnaire, based largely on the comprehensive survey used to evaluate the Moving
to Opportunity experiment (Kling, Liebman, and Katz 2007), took approximately 110 minutes to
complete. The survey was designed to investigate three main outcomes: (1) human capital, (2)
risky behaviors, and (3) health. We also asked about non-cognitive skills, peer networks, and
economic preferences in order to assess potential underlying mechanisms.
Human capital is measured through the Woodcock-Johnson Broad Math and Reading tests,
which is meant to augment the human capital measures available in the NYCDOE and NSC
datasets.27 The Woodcock-Johnson exams are designed to test general knowledge rather than
the subject-speciﬁc skills emphasized on New York State tests. The assessments are designed
26There were 599 unique entrants in the 2005 and 2006 Promise Academy admissions lotteries. We randomly
selected 30 lottery losers to test and calibrate the survey instrument, leaving 189 lottery winners and 381 lottery
losers in the potential survey sample after a duplicate row was discovered in the pretest sample. Results are identical
including the pre-test respondents.
27The Woodcock-Johnson Brief Battery that we use in our survey is an updated version of the Woodcock-Johnson
Revised Battery administered as a part of the MTO evaluation. Accordingly, there is not perfect alignment between
the sub-tests. We followed the advice of Woodcock-Johnson staff and administered the four sub-tests included in
the MTO follow-up – Letter-Word Identiﬁcation, Passage Comprehension, Applied Problems, and Calculation – in
addition to the Math Fluency and Reading Fluency sections. Following Kling, Liebman, and Katz 2007, we omit the
Writing sections to reduce the length of the survey. Treatment effects for each individual sub-test can be found in Web
Appendix Table 3.
89to be appropriate for all grades and ability levels and to have a high degree of internal reliability.28
The Woodcock-Johnson Broad Math score is composed of Applied Problems, Calculation, and
Math Fluency subscores. The Applied Problems section consists of word problems read aloud to
youth. The Calculation section tests computation skills ranging from arithmetic to Calculus. The
Math Fluency section requires youth to answer as many simple questions as possible in three min-
utes. The Broad Reading score consists of Letter-Word Identiﬁcation, Passage Comprehension,
and Reading Fluency subscores. The Letter-Word Identiﬁcation section tests pronunciation of in-
creasingly difﬁcult words. The Passage Comprehension questions require youth to identify a word
or phrase that completes a sample sentence. The Reading Fluency section, like the Math section,
requires youth to answer as many simple questions as possible in three minutes. Web Appendix B
contains additional details on the Woodcock-Johnson and the administration of the tests.
Risky behaviors are measured through a series of questions on pregnancy, controlled substance
use, and crime. For pregnancy, we ask female youth if they have ever been pregnant, even if no
child was born. In our sample, 14.6 percent of females have been pregnant at some point. We
measure criminal behavior using an indicator for incarceration at the time of our survey. We also
constructed an index based on youth’ self-reported criminal behaviors, such as theft, destruction
of property, ﬁghting, or carrying a gun. The reported incidence of these behaviors is relatively low.
Twenty-two percent of control youth report having ever been in a serious ﬁght, and 14.1 percent
report having stolen an item worth less than $50. Rates of all other criminal behaviors we measure
are less than ten percent. To measure drug and alcohol use, we construct a summary index based
on whether a youth reports that she has consumed alcohol in the last 30 days, smoked marijuana
in the last 30 days, or used hard drugs within the past year.
We measure mental health using the K6 anxiety scale used in Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007),
standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one in the control group. Physical
28Sanbonmatsu et al. (2006) analyze test results in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics Child Development
Supplement and ﬁnd that the internal reliability of the test is strong for a population similar to ours, with scores for
eight to seventeen year-old black students showing a correlation between 0.5 and 0.6 with the same test taken ﬁve
years earlier. In our sample, the correlation between students’ Woodcock-Johnson scores and their eighth grade state
test scores is approximately 0.6 in both math and reading.
90health is measured using an index based on indicators for self-reported poor health, having had an
asthma attack in the past year, having a Body Mass Index (BMI) above the 95th percentile for the
respondent’s age and gender, and having reported chronic health problems. To investigate health
risk factors, we ask about the number of times in the past week the youth has consumed foods such
as fruits and vegetables, soft drinks, savory snacks, and fast food. We use these responses to create
a nutrition index, reversing the sign on the unhealthy food variables. We also construct a health
behavior index from questions about having a physical examination in the past year, the frequency
of light exercise, the frequency of vigorous exercise, and having a dental exam in the past year.
These measures of health-related behavior are important to the extent that many ailments are not
easily detected among teenagers. For instance, while black adults are one and a half times more
likely to develop hypertension and diabetes than white adults (Lopes and Port 1995), the rates of
these diseases among black and white youth are roughly the same (Liese et al. 2006). However,
many risk factors for both hypertension and diabetes, such as childhood obesity and youth dietary
patterns, are more prevalent in black youth.
The remainder of the survey explores three potential exploratory theories that may explain
any impacts of the Promise Academy. First, we explore the importance of non-cognitive skills
by assessing self esteem, persistence, and locus of control. Second, we measure differences in
peer networks by asking youth to how important it is for their friends to study, stay in school,
and attending class regularly, in addition to whether their friends use drugs, drink alcohol, smoke
cigarettes, steal, ﬁght, and join gangs. Finally, we measure changes in discount rates and risk
aversion, both common determinants of decision-making in economic models.
Administrative Data
We augment our in-person survey data with administrative data from the Harlem Children’s
Zone, NYCDOE, and NSC. The data from the Harlem Children’s Zone consist of lottery ﬁles from
the 2005 and 2006 middle school lotteries. To ensure that all youth in the lottery have an equal
chance of being admitted to the Promise Academy, we drop entrants with a sibling that received a
winning lottery number in a previous year, as these entrants are automatically admitted. Entrants
91with asibling enteredin aPromise Academyin thesame yearare included inour analysis, although
we control for the fact that these entrants have a higher probability of admission due to potential
admission through sibling preference. Results are identical dropping all siblings. When youth
enter more than one lottery, we only include them in the ﬁrst lottery cohort. A typical student’s
dataincludehername, birthdate, parents’orguardians’names, homeaddress, andlotteryoutcome.
Following Dobbie and Fryer (2011a), we deﬁne lottery winners as youth who receive a winning
lottery number or whose waitlist number was below the average highest number called across both
years.
The NYCDOE data contain student-level administrative data on approximately 1.1 million
students across the ﬁve boroughs of the NYC metropolitan area. The data include information on
student race, gender, free and reduced-price lunch eligibility, behavior, attendance, matriculation
for all students, state math and English Language Arts (ELA) test scores for students in grades
three through eight, and Regents test scores for high school students. The data also include a
student’s ﬁrst and last name, birth date, and address. We have complete NYCDOE data spanning
the 2003-2004 to 2010-2011 school years, with test score and basic demographic data available
from the 1999-2000 school year onwards.
The state math and ELA tests are high-stakes exams conducted every year for third through
eighth grade students. All public school students, including those attending charters, are required
to take the math and ELA tests unless they are medically excused or have a severe disability. We
normalize test scores to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one for each grade, subject,
and year across the entire New York City sample.
Regents Exams are statewide subject examinations required for high school graduation. In
order to graduate, students must score 65 or higher on Global History and Geography, U.S. History
and Government, Comprehensive English, at least one math exam, and at least one science exam.
To receive Advanced Designation, students must pass all of exams required for graduation, along
with two additional math exams and a second science exam. We create two measures to capture
general performance on Regents. Our ﬁrst measure is the total number of Regent exams passed.
92The second is the average score on the Living Environment, Global History, and Integrated Algebra
exams standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one in the entire New York
City sample. These are the only three Regents exams taken by over 70 percent of both lottery
winners and lottery losers. If youth are missing one or two of these exams, we impute the mean
score in the lottery sample when calculating the average. Results are nearly identical dropping
these youth or calculating the average score only on taken exams. Web Appendix Table 1 presents
estimates on taking each exam, passing each exam, and exam score conditional on taking.
The HCZ data were matched to the New York City administrative data using name and date
of birth. We were able to match 95.8 percent of lottery winners to the NYC data (N=189), and
95.1 percent of lottery losers (N=410). Our match rates and attrition are similar to previous work
using charter lottery data (e.g. Hoxby and Muraka 2009, Angrist et al. 2010, Angrist et al. 2011,
Curto and Fryer forthcoming, Dobbie and Fryer 2011b, Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011). Additional
information on the match rates and attrition for each lottery cohort are available in Table 2, with
additional details on the match procedure available in Web Appendix B.
To explore the impact of HCZ attendance on college outcomes, we also match the lottery
admissions records to information on college attendance from the National Student Clearinghouse
(NSC), a non-proﬁt organization that maintains enrollment information for nearly every college
anduniversityinthecountry. TheNSCdatacontaininformationonenrollmentanddegreesgranted
for each college that a student attends. The Promise Academy lottery data were matched to the
NSC database by NSC employees using each student’s full name, date of birth, and high school
graduation date. Youth who are not matched to the NSC database are assumed to have never
enrolled in college, including one (unknown) student whose record was blocked by her school.
NSC data is available for the entire 2005 lottery cohort.
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94Columns 1 through 4 of Table 3 present summary statistics for baseline characteristics for our
lottery sample and two comparison populations. We report separate sample means for all NYC
students who were enrolled in 5th grade in the 2004-05 or 2005-06 school year, all such students
who live in the HCZ neighborhood, lottery winners, and lottery losers. Eighty-four and a half
percent of lottery entrants are black, compared to 32.8 percent of NYC ﬁfth graders and 63.7
percent of neighborhood ﬁfth graders. Promise Academy lottery entrants under-perform the City
average on math and ELA tests by roughly a quarter of a standard deviation. Lottery entrants
score marginally higher than their neighbors, but the difference is not statistically or economically
signiﬁcant. Taken together, these summary statistics suggest that the Promise Academy serves a
disproportionately black population whose academic performance is similar to students in their
geographic area.
4.3.2. Research Design
To estimate the causal impact of providing student, teacher, and parent incentives on outcomes, we
estimate both Intent-To-Treat (ITT) effects and Local Average Treatment Effects (LATEs). The
ITT estimates measure the causal effect of winning the Promise Academy admissions lottery by
comparing the average outcomes of youth who ‘won’ the lottery to the average outcomes of youth
who ‘lost’ the lottery:
outcomei = µ +  Xi + ⇡Zi +
X
j
⌫jLotteryij +
X
j
 jLotteryij ⇤ 1(siblingi)+⌘i (12)
where Zi is an indicator for winning an admissions lottery, and Xi includes controls for gender,
race, 5th grade special education status, eligibility for free or reduced-price lunch, receipt of Lim-
ited English Proﬁciency (LEP) services, and a quadratic in two prior years of math and ELA test
scores. Lotteryij is an indicator for entering the middle school lottery in year j, and 1(siblingi)
indicates whether student i had a sibling enter a Promise Academy lottery in the same year. Equa-
tion (12) identiﬁes the impact of being offered a chance to attend the Promise Academy, ⇡, where
95the lottery losers form the control group corresponding to the counterfactual state that would have
occurred for youth in the treatment group if they had not been offered a spot in the charter school.
Under several assumptions (that the lottery outcomes are random, that winning the lottery does
not prevent anyone from attending who would have otherwise enrolled, and that being selected
affects outcomes through its effect on Promise Academy enrollment), we can also estimate the
causal impact of attending the Promise Academy. This parameter, commonly known as the Local
Average Treatment Effect, measures the average effect of attending the Promise Academy on youth
who attend the school as a result of winning the admissions lottery (Angrist and Imbens 1994).
The LATE parameter can be estimated through a two-stage least squares regression of student
achievement on an indicator variable for having ever attended the Promise Academy (PA i), using
the lottery offer Zi as an instrumental variable for the ﬁrst-stage regression. The second-stage
equations for the two-stage least squares estimates therefore take the form:
outcomei = µ +  Xi + ⇡PAi +
X
j
⌫jLotteryij +
X
j
 jLotteryij ⇤ 1(siblingi)+⌘i (13)
and the ﬁrst stage equation is:
PA i = ↵ +  Xi +  Zi +
X
j
✓jLotteryij +
X
j
◆jLotteryij ⇤ 1(siblingi)+i (14)
where   measures the impact of the lottery offer on the probability of attending the Promise
Academy. There is a powerful ﬁrst-stage effect of winning the lottery on Promise Academy en-
rollment. Table 3 shows that 63.2 percent of lottery winners attend the Promise Academy at some
point, compared to 6.5 percent of lottery losers. The typical lottery winner attends the Promise
Academy for 2.8 years, over 2.5 more years than the typical lottery loser.
One potential threat to a causal interpretation of our estimates is that the Promise Academy
admissions offer is not random (E[⌘i|Zi] 6=0 ). We evaluate this possibility in column 5 of Table
3 by examining observed differences between lottery winners and lottery losers in the NYCDOE
data. Lottery winners are 8.8 percentage points less likely to be female in the NYC sample. There
96are no other statistically signiﬁcant differences between lottery winners and lottery losers, and a
joint F-test that all coefﬁcients are equal to zero has a p-value of 0.789.
A second threat to our interpretation of the estimates is that lottery entrants may have selec-
tively responded to our survey. In particular, one may be concerned that lottery winners were 11.8
percentage points more likely to respond (see Table 2). If lottery losers who did not respond to
our survey differ in some important way, this could invalidate our empirical design by creating
unobserved differences between the treatment and control groups. We investigate selection into
the survey sample in three ways: (1) measuring observed differences between lottery winners and
lottery losers in the survey sample, (2) correlating survey response with baseline characteristics for
lottery winners and lottery losers, and (3) correlating survey response with observed administrative
outcomes for lottery winners and lottery losers.
Column 8 of Table 4 reports the difference between lottery winners and lottery losers in our
survey sample following our results from column 5. Lottery winners in the survey sample are 10.8
percentage points less likely to be female, and 1.2 percentage points less likely to be white. There
are no other statistically signiﬁcant differences between lottery winners and lottery losers in the
survey sample, and a joint F-test that all differences are equal to zero has a p-value of 0.389. Taken
together with our results from column 5 of Table 4, these results suggest that selection into the
survey sample is similar for lottery winners and lottery losers.
Panel A of Table 4 explores selection into our survey sample further by reporting results from
a series of regressions of an indicator for survey response on baseline characteristics. The sample
is restricted to lottery entrants in the survey pool who we are able to match to the NYCDOE data.
All regressions include cohort ﬁxed effects, an indicator for having a sibling in the same lottery,
and a sibling-by-cohort interaction. Column 1 reports regression results for the pooled sample of
lottery entrants. The coefﬁcients are all small and statistically insigniﬁcant, and a joint F-test of all
of the listed variables are equal to zero has a p-value of 0.867. These results suggest that baseline
characteristics are not systematically associated with survey response.
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Youth Characteristics and Survey Response
All Lottery Lottery Lottery
Entrants Winners Losers Difference
Panel A. Characteristics (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.057  0.022 0.091⇤  0.112
(0.039) (0.064) (0.050) (0.081)
Black  0.005 0.096  0.045 0.139
(0.049) (0.091) (0.060) (0.108)
Free Lunch 0.026 0.114  0.029 0.141
(0.051) (0.088) (0.064) (0.108)
5th Grade Sp. Ed. 0.016 0.047 0.022 0.027
(0.092) (0.122) (0.117) (0.168)
5th Grade LEP 0.064  0.365 0.141  0.508⇤
(0.120) (0.263) (0.124) (0.288)
5th Grade Math  0.013 0.015  0.025 0.040
(0.035) (0.058) (0.046) (0.073)
5th Grade ELA 0.007  0.051 0.043  0.095
(0.033) (0.051) (0.044) (0.067)
Missing 5th Grade Math  0.073  0.383  0.029  0.352
(0.160) (0.273) (0.190) (0.330)
Missing 5th Grade ELA 0.023 0.529⇤⇤  0.093 0.624⇤⇤
(0.135) (0.262) (0.161) (0.305)
Missing Demographics 0.004  0.114 0.027  0.143
(0.139) (0.187) (0.173) (0.253)
541 181 360 541
Panel B. Observed Outcomes
Eight Grade Math 0.049⇤⇤ 0.034 0.036  0.002
(0.023) (0.035) (0.032) (0.047)
452 157 295 452
Eight Grade ELA  0.007  0.038 0.007  0.045
(0.030) (0.037) (0.043) (0.056)
457 160 297 457
College Enrollment 0.207⇤⇤⇤ 0.204⇤⇤⇤ 0.189⇤⇤⇤ 0.016
(0.048) (0.074) (0.063) (0.097)
298 90 208 298
p-value from Joint F-test Panel A 0.867 0.241 0.667 0.163
p-value from Joint F-test Panel B 0.000 0.006 0.016 0.808
Notes: This table reports the results of OLS regressions of an indicator for survey response on baseline characteristics
and observed outcomes. All regressions control for lottery-year indicators, indicators for having a sibling enrolled in
the same lottery, and a sibling-year interaction term. Regressions in Panels B also control for the baseline demographic
variables summarized in Table 3 and a quadratic of 4th and 5th grade math and ELA test scores. The ﬁnal two rows
report the p-value from a joint F-test of the null hypothesis that all coefﬁcients in each Panel equal zero, estimated via
seemingly unrelated regression in Panel B. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The
number of observations is reported below the standard errors in Panel B. ⇤⇤⇤, ⇤⇤, and ⇤ indicate statistical signiﬁcance
with 99%, 95%, and 90% conﬁdence, respectively.
98Columns 2 and 3 reports results of the same regression estimated separately for lottery winners
and lottery losers, and Column 4 reports the difference between lottery winners and lottery losers.
Lottery winners eligible for LEP at baseline are 50.8 (28.8) percentage points less likely to respond
to the survey compared to lottery losers eligible for LEP, and lottery winners missing a 5th grade
ELA score are 62.4 (30.5) percentage points more likely to respond than lottery losers missing an
ELA score. There are no other signiﬁcant differences between lottery winners and lottery losers,
however, and a joint F-test of the individual differences yields a p-value of 0.163.29
Panel B of Table 4 reports results correlating survey response with administrative outcomes
that are available for both respondents and non-respondents. By examining survey response along
realized outcomes, we are able to determine whether survey response differs by changes in out-
comes not predicted by baseline characteristics. The administrative outcomes available for this test
include eighth grade math scores, eighth grade ELA scores, and college enrollment. In the pooled
sample, a one   increase in eighth grade math scores is associated with a 4.9 (2.3) percentage
point increase in the probability of response, and college enrollment is associated with a 20.7 (4.8)
percentage point increase in survey response. Columns 2 and 3 present results for lottery winners
and lottery losers separately, and column 4 reports the difference between the two groups. There
is nearly identical selection into the survey sample among lottery winners and lottery losers. None
of the individual differences are statistically signiﬁcant, and a joint F-test on the null that all three
differences are equal to zero yields a p-value of 0.808. Thus, while there is positive selection into
our survey sample based on realized outcomes, there is no evidence that lottery winners and lottery
losers differentially select into the survey sample.
29In results available upon request, we correlate survey response with predicted outcomes using baseline variables.
Consistent with the results from Table 3 and Panel A of Table 4, there are no signiﬁcant predictors of survey response
among lottery winners or lottery losers. There are also no statistically signiﬁcant differences between the lottery
winners and lottery losers, and a joint F-test on the null that all ﬁve differences are equal to zero yields a p-value of
0.987.
994.4. Analysis
4.4.1. Main Outcomes
We estimate the impact of the Promise Academy in the Harlem Children’s Zone on human capital
outcomes, risky behaviors, and physical and mental health.
A. HUMAN CAPITAL
Dobbie and Fryer (2011a) ﬁnd that Promise Academy students gain 0.229  in math and 0.047 
in ELA per year on the required state exams. To provide evidence on whether these state test
score gains reﬂect increases in general knowledge and skills, as opposed to test-speciﬁc skills,
we estimate the impact of the Promise Academy on a number of alternative measures of human
capital.
Panel A of Table 5 presents ITT and LATE estimates of the impact of the Promise Academy on
human capital outcomes. Woodcock-Johnson results include lottery entrants who responded to the
survey and complete the indicated Woodcock-Johnson test. High school Regents results include
lotteryentrantswhoattendaNYChighschoolforatleastoneyear, whilecollegeenrollmentresults
include all 2005 lottery entrants. Each regression controls for the demographic variables listed in
Table 3, lottery effects, sibling by lottery effects, and a quadratic in 4th and 5th grade math and
ELA scores. We report standard errors that are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity throughout.
Lottery winners score 0.283  (0.083) higher than lottery losers on the math portion of the
Woodcock-Johnson test, and 0.119  (0.083) higher on the reading portion. Youth who attend
the Promise Academy due to a winning lottery draw score 0.439  (0.121) higher in math and
0.185  (0.123) higher in reading. Attending the Promise Academy has the largest impact on Math
Calculation, with Promise Academy students scoring 0.595  (0.127) higher than they otherwise
would have. Promise Academy students also score 0.366  (0.153) higher in Math Fluency, and
0.325  (0.138) higher on Letter-Word Identiﬁcation. The estimated impacts on the other sub-test
results are not statistically signiﬁcant.
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The Impact of Attending the Promise Academy
on Human Capital, Risky Behaviors, and Health
CM ITT LATE
Panel A. Human Capital (1) (2) (3)
Woodcock Johnson Math 0.000 0.283⇤⇤⇤ 0.439⇤⇤⇤
(1.000) (0.083) (0.121)
243 386 386
Woodcock Johnson Reading 0.000 0.119 0.185
(1.000) (0.083) (0.123)
243 386 386
Regents Passed 2.385 1.026⇤⇤⇤ 1.657⇤⇤⇤
(2.414) (0.230) (0.336)
327 482 482
Regents Test Scores  0.045 0.359⇤⇤⇤ 0.560⇤⇤⇤
(0.672) (0.064) (0.090)
285 423 423
College Enrollment 0.288 0.141⇤⇤ 0.242⇤⇤
(0.454) (0.061) (0.097)
236 313 313
Human Capital Index  0.047 0.277⇤⇤⇤ 0.465⇤⇤⇤
(0.830) (0.068) (0.105)
391 552 552
Panel B. Risky Behaviors
Ever Pregnant (Female) 0.170  0.121⇤⇤⇤  0.183⇤⇤⇤
(0.377) (0.046) (0.067)
141 205 205
Incarcerated (Male) 0.041  0.043⇤⇤  0.075⇤⇤
(0.200) (0.018) (0.030)
145 234 234
Drug/Alcohol Index  0.001  0.016  0.025
(0.692) (0.067) (0.103)
256 406 406
Criminal Behavior Index 0.000  0.004  0.007
(0.618) (0.065) (0.101)
257 407 407
Risky Behavior Index 0.053  0.135⇤  0.223⇤
(0.896) (0.072) (0.117)
289 445 445
101Table 4.5 (Continued)
The Impact of Attending the Promise Academy
on Human Capital, Risky Behaviors, and Health
CM ITT LATE
Panel C. Health (1) (2) (3)
Nutrition Index 0.000 0.108⇤ 0.173⇤
(0.572) (0.061) (0.095)
257 407 407
Mental Health 0.000  0.034  0.054
(1.000) (0.103) (0.161)
254 403 403
Physical Health Index 0.000  0.050  0.079
(0.599) (0.063) (0.098)
257 407 407
Health Behavior Index  0.001 0.031 0.050
(0.499) (0.052) (0.081)
257 407 407
Health Index 0.000 0.032 0.051
(0.533) (0.057) (0.087)
257 407 407
Notes: This table reports estimates of the effect of attending the Promise Academy. Column (1) reports the mean
and standard deviation of each variable for the control group. Column (2) reports ITT estimates of the impact of
winning the admissions lottery. Column (3) reports LATE estimates of the impact of ever attending the Promise
Academy using a winning lottery number as an instrument. All regressions control for the baseline demographic
variables summarized in Table 3, a quadratic of 4th and 5th grade math and ELA test scores, lottery-year indicators,
indicators having a sibling enrolled in the same lottery, and a sibling-year interaction term. The last row of each
Panel is a summary index equal to the average of the standardized value of each of the preceding variables. Each
standardized survey outcome is renormed using the mean and standard deviation of the control group. Administrative
outcomes are renormed using the mean and standard deviation of the entire NYC sample. Web Appendix B contains
additional details on each variable. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The number
of observations is reported below the standard error. ⇤⇤⇤, ⇤⇤, and ⇤ indicate statistical signiﬁcance with 99%, 95%, and
90% conﬁdence, respectively. See text for additional details.
102Lottery winners also take more New York State Regents exams and score higher on the exams
that most students take.30 Lottery winners pass 1.026 (0.230) more Regents exams than lottery
losers, a 43 percent increase from the control mean of 2.385 exams. On the three core exams that
over 70 percent of lottery winners and lottery losers take – Living Environment, Global History,
and Integrated Algebra – lottery winners score 0.359  (0.064) higher than lottery losers. The gains
are largest in Integrated Algebra, where lottery winners score 0.550  (0.092) higher (see Web
Appendix Table 3). Lottery winners are also 20.0 (4.7) and and 10.5 (3.4) percentage points more
likely to take the more advanced Geometry and Chemistry exams, and, conditional on taking these
exams, score 0.561  (0.124) and 0.624  (0.303) higher.
Our ﬁnal measure of human capital is college enrollment. Lottery winners are 14.1 (6.1) per-
centage points more likely to enroll in college the fall after their senior year, a 49.0 percent increase
from the control mean of 28.8 percent. Attending the Promise Academy increases the probability
of enrolling in college by 24.2 (9.7) percentage points, an 84 percent increase. In Table 6, we show
that lottery winners are also 21.3 (5.9) percentage points more likely to attend a four-year college
and 7.2 (2.3) percentage points less likely to attend a two-year college. These results are consistent
with the Promise Academy inducing at least some students to enroll in a four-year college instead
of a two-year school. Table 6 also shows that lottery entrants are 4.5 (3.8) percentage points more
likely to enroll at a college where the average student has SAT scores of 1,000 points or higher (out
of 1600), but the point estimate is not statistically signiﬁcant.
We summarize the impact of the Promise Academy on human capital using an index measure
that combines all ﬁve individual human capital measures. To construct the index, we standardize
each individual measure to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one in the control
group. We then take the average of each standardized z-score measure. The impact of winning
the admissions lottery on this human capital index measure is 0.277  (0.068), suggesting a large
impact of the Promise Academy on non-test score skills.
30Selection into the Regents exams complicates the interpretation of these estimates. If, for example, the Promise
Academy pushes weaker students to take harder Regents exams, then our results are likely to be too conservative.
Consistent with this, Web Appendix Table 1 shows that lottery winners are at least as likely to take each exam except
ComprehensiveEnglish, andaremorelikelytotakeandpassadvancedsubjectslikeGeometry, Physics, andChemistry.
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The Impact of Attending the
Promise Academy on College Quality
CM ITT LATE
(1) (2) (3)
College Enrollment 0.288 0.141⇤⇤ 0.242⇤⇤
(0.454) (0.061) (0.097)
236 313 313
Two Year College 0.081  0.072⇤⇤⇤  0.124⇤⇤⇤
(0.273) (0.023) (0.039)
236 313 313
Four Year College 0.208 0.213⇤⇤⇤ 0.366⇤⇤⇤
(0.406) (0.059) (0.093)
236 313 313
1000+ SAT College 0.085 0.045 0.078
(0.279) (0.038) (0.062)
236 313 313
Notes: This table reports estimates of the effect of attending the Promise Academy on college quality. Column (1)
reports the mean of each variable for the control group. Column (2) reports ITT estimates of the impact of winning the
admissions lottery. Column (3) reports LATE estimates of the impact of ever attending the Promise Academy using
a winning lottery number as an instrument. The sample is restricted to 2005 lottery entrants. All regressions control
for the baseline demographic variables summarized in Table 3, a quadratic of 4th and 5th grade math and ELA test
scores, lottery-year indicators, indicators having a sibling enrolled in the same lottery, and a sibling-year interaction
term. Colleges that we cannot match to SAT or ACT data are coded as zero. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
are reported in parenthesis. The number of observations is reported below the standard error. ⇤⇤⇤, ⇤⇤, and ⇤ indicate
statistical signiﬁcance with 99%, 95%, and 90% conﬁdence, respectively.
104B. RISKY BEHAVIORS
Panel B of Table 5 presents estimates of the impact of the Promise Academy on teen pregnancy,
incarceration, self-reported drug and alcohol use, and self-reported criminal behavior. Pregnancy
results include all female survey respondents, while self-reported results include all survey re-
spondents. The incarceration results include the 234 male lottery entrants whom we successfully
contacted, regardless of whether or not they completed a survey. Following Panel A, each re-
gression controls for the demographic variables listed in Table 3, lottery effects, sibling by lottery
effects, and a quadratic in 4th and 5th grade math and ELA test scores. Standard errors have been
adjusted to account for arbitrary heteroskedasticity.
Seventeen percent of female lottery losers report having been pregnant at some point. In com-
parison, 10.0 percent of minority women and 10.4 percent of low-income women in New York City
schools give birth in their teens (Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff 2011). Female lottery winners are
12.1 (4.6) percentage points less likely to report that they have ever been pregnant, a 71 percent
reduction from the control mean.31
Four percent of male lottery losers were incarcerated during our sample period, compared to
none of the male lottery winners. One female lottery loser and one female lottery winner were
also incarcerated during our sample period.32 In our ITT framework, male lottery winners are 4.3
(1.8) percentage points less likely to be incarcerated, essentially a one hundred percent decrease.
To put this estimate in context, Deming (2011) ﬁnds being offered a spot at a student’s ﬁrst choice
public school in Charlotte-Mecklenburg decreases the probability of spending at least 90 days in
jail over the next ﬁve years by 10.7 percentage points for males in the highest risk quintile, a 81.1
percent drop. The effect decreases to 8.4 percentage points, or 53.8 percent, six years after the
school choice lottery.
31We also asked survey respondents about various self-reported sexual habits which might explain the effect on
pregnancy. As the results in Panel D of Table 12 show, there are no detectable differences in these behaviors. Promise
Academy youth are equally likely to have had sex, and are about as likely to have used a condom or another form of
contraception during their most recent sexual experience, though we are under-powered to detect modest differences.
32Using national samples of men born after 1965, Pettit and Western (2004) estimate that 2.06 percent of black
men aged 15 - 19 and 6.06 percent of black men aged 20 - 24 have been incarcerated at least once. Equivalent ﬁgures
for white men are 0.39 percent and 0.73 percent.
105We ﬁnd little evidence that the Promise Academy impacts self-reported drug and alcohol use
or self-reported criminal behavior. Lottery winners are 0.016  (0.111) less likely to report using
drugs and alcohol, and 0.012  (0.064) less likely to report criminal behavior, with neither estimate
close to statistical signiﬁcance. The results are similar if estimate effects for males and females
separately. There are at least three possible explanations for the positive impact on administrative
outcomes and no effect on self-reported outcomes. First, our self-reported measures are likely
biased downwards due to the fact that incarcerated youth are unable to respond to our survey.
Second, there may be underreporting of risky behavior that masks a true treatment effect. For
instance, youth in the MTO follow-up study under report criminal behavior by 15 to 20 percent,
with treated youth only slightly less likely to self-report crime (Kling, Ludwig, and Katz 2005).
Finally, it is possible that criminal behaviors are the same, but that lottery winners are less likely
to be caught.
Following our human capital results in Panel A, we summarize the impact of the Promise
Academy on risky behavior using an index measure that combines all four individual measures.
Lottery winners are 0.135  (0.072) less likely to engage in risky behavior according to our index
measure. The result is driven by the incarceration and pregnancy results, as there is relatively little
variation across students in the self-reported measures.
C. HEALTH
Panel C of Table 5 presents estimates of the impact of the Promise Academy on healthy eating,
mental health, physicalhealth, and an index of surveyed healthbehaviors. Eachregression includes
all survey respondents, and follows the same speciﬁcation as Panels A and B.
Lottery winners are 0.108  (0.061) more likely to report healthy eating habits, yet these habits
do not appear to have translated into improvements on any other health outcomes. Lottery winners
self-report physical health that is 0.050  (0.063) lower, with no discernible effects on asthma
attacks, obesity, or self-reported health. Lottery winners also report mental health that is 0.034 
(0.103) lower than lottery losers. Our summary index of both physical and mental health is 0.032 
(0.057) higher for lottery winners as compared to lottery losers.
1064.4.2. Robustness Checks
In this section, we explore the robustness of our results to two potential threats to validity: (1)
differential attrition from the survey sample, and (2) false positives due to multiple hypothesis-
testing.
First, we consider the extent to which sample attrition threatens our estimates by calculating
Lee (2009) bounds and imputing outcomes for youth who did not respond to the survey. Panel A
of Table 7 presents these results for the administrative outcomes that are available for all lottery
entrants. Column 1 presents standard ITT estimates using the full sample of lottery entrants as
reported in column 2 of Table 5. Column 2 restricts the sample to lottery entrants in the survey
sample to explore the extent of any attrition bias on these outcomes. The impact of being offered
admission to the Promise Academy is similar in the full and survey samples across all of our
administrative outcomes. Lottery winners score 0.446  (0.077) higher in math in the full sample
and 0.466  (0.081) higher in the survey sample. ELA scores are 0.156  (0.057) higher in the full
sample and 0.132  (0.055) higher in the survey sample. Conversely, the effect on the number of
Regents exams passed is 0.241 higher in the survey sample, the effect on Regents scores is 0.022 
higher, and the impact on college enrollment is 1.4 percentage points higher. These results suggest
that there is, at worst, modest upwards bias in the survey sample.
Column 3 of Panel A reports the Lee (2009) bound for each administrative outcome. Each
bound is calculated by dropping the fraction of the highest-achieving lottery winners necessary to
equalize the response rate among lottery winners and lottery losers. In this worst case scenario,
there is still a statistically signiﬁcant effect of the Promise Academy on three out of ﬁve of our
administrative outcomes, with lottery winners scoring 0.183  (0.067) higher on our human capital
index compared to lottery losers. In each case, the Lee (2009) bounds are much lower than the true
ITT estimates from column 1.
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Attrition and Bounding
Admin Survey Lee p-value p-value
ITT ITT Bound (2)=(3) Imputed (2)=(5)
Panel A1. Human Capital (Admin.) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eight Grade Math 0.446⇤⇤⇤ 0.466⇤⇤⇤ 0.260⇤⇤⇤ 0.343⇤⇤⇤
0.077 (0.081) (0.081) 0.072 (0.065) 0.236
472 361 335 547
Eight Grade ELA 0.156⇤⇤⇤ 0.132⇤⇤ 0.006 0.111⇤⇤⇤
0.057 (0.055) (0.052) 0.099 (0.041) 0.764
477 365 337 547
Regents Passed 1.026⇤⇤⇤ 1.267⇤⇤⇤ 0.675⇤⇤⇤ 0.957⇤⇤⇤
0.230 (0.249) (0.255) 0.097 (0.218) 0.348
482 360 334 547
Regents Test Scores 0.359⇤⇤⇤ 0.381⇤⇤⇤ 0.207⇤⇤⇤ 0.262⇤⇤⇤
0.064 (0.069) (0.068) 0.072 (0.057) 0.182
423 325 298 547
College Enrollment 0.141⇤⇤ 0.155⇤⇤ 0.042 0.140⇤⇤
0.061 (0.072) (0.074) 0.274 (0.063) 0.869
313 220 206 299
Human Capital Index 0.277⇤⇤⇤ 0.331⇤⇤⇤ 0.183⇤⇤⇤ 0.274⇤⇤⇤
0.068 (0.070) (0.067) 0.128 (0.059) 0.532
552 403 382 547
Panel A2. Human Capital (Survey)
Woodcock Johnson Math 0.283⇤⇤⇤ 0.124 0.197⇤⇤⇤
— (0.083) (0.082) 0.175 (0.072) 0.429
386 364 547
Woodcock Johnson Reading 0.119  0.060 0.076
— (0.083) (0.080) 0.120 (0.071) 0.694
386 364 547
Panel B. Risky Behaviors
Ever Pregnant (Female)  0.121⇤⇤⇤  0.118⇤⇤  0.091⇤⇤
— (0.046) (0.047) 0.973 (0.036) 0.617
205 202 272
Incarcerated (Male)  0.043⇤⇤  0.039⇤⇤
— (0.017) ——(0.016) 0.880
234 281
Drug/Alcohol Index  0.016 0.038  0.008
— (0.067) (0.071) 0.579 (0.050) 0.926
406 384 547
Criminal Behavior Index  0.004 0.033  0.006
— (0.065) (0.069) 0.693 (0.049) 0.982
407 386 547
Risky Behavior Index  0.043 0.036  0.035
— (0.062) (0.066) 0.383 (0.047) 0.911
407 386 547
108Table 4.7 (Continued)
Attrition and Bounding
Admin Survey Lee p-value p-value
ITT ITT Bound (2)=(3) Imputed (2)=(5)
Panel C. Health (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Nutrition Index 0.108⇤  0.019 0.076
— (0.061) (0.059) 0.134 (0.047) 0.681
407 386 547
Mental Health  0.034  0.223⇤⇤  0.032
— (0.103) (0.103) 0.193 (0.077) 0.991
403 382 547
Physical Health Index  0.050  0.125⇤  0.033
— (0.063) (0.066) 0.407 (0.047) 0.837
407 386 547
Health Behavior Index 0.031  0.073 0.028
— (0.052) (0.051) 0.156 (0.040) 0.961
407 386 547
Health Index 0.032  0.079 0.024
— (0.057) (0.055) 0.160 (0.043) 0.908
407 386 547
Notes: This table reports ITT estimates accounting for survey attrition. Column (1) reports ITT estimates in the
administrative sample not subject to attrition bias. Column (2) reports ITT estimates in the sample of survey respon-
dents. Column (3) reports Lee (2009) bounds by dropping lottery winners with the best outcomes until there is an
equal survey response rate between lottery winners and lottery losers. Column (4) reports the p-value from a test
that the coefﬁcients in Columns (2) and (3) are equal. Column (5) reports results imputing outcomes for all survey
non-respondents using all baseline characteristics reported in Table 3 and the ﬁve administrative outcomes reported
in Panel A. Column (6) reports the p-value from a test that the coefﬁcients in Columns (2) and (5) are equal. All
regressions follow the speciﬁcation and sample restrictions from Table 5. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
are reported in parenthesis. The number of observations is reported below the standard error. ⇤⇤⇤, ⇤⇤, and ⇤ indicate
statistical signiﬁcance with 99%, 95%, and 90% conﬁdence, respectively.
109Column 5 presents results imputing outcomes for non-respondents. We impute outcomes for
all non-survey respondents, including lottery winners, using the baseline characteristics listed in
Table 3 and the administrative outcomes available for all lottery entrants. Our results in column 5
show that the imputation results are downwards biased relative to the true ITT estimates in column
1, suggesting that these results are also a conservative approach to dealing with attrition in our
sample.
Panel B reports Lee (2009) bounds and imputation results for our survey outcomes. The only
Lee (2009) bound that is statistically signiﬁcant in our survey outcomes is pregnancy, though due
to large standard errors we cannot rule out the bounds and the survey estimates being statistically
identical. We are also unable to calculate a bound for incarceration, as there are no incarcerated
males in the treatment group. Conversely, our imputation results in column 5 are nearly identical
to our results reported in Table 5. None of the results lose statistical signiﬁcance, and none are
statistically different than the reported results from Table 5.
A second concern is that we are detecting false positives due to multiple hypothesis-testing.
Table 8 presents results controlling for the Family-Wise Error Rate, using an algorithm similar to
those described by Westfall and Young (1993), Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007), and Anderson
(2008). For a given family of k-hypothesis tests, the algorithm estimates the probability that the
observed t-statistic is larger than the equivalently-ranked test statistic that would be generated
by random chance. Web Appendix E provides a full description of how we implemented this
procedure.
Table 8 conﬁrms the robustness of our main ﬁndings. The p-value on the human capital in-
dex remains less than 0.001 after adjusting for multiple-hypothesis testing, while the p-value on
the risky behavior index rises from 0.063 to 0.123. The more conservative Bonferroni correction,
which controls the family-wise error rate under the assumption that all test statistics are indepen-
dent, is calculated by multiplying the per-comparison p-values by the number of hypothesis tests.
Thus, the Bonferroni corrected p-value on the human capital index is 0.0002, and the Bonferroni
corrected p-value on the risky behavior index rises to 0.190.
110Table 4.8
Main Estimates with Familywise-Error-Rate-Controlled p-values
ITT Uncorrected Corrected
Estimate p-value p-value
(1) (2) (3)
Human Capital Index 0.277 0.000 0.000
(0.068)
Risky Behavior Index  0.135 0.063 0.123
(0.072)
Health Index 0.032 0.573 0.573
(0.057)
Notes: This table reports ITT estimates correcting for multiple-hypothesis testing. Column (1) reports ITT estimates
following the speciﬁcation described in Table 5. Column (2) reports the unadjusted p-value. Column (3) reports
the p-value correcting for the Familywise Error Rate for the three outcomes. Web Appendix E contains additional
information on the algorithm used. Standard errors reported in parenthesis are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity.
The number of observations is reported below the standard error.
1114.5. Interpretation
4.5.1. Neighborhoods vs. Schools
Inadditiontotheschoolinvestmentstypicalofahigh-performingcharterschool, PromiseAcademy
students are exposed to a network of community services in the Harlem Children’s Zone. The
community programs may plausibly impact future outcomes by providing a more supportive out-
of-school learning environment.
Following Dobbie and Fryer (2011a), we investigate the empirical importance of the HCZ
neighborhood programs and the Promise Academy school investments by estimating effects sepa-
rately for youth living within 400 meters of the original 24-block Harlem Children’s Zone (inside
HCZ), who are more likely to receive neighborhood beneﬁts, and youth living more than 400
meters away (outside HCZ), who are less likely to receive neighborhood beneﬁts.
Table 6 presents these ITT estimates for youth living in and outside HCZ. Consistent with
Dobbie and Fryer (2011a), there are no statistically different effects by HCZ residence for any of
our summary indices. Lottery winners living in HCZ have human capital scores that are 0.318 
(0.117) higher than lottery losers in the Zone, while lottery winners living outside the Zone have
human capital scores that are 0.283  (0.075) higher. Lottery winners in the Zone also are 0.127 
(0.103) less likely to engage in risky behaviors, and are 0.045  (0.094) healthier than lottery losers
in the Zone. In comparison, lottery winners out of the Zone are 0.135  (0.077) less likely to engage
in risky behaviors and 0.034  (0.062) healthier than lottery losers out of the Zone.
Table 10 presents estimates for the individual index components for students living inside and
outside HCZ. There is only one statistically signiﬁcant difference between the in and outside of
HCZ treatment estimates, with lottery winners inside of HCZ increasing their Regents test scores
by 0.234  more than lottery winners living outside of HCZ. None of the other 14 point estimates
we consider are different, and many of the estimates larger for youth living outside of HCZ.
112Table 4.9
The Impact of Attending the Promise Academy
Inside and Outside the Zone
Inside Outside
Zone Zone p-value
(1) (2) (3)
Human Capital Index 0.318⇤⇤⇤ 0.283⇤⇤⇤
(0.117) (0.075) 0.784
148 369
Risky Behavior Index  0.127  0.135⇤
(0.103) (0.077) 0.932
122 315
Health Index 0.045 0.034
(0.094) (0.062) 0.907
112 287
Notes: This table reports ITT estimates for youth with baseline addresses inside and outside of the Harlem Children’s
Zone. Column (1) presents ITT estimates for youth living within 400 meters of the original 24-block Zone. Column
(2) presents ITT estimates for youth living outside 400 meters of the original 24-block Zone, and Column (3) reports
a p-value of a test that the two coefﬁcients are equal. All speciﬁcations and variable deﬁnitions are identical to those
in Table 5. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The number of observations is
reported below the standard error. ⇤⇤⇤, ⇤⇤, and ⇤ indicate statistical signiﬁcance with 99%, 95%, and 90% conﬁdence,
respectively.
113Table 4.10
The Impact of Attending the Promise Academy
Inside and Outside the Zone
Inside Outside
Zone Zone p-value
Panel A. Human Capital (1) (2) (3)
Woodcock Johnson Math 0.326⇤⇤ 0.273⇤⇤⇤
(0.131) (0.091) 0.707
108 270
Woodcock Johnson Reading 0.173 0.114
(0.135) (0.092) 0.683
108 270
Regents Passed 1.000⇤⇤ 1.034⇤⇤⇤
(0.427) (0.251) 0.942
134 322
Regents Test Scores 0.529⇤⇤⇤ 0.295⇤⇤⇤
(0.094) (0.074) 0.029
117 283
College Enrollment 0.114 0.167⇤⇤
(0.110) (0.068) 0.666
91 205
Panel B. Risky Behaviors
Ever Pregnant (Female)  0.106  0.128⇤⇤⇤
(0.086) (0.048) 0.800
65 136
Incarcerated (Male)  0.051⇤⇤  0.041⇤⇤
(0.025) (0.017) 0.553
54 176
Drug/Alcohol Index  0.031  0.009
(0.109) (0.072) 0.850
112 286
Criminal Behavior Index 0.051  0.024
(0.117) (0.069) 0.535
112 287
114Table 4.10 (Continued)
The Impact of Attending the Promise Academy
Inside and Outside the Zone
Inside Outside
Zone Zone p-value
Panel C. Health (1) (2) (3)
Nutrition Index 0.176⇤ 0.085
(0.104) (0.067) 0.413
112 287
Mental Health  0.005  0.038
(0.149) (0.115) 0.835
111 284
Physical Health Index  0.061  0.039
(0.096) (0.070) 0.832
112 287
Health Behavior Index  0.011 0.050
(0.092) (0.057) 0.538
112 287
Notes: This table reports ITT estimates for youth with baseline addresses inside and outside of the Harlem Children’s
Zone. Column (1) presents ITT estimates for youth living within 400 meters of the original 24-block Zone. Column
(2) presents ITT estimates for youth living outside 400 meters of the original 24-block Zone, and Column (3) reports
a p-value of a test that the two coefﬁcients are equal. All speciﬁcations and variable deﬁnitions are identical to those
in Table 5. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The number of observations is
reported below the standard error. ⇤⇤⇤, ⇤⇤, and ⇤ indicate statistical signiﬁcance with 99%, 95%, and 90% conﬁdence,
respectively.
115Table 4.11
Comparison of Promise Academy and MTO Effects
Female Male
MTO HCZ MTO HCZ
Panel A. Woodcock Johnson (1) (2) (3) (4)
Woodcock Johnson Math 0.119 0.251⇤  0.095 0.310⇤⇤⇤
(0.095) (0.137) (0.097) (0.108)
Woodcock Johnson Reading 0.093 0.162  0.087 0.096
(0.084) (0.133) (0.096) (0.113)
Panel B. Health
Self Reported Health Poor/Fair  0.008  0.019 0.033 0.030
(0.029) (0.045) (0.019) (0.034)
Had Asthma Attack in Last Year 0.002 0.075 0.016  0.003
(0.037) (0.071) (0.032) (0.051)
BMI > 95th Percentile  0.009  0.037 0.026 0.018
(0.034) (0.060) (0.037) (0.061)
Mental Health 0.289⇤  0.088  0.095 0.056
(0.094) (0.169) (0.085) (0.138)
Panel C. Risky Behaviors
Drank Alcohol in Last 30 Days  0.060  0.062 0.063 0.017
(0.037) (0.067) (0.033) (0.071)
Smoked Marijuana in Last 30 Days  0.065⇤  0.019 0.051 0.063
(0.029) (0.067) (0.030) (0.068)
Smoked Cigarette in Last 30 Days  0.054 0.025 0.103⇤ 0.023
(0.033) (0.045) (0.032) (0.038)
Ever Been Pregnant or Caused Pregnancy 0.036  0.121⇤⇤⇤ 0.032 0.031
(0.040) (0.046) (0.035) (0.054)
Notes: This table reports ITT estimates of the Promise Academy and the Moving to Opportunity experiment evaluated
by Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007). Columns (1) and (3) are drawn from Table G2 of Kling, Liebman, and Katz
(2007). For all MTO estimates we report the effects from the full experimental treatment that included the neighbor-
hood quality restriction (as opposed to the Section 8-only treatment). Column (2) and (4) follow the speciﬁcations
described in Table 5. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The number of observa-
tions is reported below the standard error. ⇤⇤⇤, ⇤⇤, and ⇤ indicate statistical signiﬁcance with 99%, 95%, and 90%
conﬁdence, respectively.
116Toprovidefurtherevidenceonthisissue, Table11comparestheeffectsofthePromiseAcademy
with that of the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) intervention that relocated individuals from high-
poverty to lower-poverty neighborhoods while keeping the quality of schools roughly constant.
We use estimates from Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007), who evaluate the impact of MTO four to
seven years after random assignment for youth who are 15 to 20 years old.33 We also follow Kling,
Liebman, and Katz (2007) and present ITT estimates separately by gender.
The comparison with the MTO estimates suggests little overlap in the effects of neighborhood
quality compared to school quality. The Promise Academy signiﬁcantly increases Woodcock-
Johnson math scores for both males and females, while MTO has no impact, particularly for males.
The Promise Academy also signiﬁcantly decreases teen pregnancy, while MTO appears to have no
effect. Conversely, MTO increases mental health by 0.289  (0.094) for females, while there is no
impact of the Promise Academy on this measure for either males or females.
4.5.2. Test Scores and Later-Life Outcomes
This section considers the extent to which changes in test scores might explain the impact of
the Promise Academy on non-test score outcomes. Speciﬁcally, we compare the reduced form
estimates of the impact of the Promise Academy on non-test score outcomes to the effects implied
by the cross-sectional relationship between test scores and non-test score outcomes in Chetty,
Friedman, and Rockoff (2011) and the control group.
Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2011) ﬁnd that a one   increase in math or ELA achievement is
associated with a 5.6 percentage point increase in college attendance at age 20 for minorities, and
a 5.2 percentage point increase for students from low-income families. A one   increase in math
or ELA achievement is also associated with a 1.2 percentage point decrease in teen pregnancy
among both minority women and women from low-income families. The impact of the being
offered admission to the Promise Academy in the survey sample is 0.466  in eighth grade math
and 0.132  in eighth grade ELA. Using the average correlation across minorities and low-income
33Sanbonmatsu et al. (2011) and Gennetian et al. (2012) report MTO results ten to 15 years after random assign-
ment. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported by Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007).
117families from Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2011), these estimates imply that the test score
effect alone would lead to a (5.4 · (0.466 + 0.132)) = 3.3 percentage point increase in college
enrollment and a (1.2·(0.466+0.132)) = 0.7 percentage point decrease in teen pregnancy. Using
the ITT estimates in Table 5, this implies that the eighth grade test score increase can explain
((3.2/14.1) · 100) = 23.1 percent of the college enrollment effect, and ((0.7/12.1) · 100) = 6.1
percent of the pregnancy effect.
We can perform a similar exercise using the correlations identiﬁed within the lottery losers.
Following Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2011), we estimate correlations based on math and
readingscoresfromgradesfourthrougheight. Westackobservationssuchthateachrowisaunique
student-subject-grade combination, and identify the correlation between scores and outcomes after
controlling for our full set of demographic variables and a cubic in previous year’s test scores.
The correlations that we identify are larger than those estimated by Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff
(2011), though not large enough to explain the reduced form effects on non-test score outcomes.
A one   increase in math or ELA test scores is associated with a 12.4 percentage point increase in
college enrollment, a 6.9 percentage point reduction in teen pregnancy, and a 1.5 percentage point
reduction in the likelihood of being incarcerated. These correlations imply that the eighth grade
test score increase can explain (12.4 · (0.466 + 0.132)/14.1 · 100) = 52.6 percent of the college
enrollment effect, (6.9 · (0.466 + 0.132)/12.1 · 100) = 34.1 percent of the pregnancy effect, and
(1.5 · (0.466 + 0.132)/4.1 · 100) = 20.8 percent of the incarceration effect. Large standard errors
on the cross-sectional estimates means that we cannot rule out much larger and smaller impacts.
4.5.3. Other Mechanisms
Our results up until this point suggest that the Promise Academy investments drive the impact on
non-test score outcomes, but that the impacts are signiﬁcantly larger than what would be implied
by the cross-sectional relationship between test scores and later outcomes. This section consid-
ers three alternative mechanisms: (1) non-cognitive skills, (2) social networks, and (3) economic
preference parameters.
118A large body of evidence suggests that non-cognitive skills, such as self-esteem, locus of
control, and persistence, are correlated with later outcomes. Self-esteem is thought to inﬂuence
teenage pregnancy and drug use (Stewart et al. 1995, Kalil and Kunz 1999, Cornelius et al. 2004),
although there is considerable disagreement on these points (McGee and Williams 2000, Paul et al.
2000). Persistence, as measured through the 8-item scale we use in this paper, is associated with
educational attainment and fewer career changes among adults and increased GPA and reduced
grade retention among adolescents (Duckworth and Quinn 2009). Heckman et al. (2006) show
that self-esteem and locus of control are related to earnings, incarceration, and teen pregnancy. We
test this mechanism by administering the Rosenberg self esteem index, which asks respondents to
rate the extent to which they agree to a series of 14 statements such as “I certainly feel useless at
times” and “At times, I think I am no good at all” (Rosenberg 1965). Youth were also asked to
answer questions from the Rotter Locus of Control instrument, which measures the extent to which
respondents believe they control events in their lives (Rotter 1966).
Panel A of Table 12 presents results of the impact of the Promise Academy on these non-
cognitive skills. If anything, Promise Academy students report lower non-cognitive skills than the
control group. Lottery winners score 0.138  (0.110) lower on the Rosenberg self esteem index,
and 0.254  (0.113) lower on Duckworth and Quinn’s (2009) short grit scale, though only the latter
is statistically signiﬁcant. Lottery winners have Locus of Control scores that are 0.041  (0.107)
higher, but the estimate is not statistically different than zero.34
The second mechanism we explore is the impact of the Promise Academy on traditional eco-
nomic preference parameters such as risk aversion and discount rate. These measures are the
common determinants of decision-making in economic models and have been linked to a vari-
ety of later outcomes (Borghans et al. 2008). Discount rates and risk aversion are measured by
asking youth to make choices through a ﬁxed series of comparisons to infer an indifference point
34The negative impact of the Promise Academy on self esteem and grit may be the result of different reference
points regarding hard work and perseverance (Heine et al. 2002, 2008). To partially test this theory, we correlate grit
scores with Woodcock-Johnson math scores in the treatment and control groups. The correlation between grit and
Woodcock-Johnson math scores is 0.24 in the control group but -0.07 in the treatment group. This pattern of results
is inconsistent with the idea that treatment changes reference points by an equal amount, but could be explained by a
more complex story in which reference points change more for more students with higher ability.
119(Hardisty et al. 2011). For discount rates, youth were asked whether they would prefer that $40
to be mailed to them later that day or for a larger amount to be mailed in one month. The amount
was then varied until the student changed her answer or reached the extreme value of either $42 or
$55. For risk aversion, youth were given a choice between a job that paid $600 with probability
one and a second identical job that paid $1,200 with probability 0.5 and a value less than $600 with
equal probability. The latter value was then altered until a student changed her answer or reached
an extreme value of either $150 or $540. To maintain consistency with the rest of our results, we
report results for both discount rate and risk aversion in standard-deviation units.
Winning the lottery to attend the Promise Academy has no detectable effect on discount rates.
Lottery winners have discount rates that are only 0.045  (0.110) higher.35 Conversely, the Promise
Academy does seem to alter risk aversion in its students, as lottery winners report 0.248  (0.103)
higher Pratt-Arrow measures than lottery losers.
The ﬁnal mechanism we explore is the importance of changes in peer quality. A large literature
suggests that outcomes are heavily inﬂuenced by one’s peers (Sacerdote 2000, Fergusson et al.
2002, Boisjoly et al. 2006, Carrell et al. 2009, Deming 2011). We measure peer networks by
askingyouthabouttheattitudesoftheirpeergrouponcrimeandeducationalattainment. Academic
peer quality was measured by asking youth to how important it is for their friends to study, stay in
school, and attending class regularly. Risky behavior peer quality was measured by asking youth
whether their friends use drugs, drink alcohol, smoke cigarettes, steal, ﬁght, or are in a gang. We
use these responses to create summary indices of peer networks.
35Over a third of the sample selected the highest discount rate category, preferring $40 now to $55 in one month,
implying an annual discount rate of over 4,000 percent. We also ﬁnd no impact of the Promise Academy on choosing
the highest discount rate category, or choosing a rate above the median.
120Table 4.12
Impacts of the Promise Academy on Possible Mechanisms
CM ITT LATE
Panel A. Non-Cognitive Measures (1) (2) (3)
Self Esteem Index 0.000  0.138  0.224
(1.000) (0.110) (0.173)
255 403 403
Grit Index 0.000  0.254⇤⇤  0.402⇤⇤
(1.000) (0.113) (0.177)
250 398 398
Locus of Control 0.000 0.041 0.067
(1.000) (0.107) (0.166)
254 398 398
Panel B. Discount Rates and Risk Aversion
Discount Rate ( ) 0.000 0.045 0.073
(1.000) (0.110) (0.171)
257 404 404
Risk Aversion ( ) 0.000 0.248⇤⇤ 0.400⇤⇤
(1.000) (0.103) (0.162)
256 404 404
Panel C. Social Networks
Academic Activities in Network  0.003 0.094 0.148
(0.754) (0.077) (0.118)
252 398 398
Risky Behaviors in Network 0.001  0.009  0.015
(0.574) (0.069) (0.105)
252 398 398
121Table 4.12 (Continued)
Impacts of the Promise Academy on Possible Mechanisms
CM ITT LATE
Panel D. Sexual Behaviors (1) (2) (3)
Ever Had Sex 0.644  0.014  0.023
(0.480) (0.051) (0.080)
253 398 398
Condom Use 0.809  0.043  0.070
(0.395) (0.058) (0.089)
162 255 255
Other Contraceptive Use 0.466 0.068 0.110
(0.500) (0.066) (0.101)
161 255 255
Notes: This table reports estimates of the effect of attending the Promise Academy on mediating outcomes. Column
(1) reports the mean and standard deviation of each variable for the control group. Column (2) reports ITT estimates
of the impact of winning the admissions lottery. Column (3) reports LATE estimates of the impact of ever attending
the Promise Academy using a winning lottery number as an instrument. All regressions control for the baseline
demographic variables summarized in Table 3, a quadratic of 4th and 5th grade math and ELA test scores, lottery-year
indicators, indicators having a sibling enrolled in the same lottery, and a sibling-year interaction term. The sample
includes lottery entrants in the survey sample. Results for condom and contraceptive use are restricted to students who
report having ever had sex. Self Esteem is constructed from students’ responses to ten self-evaluative questions from
Rosenberg (1965). Grit is measured by the eight-question Short Grit Scale developed by Duckworth and Quinn (2009).
Locus of Control is constructed from students’ levels of agreement with four pairs of questions developed by Rotter
(1966) and adapted for the NLSY. Academic Activities in Social Network is the average of standardized measures
of the importance of studying to friends, the importance of education to friends, the importance of attending class to
friends, and the importance of getting good grades to friends. Risky Behaviors in Social Network is the average of
standardized indicators for a youth’s friends using drugs, smoking cigarettes, having stolen an item worth less than
$50 dollars, having stolen an item worth more than $50 dollars, getting in ﬁghts, carrying a handgun, or being in a
gang. Condom Use is an indicator for using a condom during the last time the student had sexual intercourse. Other
Contraceptive Use is an indicator for using a non-condom form of contraception. All variables are standardized to
have mean zero and standard deviation one in the control group. See Web Appendix B for additional information on
each variable. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The number of observations is
reported below the standard error. ⇤⇤⇤, ⇤⇤, and ⇤ indicate statistical signiﬁcance with 99%, 95%, and 90% conﬁdence,
respectively.
122Panel C of Table 12 presents results of the impact of the Promise Academy on peer quality.
Lottery winners have peers that are 0.094  (0.077) higher than lottery losers on our index mea-
suring the relative importance of various academic activities in one’s peer group, though the effect
is not statistically signiﬁcant. There is almost no difference between levels of risky behaviors in
the networks of winners and losers, with an estimated point estimate of -0.009  (0.069). Taken
together, we interpret these results as suggesting that changes in peer quality are not driving our
results, although we cannot rule out changes in other forms of social interaction.
4.6. Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate the impact of attending the Promise Academy in the Harlem Children’s
Zone on a wide range of human capital investments, risky behaviors, and health outcomes. Youth
randomly offered admission to the Promise Academy score higher on nationally-normed math
achievement tests, are more likely to enroll in college, less likely to be pregnant in their teens,
and less likely to be incarcerated. A comparison of youth living in and outside of the Zone reveal
similar impacts on these outcomes.
The education reform movement is based, in part, on two important assumptions: (1) high
quality schools can increase test scores, and (2) the well-known relationship between test scores
and adult outcomes is causal. We have good evidence that the ﬁrst assumption holds (Angrist et al.
2010, Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011, Dobbie and Fryer 2011a). This paper presents the ﬁrst pieces of
evidence that the second assumption may not only be true, but that the cross-sectional correlation
between test scores and adult outcomes may understate the true impact of a high quality school,
suggesting that high quality schools change more than cognitive ability. Importantly, the return
on investment for high-performing charter schools could be much larger than that implied by the
short-run test score increases.
A larger sample of schools, longer-term outcomes, and a better sense of the mechanisms gen-
erating the observed impacts are all ripe areas for future research.
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